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Arguably we speak now of living in a ‘carceral age’ more so than ever before. Yet how does 
this carcerality manifest directly into individual lives on the outside of carceral spaces? If the 
carceral should not be solely conceptualized in terms of its anchorage to the prison, then how 
do aspects of carcerality subsume the private space of the offender’s home? What effect do 
these aspects have upon offenders and their routines and behaviours, family and friends? A 
critical appraisal of carcerality demonstrates how diverse scholarly conversations have 
become when conceptualizing the notion of the ‘carceral’. The presence, proliferation and 
expansion of electronic monitoring (EM) is an appropriate example of the way in which the 
normative nature of the carceral age has taken shape in the West. EM manifests as an explicit 
symbol of punishment for the individual while they remain within their home and 
community, one node of the “great carceral network” which we are embedded within 
(Foucault, [1977]/1995: 298), and a notion which is already explicitly discussed in literature 
addressing community sanctions, penalties, and alternatives to confinement. However, there 
exists a greater exploration of how EM, as one tool of the carceral regime, literally and 
legitimately territorializes spaces in the community to monitor offender compliance and its 
violations. A fuller discussion must be had in terms of how EM takes place—not only 
through its protocols and procedures (whether they be directly controlled through government 
or contracted out to the private sector, the latter being the case of G4S Scotland), but also 
through its manifestation in the physical residence of the offender.  
Drawing upon ethnographic observations and qualitative interviews with inmates, this study 
contends that EM should be geographically contextualized as a form of ‘carceral territory’. 
This apt frame of reference examines how the inscription of punishment upon the personal 
territories, routines and lifestyles of inmates and their loved ones takes place, and queries 
how carceral territory further spreads the carceral out into society, permeating the homes and 
residences of those it seeks to monitor and punish. 
The capacity of research to provide understanding, give voice to unheard populations, and to 
even evoke positive social change demonstrates the need for continued ‘carceral work’. By 
inviting the respondents to speak of their struggles and movements between the prison and 
the community, this research attempts to give voice to unheard populations of society while 
attempting to comprehend experiences of the ‘carceral’ and the ‘territorial’ more effectively. 
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Taken together, this study crystallize a more capacious conception of how carceral territories 


























Lay Summary  
The experiences and practices of electronic monitoring (EM) of offenders in Scotland are 
important to consider, requiring further research investigation. These experiences provide a 
greater understanding of how EM is operated by G4S Scotland, the private security company 
contracted by the Scottish Government, as well as how EM is experienced and made sense by 
both operators and offenders alike. When taken together, this study proposes that these 
experiences of EM practices can be appropriately referred to as ‘carceral territory,’ a notion 
which focuses on feelings of punishment the offender struggles with while out in the 
community. In addition, ‘carceral territory’ can be construed as another significant tool which 
the state has at its disposal, in particular as the long reach of the penal arm from the prison 
and extending outwards into society.  
Research was conducted over a 12-month period (July 2017 – July 2018). Observations of 
monitoring practices were recorded at the National Electronic Monitoring Centre, located in 
Glasgow, Scotland from July to December 2017, while interviews with ten inmates at Her 
Majesty’s Prison (HMP) Edinburgh were contacted for discussion and interviewed from 
January until July 2017. Findings suggest that EM operators and offenders cope with the 
maintenance and compliance of EM and home curfews in diverse ways. When operators 
engage in communications with offenders on the telephone or visit offenders at their homes 
in the community, operators attempt to relate to offenders’ situations in order to manage the 
conversation on the phone or in person in a more appropriate way. Offenders attempt to 
comply with the time restrictions of the curfew by engaging in positive or negative activities 
that assists them to cope with the home confinement, to take their minds off of their current 
situation, or helps them pass the time while at home. Overall this research provides a unique 
and thought-provoking examination of the various individuals involved in and engaged with 
EM in Scotland. In doing so, this study demonstrates how Scotland, as one of many criminal 
justice systems in the West, attempts to manage impoverished or marginalized populations 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Introducing the Thesis 
Increasingly we now speak of living in a ‘carceral age’ more so than ever before (cf. 
Bosworth and Kaufman, 2011) especially with the extensive nature of surveillance, 
punishment and control permeating from beyond the traditional spaces of incarceration. Even 
now, citizens of Western, liberal democracies are consistently and routinely scrutinized and 
managed by various institutions in our society, their bodies profoundly exposed to 
surveillance, and their personal information “scanned, recorded, and registered multiple times 
in countless networked databases” (French and Smith, 2016: 4). Indeed, such thinking can 
cast light on a variety of actors, institutions, practices, and spaces, all of which intermesh and 
circulate within aspects of carcerality and various networks of surveillance (cf. Gill et al., 
2016; Moran et al., 2017a, Haggerty and Ericson, 2000; see also Hier, 2003; Jones, 2005; 
Lippert, 2009; Klauser, 2013; Haggerty et al., 2011; Moran and Schliehe, 2017b).  
Yet how does this carcerality manifest directly into individual lives on the outside of carceral 
spaces? If the carceral should not be solely conceptualized in terms of its anchorage to the 
prison (cf. Moran et al., 2017a), then how do aspects of carcerality subsume the private space 
of the offender’s home? A critical appraisal of carcerality demonstrates how diverse scholarly 
conversations have become when conceptualizing the notion of the ‘carceral’. In effect, the 
presence, proliferation and expansion of electronic monitoring (EM) is an appropriate 
example of the way in which the normative nature of the carceral age has taken shape in the 
West. 
In this spirit, there is a need to examine the EM of offenders not merely as a technology 
implemented within offender/community supervision, but as one node within a series of 
pathways, modalities and networks of surveillance, entangling people and places within 
shifting strategies and measures of community sanctions and penalties. As a form of location 
monitoring, EM uses sensors “to secure compliance with a specified routine of temporal and 
spatial locations sustained over a period of time” (Nellis, 2009c: 43). Yet how do EM 
operators and offenders makes sense of EM, and how do they feel or experience EM in their 
own ways? And following on, how do EM operators and offenders manage EM in their 
everyday lives? If offenders are to be released back into their community, certainly their 
movement about the home and community has a significant impact. Yet we must reconsider 
whether the potential ejection or tentative ‘barring’ from spaces and places would be viewed 
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by offenders as a significant form of punishment (cf. Jones, 2000). While a wide range of 
literature has theorized the far-reaching consequences of surveillance and control at the 
national and international level, there exists a research lacuna wherein studies seek to 
examine how ‘surveillance from below’ is conceptualized within the micro-geographies of 
everyday life and between criminal justice actors and professionals. Such research could 
illustrate how offenders experience EM, the criminal justice system spaces of the sheriff’s 
station, the courtroom, the social service office; and how they perceive the exclusion (or 
arguably, ‘banishment’ cf. Beckett and Herbert, 2010a, 2010b; Herbert and Beckett, 2010, 
2016) to and from particular spaces they routinely interact with in their communities.   
While countries may differ in terms of implementing radio frequency (RF) or global system 
positioning (GPS) measures with their EM programmes, the common thread through such 
implementation is the advancements of technology, communication and monitoring made 
available to governments, market industries and criminal justice agencies. Coupled with the 
increased sense of ontological insecurity faced by Western liberal democracies is the 
enhanced surveillance systems in place to regulate, control and monitor diverse populations 
to various degrees and proximities. Today, almost all individuals can be traced and located 
via modes of communication and at several nodal points within the comprehensive human 
networks they interact with and forge over time. Indeed, those individuals who consent to be 
‘tagged’ by criminal justice authorities become all too familiar with the sense of tracking, 
tracing and monitoring experienced within their daily routines, and the spaces and places they 
venture to throughout their lives generally and within the EM period specifically.  
In light of this pressing need to reconsider EM differently, and drawing upon a litany of 
literature and empirical research from various disciplines, this interdisciplinary study 
proposes an insightful way in which to examine the EM programme in Scotland. In doing so, 
a unique appreciation for what I refer to as ‘carceral territory’ can form as an apt frame of 
reference to geographically contextualize EM as a form of punishment for the offender in the 
community. The concept of carceral territory can be reasonably extended to a focus of EM, as 
it not only considers the politics and dynamics of mobility in our postmodern era but it also 
allows for a more capacious conception of how carcerality and territoriality manifest in 
different ways and across a wide range of sites used in the Scottish EM programme. 
Furthermore, by capturing the observations and experiences of carceral territory in many 
ways, this concept supplements the extensive interrogation of carceral mobilities within and 
beyond the vast latitudes of carceral geography (cf. Turner and Peters, 2017). Therefore, this 
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project offers evidence of and critiques the normality of contemporary surveillance, and it is 
through carceral territory that we further extend considerations of carcerality beyond the 
conventional anchorage of the prison and state-sanctioned imprisonment to consider the 
people, objects, and practices which comes into contact with the operation and management 
of EM surveillance in Scotland.  
 
Yet Scotland is but one nation in a vast array of many considering the expansion of their own 
carceral states, by which we can consider the ‘carceral state’ here as a collection of 
institutional configurations and actors all of whom prioritize punishment alongside 
containment, detention, and/or incarceration in order to manage poverty and marginalization, 
rather than to ameliorate these social issues outright (cf. Villanueva, 2017b; see also Beckett 
and Murakawa, 2012; Peck, 2003; Wacquant, 2009). To a certain extent, this exploratory 
project provides a way in which to reconsider sites of power and knowledge (cf. Youngblood 
Jackson, 2013) where EM as surveillant technology both operates and monitors those it has 
been informed to watch by the carceral state. By providing a cartography of sorts which 
illuminates forms of confinement and mobility under the shadowy auspices of the carceral 
state, the aim of this study is to trace out some of the forces at play in the reproduction of the 
‘carceral’ beyond the anchorage to the prison. In effect, it is through EM that carceral 
territory is created, sustained and managed in the homes, physical residences, and personal 
territories of offenders and their loved ones. Furthermore, by demonstrating the how EM 
operates in form, function, and delivery, and coupling this with experiences by those whom 
are under surveillance by the carceral state, the everyday workings of criminal justice actors 
engaging with surveillant technologies hooks up with the extra-territoriality of carceral 
spaces, the reign of the carceral state and its increasing spread throughout society.  
While Nellis (2018) contends that considering forms of mobility monitoring like EM as 
something carceral is a ‘semantic stretch,’ I respectfully diverge from this view. Macro-level 
research studying shifts in “vision[s] of ‘corporate futurism’ in contemporary criminal 
justice” (Nellis, 2018: 140) have their place; indeed, “the commercial exploitation of, and 
government receptiveness to, digital connectivity is far from played out –and…this is the 
milieu from which EM technologies derive their appeal” (Nellis, 2018: 140). 
Notwithstanding, this project is an attempt to examine EM within the minutiae of everyday 
life, and to focus upon the people, places, and practices which make EM possible. 
Geographically contextualizing EM as a form of carceral territory sheds light on the coerced 
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mobilities and power relations inherent in those surveying and those who are under EM 
surveillance. As a novel frame of reference, carceral territory can call attention to how 
carcerality makes us feel as social beings; it can be considered as a creative extension of the 
carceral state that engages throughout the successes and struggles in our daily lives; and at 
the macro-level, the acknowledgement of carceral territory in our lives allows us another way 
in which to query the current state of penal affairs in our society, and to question where the 
societal spread of the carceral is taking us.   
While the next chapter devotes significant attention to the historical background and thematic 
debates encircling EM, it becomes pertinent to briefly highlight and draw upon aspects of the 
EM literature which frames the current study. Doing so provides the preliminary 
justifications and necessary foundation to which a carceral territorial framework of EM can 
be conceived, a focus to which I now turn.  
What is Electronic Monitoring? 
When considering the enhanced capabilities of surveillance and the effects such 
enhancements could have on its subjects, Nellis and colleagues (2013: 4-5) define electronic 
monitoring or EM as “technology [which] must be understood as nothing more or less than a 
form of remote surveillant control, a means of flexibly regulating the spatial and temporal 
schedules of an offender’s life.” The technology has a chameleon-like character of a multi-
usable device, and can be presented as a solution to different types of penal problems. As 
Nellis and colleagues (2013: 5) argue, the intended effect of monitoring is to remind the 
offender that “he [sic] is being watched (continuously or haphazardly and regularly), and that 
his compliance or otherwise with the spatial and temporal regulations that the court or prison 
has imposed on him will be relayed to a judicial or penal authority.” Should the offender 
‘breach’ the conditions imposed on them within the EM period, they will be subject to a more 
severe penalty (or recalled to prison) if a ‘violation’ has been deemed to occur. There are 
several uses of EM in criminal justice systems, such as during the pretrial phase, during 
parole, or in conjunction with other sanctions (e.g. imprisonment). In the latter case, the 
offender receives a prison sentence and is then placed on the EM system when released back 
into society (Payne and Gainey, 2004).  
As a relatively new way of controlling (and punishing) offenders in the community, EM has 
been taken up in varying degrees (either as localized experiments or nationwide schemes) in 
approximately 25 countries over the last 25 years (Nellis, 2009b). In its original and 
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predominate form, EM is implemented alongside of curfews and home detention as forms of 
offender supervision in the community. Generally, the offender has a tag attached to their 
ankle (and in rare cases, the tag is worn on the wrist) (Nellis, 2009b; Nellis, 2013a). EM can 
exist as a generic term or several remote location-checking technologies which each make 
possible the micro-management of offenders’ (or in some cases, pre-trial detainees’) 
schedules and locations at various points in the criminal justice process (Nellis, 2013a). 
Similar to the Anglo-Welsh approach of privatized EM service provision (cf. Lilly and Nellis, 
2013), the systemic organization of EM in Scotland involves the installation and 
deinstallation of ‘tagging’ technology, coupled with monitoring and reporting to statutory 
authorities. The current contractual framework revolves around close oversight between the 
national private security provider (which is currently Guard 4 Securior, otherwise known as 
G4S) and the Scottish Government Justice Department (aptly named the Community Justice 
Department). Such close oversight is paired with ‘tight’ accountability “via real-time access 
to the contractor’s data on all tagged offenders, monthly performance audits and regular 
meetings with managers” (Nellis, 2016a: 184, cited in Graham and McIvor, 2017: 65).  
Why Study Electronic Monitoring? 
Described as one of the ‘successful areas’ in the development of non-custodial options, 
Bottoms and colleagues (2004) contend that the 1990s were defined as the ‘new generation’ 
of community penalities. This generation emphasized punishment in the community and the 
enforcement of orders to ensure that offenders receive and experience the intended liberty 
restrictions. The authors point out that this era was characterized by a ‘managerial revolution’ 
in the probation service where the contracting-out of some of probation services to the private 
sector was encouraged, coupled with a growing reliance on the use of technology to enforce 
the requirements of community orders (Bottoms et al., 2004; see also Nellis et al., 2013). This 
generation introduced the ‘creative mixing’ of different kinds of interventions, all of which 
aimed for a combination of more control and individualized sentences. A whole contractual 
and commercial infrastructure has grown around EM, and has created a new category of 
penal subjects—of whom are remotely surveilled—which are “required to comply with 
regulations that have had no real precedent in community supervision” (Nellis et al., 2013: 8).  
More than ten years on from Bottoms and colleagues (2004), scholars are still extensively 
researching EM’s potential in having a transformative impact on the nature of offender 
supervision. However, as mentioned above, such technological advancements are not created 
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in a vacuum; there are deeper social, economical, and political reasons why different varieties 
of this technology are introduced and sustained (cf. Bülow, 2014). Many countries view the 
attractiveness of EM for policy-related reasons, in terms of it reducing prison population and 
recidivism rates. Yet the reduction of these burgeoning populations and rates are not always a 
result (Nellis et al., 2013). It may be more the case that EM technology satisfies political 
intentions in the penal field, whether we refer to ‘tough on crime’ political agendas, 
deterrence, and incapacitation, or respecting human rights and dignity by avoiding 
incarceration when- and wherever appropriate.  
Nevertheless, a common thread throughout the various reasons countries differ in terms of 
their use of EM technology is that, to a greater or lesser degree, the emergence of this 
technology is challenging the traditional approaches to offender supervision. While it is not 
well understood yet as to the full nature of this challenge—and its likely outcomes and 
consequences—it is apparent that such a challenge has both theoretical and practical 
dimensions within and between disciplines, including but not limited to criminology, 
sociology, carceral geography, and criminal justice studies. Although the initial hostility and 
scepticism towards EM by critical observers has been and continues to be receding, the 
technological advances seen within the West, coupled with the (in)securities of globalization, 
is consistently assessed and examined throughout interdisciplinary academic communities. 
The trajectories of processes, practices and policies within and between criminal justice 
institutions and carceral regimes indicate an ongoing interest in surveillance and alternatives 
to incarceration—namely community sanctions and their subsequent and associated penalties. 
Indeed, the current study is not immune to the clarion calls by researchers to examine the 
increase of surveillant technologies and techniques of control generally and EM specifically 
in Western democracies (cf. Lyon, 2001, 2003). Such an expansion warrants further 
investigation, a discussion to which I now turn.    
The Normality of Contemporary Surveillance and the Growth of the Private 
Sector 
Most often, surveillance is thought of as undesirable. The fact that we continue to hear 
frequent cautions about ‘Big Brother’ or ‘1984’ speaks to the continued salience of Orwell’s 
([1949]/2008) worrisome tale. Presenting us with a prescient and dystopic vision of how he 
believed surveillant technologies would intensify and advance, even he could not have 
envisioned the remarkable marriage of optics and computers which we see in contemporary 
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social orderings. When new surveillance technologies and practices are introduced, popular 
culture reflects disturbing scenarios all of which suggest that surveillance is something to be 
feared (Kohm and Gacek, 2016). Yet the rise of the Internet and other digital technologies 
has shifted Western society into the age of a new, highly mediated visibility (Brighenti, 2006, 
2010). Surveillance has become an intriguing paradox, in which many people across the 
world have become fascinated by such emergent surveillant technologies and practices 
(especially in the context of social media production, consumption and popular culture—see 
for example, Nellis, 2003b). However, simultaneous these same people feel very threatened 
by the same apparatus and contend, for example, that privacy rights should be balanced with 
the use of closed circuit television (CCTV) surveillance within public spaces (Norris and 
Armstrong, 1999; see also Lyon, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2004; Smith, 2004, 2008, 2014).  
In terms of EM, both Marx (2007) and Lilly and Nellis (2013) have adamantly encouraged 
the examination of EM in the context of “a broad swathe of techno-corrections,” as well as in 
relation to the widespread surveillance practices affecting law-abiding citizens as much—if 
not more than—as offenders (Lilly and Nellis, 2013: 34; see also Graham and McIvor, 2015, 
2017; Nellis et al., 2013 for further examinations). Specifically, Lilly and Nellis (2013) 
rightly contend that the ascendancy of the neoconservatives in the United States undoubtedly 
boosted the principle and practice of surveillance as a general strategy for securing political 
and social order. Indeed, the horrific events of 9/11 arguably provided a pretext for 
implementing widespread surveillance practices that neoconservatives might not otherwise 
would have had, but the foundations of “techno-utopianism” preceded the terrorist attack 
(Lilly and Nellis, 2013: 34).  
According to Lilly and Nellis, neoconservative developments affected the use of EM in three 
distinct ways. First, a “cultural mood” was created with the implementation of EM, in which 
the concept of surveillance generally became (even more) emotionally and intellectually 
appealing as “a means of dealing with threats to social order” (Lilly and Nellis, 2013: 35). In 
effect, the corollary of this mood, even within the local criminal justice context, was that if 
anyone argued against surveillance practices, they risked becoming perceived as ‘against the 
grain’ of society and all the morals and values ascribed to it (see Nellis, 2007a for the British 
equivalent). Related to the first tenet, the second neoconservative development demonstrates 
a discourse which arguably blurs (to an extent) the distinction between ‘ordinary citizen’ and 
‘terrorist’ as threats to social order and the democratic status quo (see also Lyon, 2003, 2004). 
Such neoconservative discourses weakened still further “the already precarious claims of 
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humanistic (constructive and supportive) interventions with ordinary criminals, implicitly 
displacing or subordinating them in favour of ostensibly more controlling ones” like EM 
(Lilly and Nellis, 2013: 35). Finally, the demand for increased surveillance capacity by both 
the political and military institutions boosted technological innovation within surveillance 
industries, and given the pre-existing connections between criminal justice and military 
institutions, and the commercial technological vendors who service these institutions, such 
linkages inevitably created “new surveillance options for correctional and law enforcement 
agencies” (Lilly and Nellis, 2013: 35; see also Nellis, 2009b, 2010; Nellis et al., 2013).  
In sum, EM appears to have a vastly greater significance in a high-tech penal future, as no 
doubt EM does represent a new penal modality which is distinct from both incarceration and 
other intermediate sanctions. Customized from the “all-pervasive networks of information 
and communication technology” (Lilly and Nellis, 2013: 36), EM, whether in its RF or GPS 
forms, constitutes a surveillance-based intervention unlike other, alternative forms of 
offender supervision in the community (cf. Graham and McIvor, 2015, 2017; McIvor and 
Graham, 2016a, 2016b). Per Lilly and Nellis (2013), it can safely be said that EM is less 
relational than traditional loads of community supervision (thanks to the increasing 
probation/parole caseloads which can inhibit the formation of relationships), as well as 
introduces into this supervision a novel element of ‘the virtual’ not seen before within 
normative forms of supervision (cf. Nellis et al., 2013).  
Criminological and criminal justice literature in particular have shown that EM is a 
qualitatively different experience of punishment from community service or probation, and 
“the experiences of the many thousands of offenders who have now experienced [EM] cannot 
be discounted or minimized” (Lilly and Nellis, 2013: 36; see also Bottomley et al., 2004; 
Nellis, 2003a, 2009c; Hucklesby, 2008, 2009, 2011, 2013). While goals of retribution and 
deterrence may have been harnessed and repurposed within the use of EM technology, it has 
become a significant penal innovation, due in part to neoconservative discourses 
championing surveillant practices which ostensibly target and monitor citizens and terrorists, 
allies and enemies; the “affordances of a new global communication architecture” (Lilly and 
Nellis, 2013; 36; see also Nellis, 2010); and finally, the development of Western penal 
systems becoming predominantly more ‘panoptic’ or ‘telematic’ (cf. Foucault, [1977]/1995; 
Bogard, 1996; Castells, 1996). 
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Yet the growth, development and expansion of EM cannot be properly understood purely as a 
solely penal initiative. As Nellis (2009b: 104) argues, something approximating to EM had 
been imagined and desired by “electronic engineers, behavioural psychologists, and science 
fiction writers from the mid-20th century onward (and imagined and feared by liberal 
intellectuals who took their cues from George Orwell).” However, EM could have never been 
actualized or mainstreamed without “the prior availability of miniature electronic components 
and a cable and wireless communication infrastructure that had been developed for purposes 
quite independent of crime control” (Nellis, 2009b: 104). Indeed, the expansion of global 
capitalism—such as the processes which include, but not limited to, the compression of time 
and distance by digital technologies to facilitate vast flows of data, primarily to increase 
capital accumulation, extend and consolidate economic, social and political networks, and to 
enhance consumption overall—is invariably seen “as the driver of telematic society” (Nellis 
2009b: 105). Just as commercial organizations can now gauge when face-to-face interactions 
and encounters are essential to business and when communication can now be ‘virtual,’ so 
too can cost-conscious crime controllers now consider the different grades of presence that 
are available, and weigh these against the costs when deciding how offenders should be 
supervised (cf. Mitchell, 1999). This ‘economy of presence’ has become a significant factor 
in the way that EM rivals normative probation (and prison) (Mitchell, 1999). Where 
supervision is deemed to require nothing more than an impersonal transaction—a gesture of 
acquiescence, the delivery (or exchange) of information, or proof of compliance with a 
particular rule—not only do social workers become unnecessary, “but telepresence, even 
automated telepresence, may be deemed sufficient” (Nellis, 2009b: 106). Arguably, we could 
say this is now the late modern life our telematic society leads and continues to advance. 
More than ever before, society is now permeated with location monitoring technologies, “a 
multiplicity of embedded tags and sensors that can rapidly identify what things are, where 
they are, and (in varying degrees) regulate their movement” (Nellis, 2009b: 106).  
Outline of the Thesis  
Chapter 2 begins by examining the development of EM technologies and modalities in the 
United States and then turning the attention towards the United Kingdom, in particular 
England & Wales and Scotland. It also explores the variable cultural perceptions of EM 
between the US and the UK, and reflects upon EM’s historical developments and debates 
advanced widely within EM scholarship at large. 
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Chapter 3 unpacks research on carcerality, examining the ways in which the ‘carceral’ has 
been advanced and discussed within academic scholarship. The recent spatial turn within 
criminology and prison sociology (cf. Campbell, 2012a, 2012b; Hayward, 2004, 2012, 2016a, 
2016b; Kindynis, 2014) increasingly draws upon geographical understandings of space and 
spatiality as “multiplicitous and heterogeneous, lived and experienced” (Moran, 2015b: 7; see 
also Pickering, 2014). In effect, an increasingly interdisciplinary approach has emerged 
within the social sciences, opening a space for the coalescence of work under the banner of 
carceral geography (cf. Moran et al., 2011; Moran, 2013a, 2013b, 2014, 2015b).  The purpose 
of this chapter “is to describe, rather than to prescribe, the nature of… carceral geography” in 
terms of its emergence within existing geographical scholarship, as well as some of the 
synergies already apparent within and between cognate disciplines utilizing the more 
‘established’ themes of carceral geographical inquiry (Moran, 2015b: 8; italics in original). 
By geographically contextualizing the people, places, and practices associated with the EM 
programme in Scotland, this chapter suggests that an exploration of EM through carceral 
geography benefits carceral territory as a notion for further investigation.  
Building upon carceral geographical research in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 examines the 
significance of territory to the current study. By drawing upon Sack’s (1981, 1983) and 
Brighenti’s (2006, 2007, 2010) respective research on territoriality, I argue for a greater 
appreciation of territoriality for exploring the EM programme in Scotland. Following this, I 
then make a theoretical case for ‘carceral territory’ by connection Sack’s work on territorial 
tendencies with Moran and colleague’s (2017a) insightful examination of conditions of 
carcerality. Doing so highlights how EM, as a form of carceral territory is the inscription of 
punishment upon the personal territories, routines and lifestyles of inmates and their loved 
ones.  
Chapter 5 discusses the methods and methodologies underpinning the study. I endeavour to 
engage in a discussion which proposes that both ‘institutional ethnography’ (Walby, 2005a, 
2005b, 2006, 2007, 2013; Taber, 2010) and ‘ethnographic commuting’ (Büscher and Urry, 
2009; Murray, 2009; Jungnickel, 2014) are key methodologies to the present study, as the 
pair provide insight into both EM operators and offenders engage with surveillant 
technologies in their daily lives. Following this, data collection and analysis are then 
discussed for both (1) fieldnotes and ethnographic observations; and (2) conducting inmate 
interviews at Her Majesty’s Prison (HMP) Edinburgh, located in Edinburgh, Scotland.  
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Chapter 6 is the first of three analyses chapters. This chapter focuses on ethnographic 
observations of the National Electronic Monitoring Centre (NEMC), based in Glasgow, 
Scotland. Drawing upon institutional ethnographic and fieldnotes literature, respectively, I 
discuss and reflect upon how EM generally takes place at the NEMC, in terms of the 
protocols and procedures conducted by the G4S monitoring officers (MOs) behind the 
NEMC computer screens.  
The second of three analyses chapters is Chapter 7. Supplementing ethnographic observations 
in NEMC, this chapter further explores how EM takes place by venturing out into Scotland. 
Partnered with a mobile G4S MO, I receive first-hand experience of how EM is installed, 
deinstalled and reinstalled in monitored persons (MPs) homes.  
Chapter 8 is the final of three analyses chapters. Inviting those individuals whom are 
subjected to EM surveillance allows me a further opportunity to examine EM as a form of 
carceral territory. By conducting semi-structured interviews with ten inmates at HMP 
Edinburgh, I engage in a wider discussion of power, space, and mobility as they connect to 
carceral territory. Following this, I reflect upon themes which arose from the data collected. 
This includes further analysis of the commonsense and commonplace characteristics of EM 
as a carceral territory, coupled with a greater examination of how timepass and penal waiting 
ensure offender compliance through the EM curfew. I then highlight how the feelings of 
‘sticking,’ or being ‘stuck’ run parallel to aspects of carcerality, in term of turn the 
respondents’ struggles with stigma or sticking to home or to ‘watch-time.’ I also discuss 
whether routines changed for both respondents and their loved ones, and couple this with an 
examination of respondents’ general freedom and mobility felt outside of curfew times and 
through transient living. Such a discussion must also take into consideration the ‘unruly’ 
mobilities experienced by respondents.  
Chapter 9 is the concluding chapter of the study, which reviews the significance of carceral 
territory demonstrated in the project. Supplemented by existing criminological and carceral 
geographical scholarship, this project brings an understanding of spatial processes and flows 
between as well as within locales, as well as a desire to “broaden the conceptual and 
analytical contexts in which imprisonment is situated” (Mitchelson, 2012: 148). I also address 
the limitations of the study, and consider future considerations of this work. My aim is to 
highlight the importance of carceral territory in amongst the overwhelming and overarching 
societal spread of the ‘carceral.’ As an apt frame of reference, carceral territory supplements 
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brilliant and diverse scholarship continually reconsidering the expedience of the spread of 
carcerality throughout society. As a creative extension of the carceral state, a focus upon EM 
as a form of carceral territory also cautiously queries whether it is now the time to reconsider 
the reduction, reversal, or outright raze of the carceral state (cf. Gottschalk, 2015). By 
stressing the linkages between people, punishment and places, the originality of the project 
lies in the notion of carceral territory, and the wider yet intricate geographies of 
marginalization with which people, punishment, and places are both intimately and 





















Chapter 2: Historical Background and Literature Review   
Introduction 
Since the 1980s, the EM of offenders has been successfully introduced in over 30 countries 
worldwide, having originated in the United States, and with England and Wales being the 
first jurisdiction in Europe to introduce EM in 1989 (Nellis et al., 2013: 2). Historical and 
prominent debates about electronic monitoring (EM) have tended to foreground a focus on 
EM technologies and modalities. The most common questions have tended to revolve around 
“the effectiveness of a particular use of EM in seeking to reduce recidivism rates, and its 
utility as an ‘alternative’ to prison both to increase rates of diversion and decarceration and to 
decrease incarceration rates and costs” (Graham and McIvor, 2017: 63). Indeed, as Nellis and 
colleagues (2013: 3) argue, looking across different jurisdictions supports this view; EM has 
certainly been regarded as a “near-panacea” by governments seeking quick and cheap—but at 
the same time publicly credible—solutions to overburdened prison systems.  
To this end, a further discussion of EM’s historical development and prominent debates are 
warranted, a discussion which this chapter provides. EM has been examined as an exemplary 
expression of managerialist tendencies in criminal justice (cf. Bottoms, 1995; Jones, 2000), 
and its rise is certainly coterminous with the emergence of the penal strategies that Feeley 
and Simon (1994) dubbed ‘actuarial justice’. In other words, such strategies were often 
presented to American and British publics as “merely pragmatic and depoliticized, concerned 
primarily with efficient risk management and cost-effectiveness, and detached from 
traditional penological aims” (Nellis et al., 2013: 4). However, aided and abetted by skeptical 
media, these publics became more inclined to view EM as a “mild and easily evaded form of 
control” and disinclined to see EM being sentenced to remain at home as a severe punishment 
(Nellis et al., 2013: 4). In effect, we must take account of the variable cultural perceptions of 
EM’s actual punitiveness, and reflect upon EM’s historical developments and debates 
advanced widely within EM scholarship at large.  
This chapter begins by examining the development of EM technologies and modalities in the 
United States. The significance of the Schwitzgebels’ early research (cf. Schwitzgebel et al., 
1964) advanced proto-forms of tracking subjects not yet witnessed within the realm of 
American crime control, setting the stage for additional scholars and authorities—most 
notably Judge Jack Love—to further stimulate the development of an operational version and 
the practical uses of EM in the United States. Following this, I venture across the Atlantic to 
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the United Kingdom, and focus upon the origins and development which took place in 
England & Wales and Scotland. While EM has expanded and progressed at a substantial rate 
within the UK, there is a distinction between the developments of the technology within the 
Anglo-Welsh model of criminal justice which differs from the Scottish context of EM. The 
variable cultural perceptions and development of EM provides a solid foundation in which I 
then turn to a further examination of the pressing issues arising from scholarly debates 
concerning EM. Reflections on the diverse landscape of EM across the US and the UK, and 
the intensified spread of EM going forward will conclude the chapter.  
Star-Spangled Tracking: EM in the United States 
While currently there is no country in which EM constitutes the dominant approach to 
offender supervision in the community, the national and global development of EM 
technology is by no means insignificant, nor does it show any signs of waning (Nellis et al., 
2013). Such development can certainly be accredited to the political and commercial 
momentum this technology has gained within the last few decades (Nellis, 2009b: 102). 
Electronic monitoring has its origins in the United States, and it is Lilly and Nellis’ (2013) 
definitive account of its emergence and developmental trajectory which provides us with a 
comprehensive understanding the beginnings of ‘techno-corrections’ in the late modern 
world, and the greater recognition of the potential science and technology have to transform 
western, liberal democratic societies (cf. Moran, 2002).  The now somewhat distant era in 
which the prototypes of EM first arose was infused by vigorous and confident public debate 
regarding such potential found within science and technology, and the extent to which this 
potential could transform human nature through technological ingenuity and prowess (cf. 
Harrington, 1965; Toffler, 1970; Crowe, 1972; Corn and Horrigan, 1984). As Lilly and Nellis 
(2013: 22) argue, the forerunners of what came to be called EM were born “in a moment 
when techno-utopian tropes were particularly powerful, and gained initial credence because 
of them.”  
Scholarship generally agrees that the origins of EM began with the pioneering research of 
Harvard behavioural psychologist Ralph K. Schwitzgebel. Aided by his brother Robert, 
Schwitzgebel tested “portably but unwieldy (and short-range) tracking devices (which 
permitted bi-directional communication) on students, psychiatric patients and offenders” both 
in Cambridge and Boston, Massachusetts between 1964 and 1970 (Lilly and Nellis, 2013: 22-
23). Containing equipment adapted from a guided missile system, the devices enabled the 
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research to “unobtrusively” record the individual in question and ascertain where said 
individual spends their time (Schwitzgebel, 1963: 13). In effect, this technology was patented 
and the findings were subsequently published in authoritative scientific and legal journals (for 
example, see Schwitzgebel et al., 1964; Schwitzgebel, 1964, 1966, 1968, 1969, 1970, 1971; 
Schwitzgebel and Bird, 1970; Schwitzgebel and Schwitzgebel, 1973).  
Interestingly, the time in which this work took place was predominated by the behavioural 
psychology of B.F. Skinner (1948). It was widely thought during this time by many academic 
social scientists that Skinner’s research on ‘operant conditioning’ could have a significant and 
transformative impact in the arenas of education and crime control. Skinner was a great 
inventor of gadgets to aid his research, and coupled with the Schwitzgebels’ work on 
‘psychotechnology,’ formed an “intellectual niche” which brought together both behavioural 
psychologists and scholars engaging in pioneering research on neuroscience (Lilly and Nellis, 
2013: 23). For instance, Delgado’s (1969) work sought to reduce the violent impulses men 
experience through experiments which engaged in ‘electrical stimulation of the brain’ (ESB). 
Indeed, the Schwitzgebels had themselves once entertained the notion of subjecting 
substance-using offenders to electronic stimulation technologies, which would resemble 
“small portable shock [apparati] with electrodes attached to the wrist” (Schwitzgebel, 
undated, quoted in Mitford, 1974: 226). However, such an idea was eventually discarded, as 
the Schwitzgebels maintained that their work should be implemented for rehabilitative 
purposes (Lilly and Nellis, 2013: 24). The Schwitzgebels hoped that by monitoring the 
movements of offenders and praising the offenders for staying within agreed zones and 
schedules, they would be able to provide the ‘positive reinforcement’ that Skinnerians argued 
was essential to effecting behavioural change. The Schwitzgebels wanted their technology to 
have a more practical application than what was seen in the research of other scholars 
working within the psychotechnology movement (cf. Meyer, 1971; Ingraham and Smith, 
1972); however, they were less convinced that ESB could be utilized and applied both 
outside of the laboratory and in the real world.   
Notwithstanding, the Schwitzgebels’ work advanced proto-forms of tracking not previously 
witnessed within the realm of American crime control (Lilly and Nellis, 2013). The 
possibility to monitor mobile subjects and pinpointing individuals in a small town or crowded 
city seemed at the time like a significantly spectacular application of technology and science. 
However, criminal justice agencies did not adopt such technologies, and they were not 
subject to further development or research, and did not find commercial sponsors to progress 
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the psychotechnological momentum further (Lilly and Nellis 2013: 24). In respect of the 
Schwitzgebels’ technology, Mainprize’s (1996) contention was that the Schwitzgebels’ 
emphasis on their technology as a form of rehabilitation had conflicted and clashed with the 
punitive shift in penal responsibility and control. Arguably, what brought the 
‘psychotechnology’ movement and the proto-forms of EM to a fall in support—and 
somewhat of an abrupt end—was the “burgeoning backlash against the illiberal implications 
of behaviouralism (as expressed by Skinner (1971)), the ascendancy of the personalist and 
libertarian values of the counterculture and the exposure and critique of military funding of 
university research” (Lilly and Nellis, 2013: 24). Indeed, the Schwitzgebels’ own work may 
have been relatively inoffensive in comparison to other scholars in the movement, but 
ultimately the Schwitzgebels’ ideas became unquestionably tainted because of the factors 
mentioned above. As Morris (1974) indicates, most community corrections and rehabilitation 
professionals could not reconcile the surveillance produced from such technologies with the 
social work practices they engaged with. In effect, more professionals agreed, becoming 
increasingly confident that parole and probation services could be improved, and 
incarceration reduced, without recourse to technology (cf. Morris, 1974).   
While there was not governmental or professional attempt to revive interest in the 
Schwitzgebels’ research, a district judge in Albuquerque surreptitiously revived EM as we 
have come to know the technology. In 1977, Judge Jack Love became interested in ways of 
facilitating temporary release for young adult offenders from the local New Mexican 
penitentiary. Love randomly began collecting information on location monitoring, as he 
realized that public confidence required knowing where offenders were outside of the prison. 
Furthermore, it became clear that if there existed the potential to create specialized location 
monitoring programs, that such programs should be influenced and formed from broader 
social, political and technological changes within society (Payne and Gainey, 2000). Such 
collected information included “swipe-card systems in supermarkets, [and] animal and cargo 
tracking technologies” (Lilly and Nellis: 2013: 24). Interestingly, Love found a copy of a 
Spiderman comic strip which had been syndicated in a local newspaper. The comic strip 
depicted the superhero combating a villain who has fitted Spiderman with a (potentially 
explosive) tracking device to his wrist. This tracking device allowed the villain to offend with 
impunity and wreak havoc on the city as he could now stay one step ahead of Spiderman. 
Indeed, many punishment scholars agree that the origin of EM famously began with Love’s 
consideration of this comic book, and that the Spiderman comics of the sixties generally 
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provided the creative foundation of what was needed to think about creating an electronic 
monitoring sanction within the criminal justice system (Muncie, 1990; Lyon, 1994; Payne 
and Gainey, 2000; Nellis, 2006; Gable, 2007; Lilly and Nellis, 2013; Bülow, 2014).  
Love deserves credit for both stimulating the development of an operational version of EM 
and making the first practical use of the technology. In effect Love became the originator of 
the modern form of EM in the United States, and stimulated international interest and 
development in EM technology (Lilly and Nellis, 2013; see also Burrell and Gable, 2008 for 
a further review). Within the United States, EM developed largely in the context of probation 
services (sometimes administered by police or sheriff’s departments), and used EM 
equipment bought or loaned from private vendors (Lilly and Nellis, 2013). EM became a 
predominant development in such services, as probation was mostly administered at the state 
level, with the remaining probation services split between state and county, or otherwise 
operated by the counties themselves. From the 1970s onwards, the primary emphasis of 
probation became intertwined with offering greater public protection and reducing prison use, 
of which operated under the rubric of ‘community corrections,’ such as the early community 
corrections innovation of ‘house arrest’ (and its variants, such as home detention, home 
confinement, and home incarceration) (Lilly and Nellis, 2013; for a further review see Nellis 
et al., 2013).  
However, EM did not develop solely as a technical means of making house arrest possible or 
viable; in fact, the technology became a crucial part of the burgeoning and intensive 
probation and parole movement taking place during the 1980s (Morris and Tonry, 1990). 
Such a movement characterized a shift from ‘community corrections’ to ‘intermediate 
sanctions,’ which aimed to not only reduce overcrowding in prison, but also to address 
recidivism and prison operation costs. This shift required probation services to become part 
of a control system which openly supported punishment and surveillance (in other words, 
deterrence, retribution, and incapacitation). In effect, this shift marked the transition from 
therapeutic to more controlling forms of probation which allowed politicians—Democrats 
and Republicans alike—to get ‘tough on crime’ while simultaneously exert control, save 
money, and rhetorically exaggerate EM’s punitive characteristics (Lilly and Nellis, 2013).  
However, the intermediate sanctions movement initiated a shift in the US which, largely for 
commercial organizations, gave an incentive to transgress boundaries typically occupied by 
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voluntary (i.e. non-for-profit) and statutory organizations. As Maxfield and Baumer (1990: 
522) indicate:  
Electronic monitoring equipment has been developed by private entrepreneurs 
and aggressively marketed as a solution to prison and jail overcrowding. Vendors 
extolling the virtues of this equipment present a case that is very attractive; the 
systems are foolproof, safe, punitive, cheap and can reduce institutional 
overcrowding. Such a sales pitch presented to potential clients desperate for 
viable alternatives is almost certain to generate sales.  
In essence, the constitution and continuation of commercial organizations (and arguably their 
profit motives) became significant in the advancement of EM in the US. Over time, emphasis 
was gradually increased to focus on the “impressive technical specifications of the 
equipment… [and] on the ways [EM] could actually help with the supervision of offenders” 
(Lilly and Nellis, 2013: 27). Such an expansion included both large commercial organizations 
and the small, local companies trying to offer competition within the EM US-based market, 
and as the technology increased in appeal to correctional system administrators what had 
resulted was the creation of the ‘corrections-commercial complex’ (cf. Lilly and Knepper, 
1992, 1993; Lilly and Deflem, 1996). The corrections-commercial complex is an endlessly 
recomposing and amorphous ensemble of profit-driven organizations, all of whom are 
contracted to provide services at various levels of state administration. Indeed, information, 
resources (financial and otherwise) and influence flow between for-profit companies and 
organizations on the one hand and professional and federal agencies on the other. Such a 
complex typically operates without public scrutiny, and both lobbies for and exercises 
enormous influence over corrections policy (Lilly and Knepper, 1992, 1993). In effect, the 
commercial aspects of American continually emphasize the market-driven dimensions of 
criminal justice and the “political and power-related aspects of penality” (Lilly and Deflem, 
1996: 5).  
Per Lilly and Nellis (2013: 28), “[a]s the political climate became more punitive, it became 
marginally easier to argue for the slightly earlier-than-otherwise release of those already 
imprisoned [onto a subsequent period of EM] than it was to argue against the use of a prison 
sentence in the first place.” It had also become easier for politicians to draw upon ‘technical 
fixes’ to corrections practices generally and probation services specifically and “could so 
easily be presented to electorates as more punitive than mere probation” (Lilly and Nellis, 
2013: 29) and throughout the 1990s more probation and parole officers gradually conceded 
that EM would be a potentially beneficial tool so long as it was appropriately paired with 
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other forms of supervision (Lilly and Nellis, 2013: 29). While EM has been discursively 
(re)presenting EM as a form of probation with a higher degree of control, scholars such as 
Enos and colleagues (1992) argued that EM should not be considered as something alien or 
extraneous to probation; rather, EM technologies can be assimilated into probation services, 
and have the potential to genuinely enhance the quality of offender supervision. They argued 
that there existed a “false dichotomy” between counselling and surveillance, and that such 
technology, “[freeing] the probation officer to concentrate his or her efforts… [on] 
counselling” could bridge and potentially reconcile these traditionally polarized notions 
(Enos et al., 1992: 159). For other probation academics, the overarching theme of dissent 
relayed that such a reconciliation by way of EM was a compromise gone too far. For 
instance, Clear (1994: 109) contended that the shift towards EM technology within probation 
services was a certain exemplification of punishment and control, and hardly enhanced the 
humanistic qualities of probation which traditionally formed such services. The 
“attractiveness of EM” and other new community programmes witnessed in the 1990s were 
ultimately “tied up in…[an] imagery of nastiness,” to the point that several community 
programmes harnessing EM technology had promoted themselves on their records that “some 
prisoners would rather be in prison than in [their] community alternative programme[s]” 
(Clear, 1994: 109).  
Per Enos and colleagues (1999: iii), EM had “become a standard tool in the probation and 
parole officer’s arsenal of supervision technology. Yet by the end of the 1990s EM “was still 
not widespread” across the US (Lilly and Nellis, 2013: 30). Lilly and Nellis (2013) attribute 
this opposition through two main factors which arose from the opposite end of the American 
political spectrum. To the political Right, EM was simply not a very punitive measure (Lilly 
and Nellis, 2013: 30). Nationally and locally, the influential pressure group Mothers Against 
Drunk Driving (MADD) never accepted EM house arrest as a penalty for driving under the 
influence, claiming that EM “was both inadequate as censure and that, compared to the fully 
segregative penalty of imprisonment, it still left neighbourhoods vulnerable to reoffending” 
(Lilly and Nellis, 2013: 30). Furthermore, many politicians also accepted that EM was a 
lenient sentence and queried whether it was an adequate penalty to impose to ensure general 
and specific deterrence of criminal activity (Lilly and Nellis, 2013). For example, in 1992 in 
New Jersey, state senator Louis Kosko sought to restrict EM use after two incidents in which 
monitored offenders were involved in violent crime, one with lethal results (Durham, 1994: 
195). Nevertheless, as the 1990s progressed, “and the escalating costs of mass incarceration 
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began to affect state budgets, politicians and professionals alike were forced to becomes more 
positive about EM, whether they liked it or not” (Lilly and Nellis, 2013: 30). As 
Congressman James Traficant indicates: 
Electronic monitoring could and should be a method that could make alternative 
sentencing programs feasible… While [it] does not represent a magical solution to 
America’s crime problems, it should and must be actively examined as an integral part 
of this nation’s long term strategy to deal with problems of crime and prison 
overcrowding. (quoted in Enos et al., 1999: ii) 
Despite the small proportion of offenders subjected to EM, it became clear that once the 
technology was introduced into the American criminal justice system it would then be 
expected to expand, and the expansion “was frequently commented on as if [EM] represented 
the inexorable future of community corrections” (Lilly and Nellis, 2013: 31). Indeed, scholars 
such as Sullivan (1990) and Lilly and Ball (1990) warned that the evolution of such 
technology could pave the way for greater social trends in discipline and the reduction (if not 
total suppression) of individuality within offender supervision specifically and community 
corrections generally. As Sullivan (1990: 136) suggested, the development of EM would only 
be the beginning of a punitive shift within the future of community corrections, as the 
implementation and advancement of EM was “only the beginning of the use of new 
technologies for total surveillance and punishment.” Such a punitive shift “heavily 
emphasize[d] incarceration or technological surveillance” over the more normative methods 
of probation, parole, and fines generally (Sullivan, 1990: 136).  
The 2000s saw the advent of GPS tracking for the US, and while GPS satellites had been 
available for non-military use since the late 1970s, “interestingly no-one seem[ed] to have 
imagined them in a correctional context” (Lilly and Nellis, 2013: 32). Several US electronics 
companies pursued the idea of personalized tracking at the time, such as Lucent 
Technologies, Westinghouse, and Motorola, plus the Canadian company Strategic 
Technologies Inc. (Lilly and Nellis, 2013: 32). In addition, the New Mexico Corrections 
Department (which had once been skeptical of Jack Love’s initiative) had asked Sandia 
National Laboratories in California to explore real-time tracking technologies, and Sandia 
and Spectrum Industries came close to marketing a device (Lilly and Nellis, 2013: 32). 
However, Protech, a company based in Florida, was the one which decisively tilted offender 
tracking technologies towards GPS-based systems and quickly became leaders in the field 
(Drake, n.d., cited in Lilly and Nellis, 2013: 32). Per Lilly and Nellis (2013: 33) by 2001 
GPS-based EM was being used “in a number of states on small batches of offenders (often 
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fewer than 30), and the professionals were still testing the quality of the equipment” (for a 
further review, see also Johnson, 2002). For example, Florida began using it in conjunction 
with ‘CrimeTax’ software, which enabled corrections and law enforcement computer systems 
to coordinate offender movements to each day’s new crime scenes “either to incriminate or 
exonerate [offenders]” (Lilly and Nellis, 2013: 33). Currently all 50 states, the District of 
Columbia, and the federal government use EM to monitor the movements and activities of 
pretrial defendants or convicted offenders on probation or parole (The Pew Charitable Trusts, 
2016: 1). Recent numbers indicate that since 2015 the number of accused and convicted 
offenders in the US who are monitored has risen nearly 140 percent over the last decade (The 
Pew Charitable Trusts, 2016: 1). More than 125,000 people were supervised with EM in 
2015, up from 53,000 people in 2005 (The Pew Charitable Trusts, 2016: 1). Although some 
research suggests that EM can help reduce reoffending rates (cf. Renzema and Mayo-Wilson, 
2005), “the expanded use of these technologies has occurred largely in the absence of data 
demonstrating the effectiveness for various types of offenders at different stages of the 
criminal justice system” (The Pew Charitable Trusts, 2016: 3). 
Since the new millennium onward, such scholars were correct to anticipate the turn towards 
technological surveillance within the American criminal justice system. The constant 
upgrading and increasing role of technology and surveillance within offender supervision and 
control speaks to a predominately neoconservative discourse, perpetuating the need to secure 
political and social order within the US. While it is clear that Western, liberal democracies 
have considered the move towards GPS monitoring of offenders over traditional RF forms of 
EM, it has yet to be seen whether such countries will execute these hyper-surveillant notions 
(Lilly and Nellis, 2013). Although the price of GPS tracking systems is falling, and old RF 
systems become obsolete to successfully track and locate offenders, the adoption of GPS 
nationally and internationally remains an ongoing discussion (Lilly and Nellis, 2013; see also 
The Pew Charitable Trusts, 2016). In the American context, such discussions will typically 
intertwine pervasive, “techno-utopian/dystopian discourses” (Lilly and Nellis, 2013: 34) with 
a symbolic need to secure order from ‘terrorists’ and ‘ordinary criminals’ alike. In effect, a 
“cultural mood” is formed in the post-9/11 age which emotionally appeals to the American 
population, harnesses technological surveillance above all else, and furthers neoconservative 




The Great British Track-Off:  EM in the United Kingdom 
The private sector operates EM in the United Kingdom. At the time of writing, Capita holds 
the contract in England and Wales, while Guard 4 Securior (G4S) holds the contract for 
Scotland. These companies provide and fit the equipment, monitor offenders and investigate 
breaches. This situation arose because of the Probation Service’s original hostility towards 
the implementation of EM (Nellis and Lilly, 2000; Mair, 2001), and while the Probation 
Service’s concerns regarding EM have lessened (Bottomley et al., 2004), they have not yet 
fully embraced the technology (Hucklesby, 2013 citing Rogers, 2011). As a result, EM has a 
distinct identity and runs in parallel to the broader provision of community services available 
in the UK, resulting in limited information-sharing and integration between the private and 
public sector (CJJI, 2008; Hucklesby, 2013; Mair and Nellis, 2013).   
By focusing on the origins and development of EM in Great Britain, we see how the UK led 
the way for Europe in piloting EM as an effective and alternative tool for criminal justice 
agencies (Mair and Nellis, 2013). The UK likes to see itself as a leader in penal policy and 
practice, and is proud to claim its importance “as the originator of probation”, despite the 
more accurate claims from other Western countries (Mair and Nellis, 2013: 63). While 
England and Wales led the way in Western Europe to pilot and develop EM, it went about 
this process in ways which had reflected the government of the day’s comprehension of penal 
crisis and their subsequent (and preferred) solutions to such a dilemma. However, this section 
will demonstrate that although EM progressed substantially within the UK, the development 
of the technology within the Anglo-Welsh model of criminal justice differed slightly from 
their Scottish counterparts, an examination to which I now turn.  
England & Wales 
EM had a shaky beginning in England and Wales (Hucklesby, 2013). First used in the mid-
1980s, EM had its start in a pilot programme as a condition of bail (Mair and Nee, 1990). 
However, the pilot for EM produced negative results and any idea of EM lay dormant until 
the mid-1990s, when curfew orders were introduced on a pilot basis in the Criminal Justice 
Act 1991 (Mair and Mortimer, 1996; Mortimer and May, 1997; see also Mair and Nellis, 
2013: 66). EM was pushed onto the policy agenda in England and Wales in two main ways. 
First, a journalist named Tom Stacey had independently thought up the idea of remote 
monitoring as an alternative to custody (he initially envisaged tracking more than house 
arrest) (Mair and Nellis, 2013). Stacey founded the Offenders Tag Association in 1981 to 
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promote the idea, and in effect he originated the word ‘tag’ and the process of ‘tagging’ to 
denote EM (Nellis, 1991, 2000; Mair and Nellis, 2013). Second, the organizations that made 
and sold electronic equipment in the US saw their next market in the UK. As Mair and Nellis 
(2013: 64) indicate, members of the Home Office Research and Planning Unit (RPU) 
attended criminological conferences in the US and were told so quite openly, as well as 
senior staff of EM organizations met with Home Office officials in London to push and 
persuade their products.  
While official interest in EM was encouraged, the then Conservative government was under 
considerable pressure to deal with increasing size of the prison population. A great deal of 
effort had gone into the development of alternatives to custody over the previous 10-15 years; 
however, all the evidence suggested that community service, probation centres and other 
requirements which could be included in a probation order had not been successful in 
diverting offenders away from custody (Mair and Nellis, 2013). While the increasing 
government response was to criticize the Probation Service and its social work ethos, such a 
response was coupled with the implication that tougher ‘punishment in the community’ 
would finally reduce prison population numbers. In effect EM was claimed as the necessary 
tough punishment and should be substituted for the ‘soft on offenders’ social work ethos 
(Mair and Nellis, 2013).   
Cutting the costs of public service was another ideological commitment on the government’s 
part (Mair and Nellis, 2013). Privatizing public sector jobs and processes wherever possible, 
the privatization of criminal justice was viewed with some apprehension by those who 
worked in the sector. Such a cause for concern was understandable, as the government 
engaged in considerable piecemeal cuts and privatization of some aspects of prison services 
and police work. It was during this time that EM was perceived as a way of introducing 
privatization—as well as technological and managerial rigour—into what would become 
known as ‘community penalties’ (cf. Bottoms et al., 2001). Such an introduction signalled to 
a cacophony of security, construction and telecommunications companies and firms—
nationally and internationally—that a robust, unique market was about to emerge (Nathan, 
2003; Mair and Nellis, 2013).  
EM was introduced in England and Wales on the basis of what were assumed to be “vote-
winning politics rather than a fully thought-out response to crime reduction” or to increasing 
prison populations (Mair and Nellis, 2013: 65). The lustre of EM as a new technology was 
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coupled with the privatization of the Probation Service, and government proponents saw EM 
as a tougher approach to dealing with offender populations. In fact, arguments that suggested 
greater caution of this technology were simply marginalized. As Mair (2005: 264) indicates, 
the research evidence in criminological terms was portrayed as “limited and unreliable,” the 
economics behind EM was ignored, and “the moral or ethical arguments were scarcely 
noted.”    
Today, EM in England and Wales use radio-frequency identification (RFID or RF) 
technology. Offenders are required to stay at a specific address during a curfew period and 
wear an electronic tag, which is linked to the monitoring company through a home 
monitoring unit (HMU) placed at the address. Capita is then alerted when the offender 
attempts to go out of range of the equipment by leaving the address. Monitoring companies 
are generally aware when offenders are not at their specified addresses, when offenders have 
removed their tags, or when the HMU is unplugged or moved. These incidents could result in 
an EM condition breach, but depending on the seriousness of the incident the offender may 
not result in a return to court to be resentenced (Hucklesby, 2013). This system is widely used 
for the Anglo-Welsh criminal justice model, specifically for adult offenders sentenced by the 
court, bail defendants, released prisoners, and, in rare cases and circumstances, terrorist 
suspects (cf. Nellis, 1991, 2004, 2007a). The removal of the tag, as well as the offender being 
out for the whole of the curfew period (or a significant portion of the period), will lead to 
immediate breach action; however, less serious breaches such as being late for the start of a 
curfew period simply result in written or verbal warnings for the offender (Hucklesby, 2013 
citing Ministry of Justice, 2011).  
Per Hucklesby and Holdsworth (2016: 20), there is limited publication details on EM data as 
data published prior to 2013 “is also likely to be inaccurate, [and] overestimat[es] the use of 
EM”. These data recording issues are linked to an overcharging scandal in which G4S and 
Serco was under investigation by the Serious Fraud Office for over-charging the government 
for EM services (Comptroller and Auditor General, 2013). They are accused, inter alia, of 
claiming fees for monitoring offenders who were not actually monitored. This investigation 
links to broader concerns about the price charged by G4S and Serco (Geoghegan, 2012; 
Comptroller and Auditor General, 2013) which utilized evidence provided by the right-wing 
think-tank Policy Exchange that the price was significantly higher than that charged by these 
and other contractors in the US (Hucklesby and Holdsworth, 2016: 7). The accusation is that 
these private contractors have been reaping large profits at the expense of taxpayers, and as of 
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yet this scandal has not been resolved (Hucklesby and Holdsworth, 2016). Short-term data 
provided by Hucklesby and Holdworth indicate that the use of EM decreased by 11 percent in 
an 18 month period, from 14, 762 people monitored in June 2013 to 13,210 in October 2013 
(2016: 20). Nevertheless, Hucklesby and Holdsworth (2016: 20) contend that despite this 
decrease, England & Wales remain a “high user of EM” when compared to Scotland, 
Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands—the four other jurisdictions compared in the 
study—suggesting that EM supplements imprisonment “rather than provides an alternative to 
imprisonment”.  
Scotland 
It is apparent that EM within Scotland is the focus of the current study, and so to introduce 
and undertake a comprehensive overview of this technology in this section would not provide 
the theoretical nuances necessary to appreciate EM as a form of carceral territory. 
Nevertheless, while later chapters are dedicated to and delve into a more robust 
understanding of this jurisdiction’s EM programme, a succinct discussion of EM’s 
development in Scotland can be briefly outlined here. 
While similar and basic “parallel tracks” pattern of policy development emerged in Scotland, 
such policy development diverged from the normative Anglo-Welsh model (Mair and Nellis, 
2013: 75). EM was first introduced under a Labour government in 1998, and then 
reintroduced under a Scottish National Party government, and the EM schemes were first 
trialled in 1998-2000 and subsequently evaluated shortly after (Lobley and Smith, 2000; 
Smith, 2001). Organizing a public consultation with relevant stakeholders, the Scottish 
Executive (2000) sought perspectives on the use, benefits and consequences of EM from the 
judiciary, local authorities and voluntary organizations. The consultation reported results 
which were largely positive and in favour of the technology, and in 2002 the government 
legislated EM as a Restriction of Liberty Order (RLO, or the equivalent of an EM curfew in 
Anglo-Welsh model). EM was also legislated as a condition of both a Probation Order (PO) 
and a Drug Treatment and Testing Order (DTTO). Unlike the Anglo-Welsh model, 
Scotland’s orders permitted both ‘restrictions from a place’—the equivalent of an exclusion 
zone created by placing tag-sensitive equipment around its perimeter—and ‘restrictions to a 
place’ (the equivalent of a curfew) (Nellis, 2009b; McIvor and Graham, 2016a, 2016b; 
Scottish Government, 2016). Subsequent legislation in 2003 (the Criminal Justice (Scotland) 
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Act 2003, as discussed below) specified that RLOs could be used as a direct alternative to 
custody, and also introduced EM as a parole condition (Mair and Nellis, 2013: 76).  
EM was initially introduced in Scotland on a pilot basis in 1998 as a means of monitoring 
compliance with RLOs. RLOs were established through Section 245A of the Criminal 
Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 (as introduced by Section 245A of the Crime and Punishment 
(Scotland) Act 1997) and enabled the courts to require that offenders stay in a specified place 
for up to 12 hours a day, for a period of up to 12 months, or stay away from a specified place 
for up to 24 hours a day for up to 12 months (Graham and McIvor, 2016). RLOs can be 
enforced as a standalone measure, or in conjunction with a supervisory order, and failures to 
comply with an RLO—otherwise known as ‘violations’—can include “being absent from the 
address to which [the offender] had been restricted; being present at the address away from 
which [the offender] had been restricted; withdrawal of consent; and tampering with or 
damaging the monitoring equipment” (Graham and McIvor, 2016: 21). In the event of non-
compliance, G4S could initiate proceedings by reporting them back to the court to decide. In 
the case of a proven breach, the court could impose a fine on the offender, vary the conditions 
of the order, or revoke the order and re-sentence the offender for the original offence, taking 
account of the time during which the order was in operation (Graham and McIvor, 2017).  
Following an evaluation of the EM pilot scheme (Lobley and Smith, 2000) RLOs were 
subsequently rolled out nationally in Scotland in April 2002. The use of EM was further 
extended by the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003, which introduced provisions for EM 
curfews as a condition of parole (s. 40), as a probation order (s. 46), or as a condition of a 
drug treatment and testing order (DTTO) (s. 47). Furthermore, the same legislation also 
specified that the RLO should be deemed an alternative to custody (s. 50(3)) by stipulating 
the orders should only be imposed for offences punishable by imprisonment where the 
alternative would be a period of detention or imprisonment. In 2005 EM was introduced as a 
condition of bail (or EM bail) on a pilot basis in order to improve bail decision-making and 
encourage compliance with bail. However, following the evaluation research by Barry and 
colleagues (2007) the decision to not roll out EM bail nationally was made. The findings of 
this evaluation indicated that applications for EM bailed representation a very small 
population of potentially eligible cases, and that there was no sufficient evidence to prove 
that confidence in public safety attributable to EM improved as opposed to the standard bail 
process already in place (Barry et al., 2007). In effect, the remand population in the pilot 
areas was reduced by less than two percent (Barry et al., 2007). In 2011, the Community 
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Payback Order (CPO) was introduced in Scotland through the Criminal Justice and Licensing 
(Scotland) Act 2010, following the recommendation of the Scottish Prisons Commission 
(2008), to replace existing community sentences (probation, community service, and 
supervised attendance orders). Specifically, RLOs and DTTOs were not ‘rolled up’ into the 
new order. RLOs were retained for those offenders “where the safety of the public in general 
or of particular individuals… [are] at risk” (Scottish Government, 2008: 11). While EM 
cannot be imposed as a condition of CPO, it is possible for an RLO and a CPO to be imposed 
concurrently, providing offenders with access to other services and supervision as warranted.  
At present, Guard 4 Securior (G4S) is the national private security provider which holds the 
five-year contract in Scotland, and operates EM at various points in the Scottish criminal 
justice system. G4S provide its services to the Scottish Government in the installation and 
deinstallation of ‘tagging’ technology. Additionally, G4S couples this service with the 
monitoring of offenders and the reporting of EM breaches and violations to statutory 
authorities such as courts and the Scottish Government Justice Department (more recently 
renamed as the Community Justice Department) (cf. Graham and McIvor, 2017).  
Thematic Debates in EM 
Several themes are brought to light when one engages in a critical discussion of EM. Such 
themes are not unique to one country or nation, but span internationally and have been 
discussed to varying degrees. Indeed, discussions of EM have become so topical and 
controversial in nature that research across disciplines overstate some issues while 
underplaying others. At times there is overlap between the themes, and as EM technology 
expands and advances by no means will this be a comprehensive nor exhaustive list. 
Nonetheless, what is apparent in these discussions are notions pertaining to evaluation, 
privatization, the perspectives from offenders, operators, victims, media, and the public about 
EM; and the ethics of EM which ultimately progress the debate forward (cf. Nellis et al., 
2013; Graham and McIvor, 2015).  
Evaluative Research on EM  
Per Renzema (2013), there is only a limited amount of evaluative research on EM. Much of 
this research was and continues to be published and disseminated by official government 
researchers, with a strong focus on cost-effectiveness and a primary concern with reducing 
offending. Such evaluation studies include Mair and Nee (1990), Church and Dunstan (1997), 
Bourn (2006), and Robert and Stassart (2009). Furthermore, this research contends that 
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punishment and leniency can only be fully understood if the experience of those who 
underwent the sanction is also considered (cf. Spelman, 1995; Robert et al., 2003; Payne and 
Gainey, 2004).  
There has been relatively limited empirical research into the operation of EM in Scotland, 
with the main studies having been commissioned by the Scottish Government to evaluate the 
piloting of EM at different stages of the criminal justice process (cf. Lobley and Smith, 2000; 
Barry et al., 2007; McIvor and Graham, 2015; Graham and McIvor, 2016).  
Furthermore, there have been attempts to estimate the unit costs of EM orders and curfews in 
the evaluations of pilot schemes in Scotland. However, the yielding estimates of unit costs 
have a greater probability of being artificially high as a result of start-up costs, coupled with 
relatively slow take up and progression (Graham and McIvor, 2015). For instance, as a result 
of the lower than anticipated number of orders made in the pilot RLO scheme fifteen years 
ago—which had been operating at under-capacity—the unit costs of EM orders was relatively 
high (Lobley and Smith, 2000). In effect, Smith (2001) had subsequently suggested then that 
there was little substantial evidence from their evaluation (Lobley and Smith, 2000) that 
RLOs could reduce the prison population or the overall costs of the criminal justice system in 
Scotland.   
The Scottish Government annually publishes the costs of EM, and the most recent numbers 
indicate that the average unit cost for EM in Scotland in 2013-2014 was £743, a significant 
reduction from £1,940 in 2011-2012 (Scottish Government, 2013b, 2015).1 In 2013, the 
average cost per EM order per day in Scotland was an estimate of £10.17 (Scottish 
Government, 2013a: 7). Annual costs of EM can be problematic to estimate, as typically most 
EM orders are not imposed for such a long period of time. Contrarywise, while per diem 
costs are difficult to calculate for prison sentences, the average cost per prisoner place during 
2013-2014 was £37,059 (Scottish Government, 2015).  
Finally, in an evaluation conducted by Armstrong and colleagues (2011), two weeks of Home 
Detention Curfew (HDC) was estimated to produce a cost saving of £266, and six months of 
HDC produced a saving of £10,914. In 2013-2014, findings suggested that the average unit 
cost of writing a HDC report was estimated at £142, which is different and additional to the 
                                                          
1 As McIvor and Graham (2016) indicate, figures represented here are comprised of total expenditure across all 
forms of EM, including as part of a DTTO as well as Movement Restriction Conditions (MRCs) imposed upon 
children and young people by the Children’s Hearing System in Scotland (for further review see also Graham 
and McIvor, 2015).  
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average unit cost of the EM element of HDCs (Scottish Government, 2015; see also Graham 
and McIvor, 2015; McIvor and Graham, 2016). 
EM and the Private Sector 
The question of whether the daily monitoring of offenders should be contracted out to the 
private sector was and still is a highly contentious and political debate (Paterson, 2013). 
While such contracts can be different across countries and jurisdictions, in the United States 
and the United Kingdom we see the private sector involved in the contracted provision of EM 
in two ways—technology manufacture and service provision (of which the provision of 
monitoring offenders is separate from existing probation services) (Nellis et al., 2013). 
However, some organizations combine both functions. For example, England & Wales and 
Scotland have fully fledged private sector providers, contracted for five-year periods (Nellis 
et al., 2013; McIvor and Graham, 2016). State agencies within the United States have even 
tended to buy or loan equipment, and do the monitoring themselves. Many of the business 
areas where EM and commercial criminal justice now flourish are based upon original 
developments in the United States, and have inspired the development of new commercial 
crime control markets across the globe (cf. Newburn, 2002).  
Paterson’s (2013: 213) research on the development of EM in the context of international 
developments in private security and penal provision highlights the growth of the 
“corrections-commercial complex.” Indeed, by drawing on the growth of commercial markets 
in the United States, Canada, and England & Wales, Paterson argues that the commercial 
markets in incarceration and social control have been driven by “the dual forces of neoliberal 
globalization and insecurity” which have dominated the Western world in our late modern era 
(2013: 224). Despite a lack of conclusive evidence that EM ‘works’ in protecting the public 
and reducing offending, Paterson indicates that such growth is driven by a fascination with 
“the potential of new technologies to deliver managerialist solutions to complex social 
problems” (2013: 223). In effect, he suggests that by sub-contracting service delivery to the 
commercial sector, “central government is able to expand the crime control system, 
and…meet the political demand for enhancing security, while also deviating around fiscal 
restraints” (Paterson, 2013: 224). Arguably, this creates new problems for transparency and 
accountability within a fluid structure where relations between different agencies are both 




Offender and Operators’ Perspectives of EM  
New categories of penal subjects and monitoring agents have entered the field of crime 
control with the introduction of EM. Research like that of Payne and Gainey (1998, 2000, 
2004), Roberts (2004) Jones (2005), Hucklesby (2008, 2009, 2011, 2013), Gibbs and King 
(2003), King and Gibbs (2003), Martin and colleagues (2009), and Vanhaelemeesch and 
colleagues (2014) thoroughly examines the extent to which such surveillant technology 
impacts offenders, the family members of the offenders being put under EM, the work 
experiences of monitoring agents operating and enforcing the conditions of EM sentences, 
and additional vulnerable populations within the community.  
In the study conducted by Payne and Gainey (2000a), the authors found that punishment is 
experienced differently by different groups and individuals, which has led to the suggestion 
that EM causes some individuals to be unfairly punished, while other are not necessarily 
affected by the sanction (Payne and Gainey, 2000a: 96). Tracing the development of EM 
programs in the United States, the authors contend that research on EM must continue to 
explore the viability of these programs, and ensure that lines of communication and 
transparency between researchers, program officials, politicians and citizens are and remain 
open (Payne and Gainey, 2000a: 106). Furthermore, as institutions change, so should the 
standards and the role EM plays in the criminal justice system; in doing so we must be 
mindful that evaluations of EM programs (regardless of their successfulness) must continue 
(Payne and Gainey, 2000a: 106). Finally, such evaluations have the potential to better fit 
offenders with supportive technologies and ensures a criminal justice system that operates as 
efficiently, effectively and as humanely as possible (Payne and Gainey, 2000a: 107).    
Jones (2005) examined EM in several areas within England & Wales, indicating that while 
the rollout of EM was nationwide, there were slight differences in the implementation of EM 
geographically which influenced the experiences of monitoring officers as they went about 
their work. Such differences included the densities of populations within the urban areas, the 
busyness of traffic congestion, the distance for travel to remote or rural communities, the 
weather conditions and the number of officers assigned to monitor a particular offender 
(Jones, 2005). With a similar focus upon England & Wales, Hucklesby (2008) examined the 
impact of standalone curfew orders imposed upon 78 offenders between April and August of 
2005, and how EM factored into offenders’ desistance from crime. Hucklesby’s (2008) 
findings suggest that for some offenders, curfew orders reduce offending and contribute to 
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desistance by (1) reducing offenders’ links with situations, people, places and networks 
correlated with their offending; and (2) by encouraging offenders to (re)connect with 
influences linked with desistance such as employment and family. Following this, Hucklesby 
(2009) then analyzed the same data collected to investigate offenders’ experiences and 
attitudes about compliance to EM curfew orders. These findings indicated that the 
surveillance-based nature of the curfew orders influenced offenders’ decisions to comply, and 
that subjective perceptions of offenders about EM equipment efficiency played a role in their 
compliant behaviour. Such findings also take into consideration the consistent use of the 
(sub-)contracted monitoring company (Hucklesby, 2009; see also Hucklesby, 2013).  
To provide a more nuanced and complex understanding of EM curfew orders, Hucklesby 
included participant observations and interviews with 20 monitoring officers by one security 
company contracted in England & Wales to monitor offenders (Hucklesby, 2011). In terms of 
the working life of monitoring officers, Hucklesby (2011) argued that feeling unsafe or 
vulnerable impacted upon how the officers went about their work. Such feelings occurred 
when monitoring officers were reluctant to visit the homes of offenders’, and when officers 
engaged in particular interactions to either avoid conflict with the offender undergoing EM 
(Hucklesby, 2011). Furthermore, situational/environmental factors played into how officers 
were influenced by the practices their occupation was required to carry out, such as working 
late evenings and at night, largely on their own, within certain marginalized neighbourhoods, 
and without immediate backup. Taken together, Hucklesby contends that monitoring officers’ 
practices and concerns impact how EM is operated, and can have a significant impact on 
whether the offender complies with the conditions of EM, depending on the encounters 
between monitoring officers and offenders (Hucklesby, 2011; see also Hucklesby, 2013).  
In a parallel vein, Smith’s (2004, 2008, 2014, 2016) work on closed circuit television 
(CCTV) monitoring agents reflects similar experiences of empowerment and 
disempowerment within the work spaces of agents as they scrutinize the CCTV images taken 
within the U.K. Specifically in his research on the CCTV workplace culture, Smith (2004) 
found that, contrary to political and academic assumptions about surveillance operations, the 
control rooms he observed were “soaked in playfulness, time wasting and at times, comedy, 
as the operators attempted to cope with socio-structural disparities, and the monotony of a 
routinized and largely unrewarding job” (p. 392). Those who monitor the CCTV cameras 
were not robotic individuals with ‘super-human’ tendencies, capable of watching screens 
objectively and effectively for hours on end. Instead, these operatives considered themselves 
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as subjective human beings, “open to natural and emotional factors such as tiredness, 
boredom, frustration, apathy and discrimination” (Smith, 2004: 393). Similar experiences 
were found in his later work (Smith, 2008: 133), which indicated that the CCTV workspaces 
were not “voyeuristic paradises”. Rather, these work cultures were subjected to “unrealistic 
organizational goals and demands” and coupled with various responsibilities and tasks 
associated to the shifting and blurring roles of employee/worker/ ‘watcher’ (Smith, 2008: 
133). Through his interviews and observations, Smith contended that his sample of operatives 
produced a collective narrative of the ‘disempowered worker,’ continually frustrated with and 
alienated from their labour. Such powerlessness was demonstrated through the operatives’ 
wider understanding of CCTV surveillance (and how this ontology of control operationally 
restricted their freedoms to work); the operators’ position at the bottom of a social control 
hierarchy; the operators’ inability to physically take part and intervene in the action being 
televised on their screens; and the extent to which escalating court appearances erode 
operators’ anonymity and integrity (Smith, 2008). Such studies demonstrate the degree to 
which surveillant technologies are not only experienced by the offenders for whom they were 
made for, but ultimately draws upon how auxiliary criminal justice actors work within the 
predominant assemblage of surveillance and crime control (cf. Haggerty and Ericson, 2000).   
Returning to offenders’ perceptions of EM, one study of 27 offenders subjected to EM in 
Belgium found that EM was not simply a ‘soft’ alternative to imprisonment for those who 
experience it (Vanhaelemeesch et al., 2014). The majority of respondents found EM to be 
both a penalty and a favour, in comparison to the physical confinement and restricted 
mobility inmates experience while incarcerated.  However, there were mixed results in terms 
of the social life of respondents, as some felt slight changes in their routines and habit with 
friends and family members, while others experienced significant strain (Vanhaelemeesch et 
al., 2014). While the EM technology allowed respondents a greater allowance of flexibility to 
find and hold employment as they abided to their EM conditions, respondents 
overwhelmingly felt variations of restricted freedom. Such ‘false’ or illusory freedom has 
been noted in Martin and colleagues’ (2009) research as well, as offenders perceive and 
expect more freedom with EM than they get in actuality, which leads them to think of 
themselves as prisoners in their own home (cf. Mair and Nee, 1990; Church and Dunstan, 
1997; Bourn, 2006). The respondents in Vanhaelemeesch and colleagues’ (2014: 281) 
research had reported that they felt limited in the use they could make of local space (such as 
within and the immediate space outside of and surrounding the home), and those respondents 
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who needed to rely on public transportation were “mainly tied to a particular geographical 
area”. Other respondents had resented the limitations on their own home by the boundaries of 
EM, as some could not even go into their own garden or into the hallway of their building 
without triggering the EM receiver alarm installed in their residence. Such limits on freedom, 
even at the minute level of movement through and around the home or residential property, 
was one element of EM that made the experience more difficult for the respondents, 
increasing their temptations to violate EM compliance and transgress the EM boundaries 
placed on them (Vanhaelemeesch et al., 2014: 281).  
Victims’ Perspectives and Involvement with EM  
Victim involvement in the use of EM can take on many forms. However, there remains a 
dearth of research about victims’ experiences and perceptions of EM (Graham and McIvor, 
2015, 2017). The existing and paucity of empirical knowledge pertaining to EM is mostly 
derived from small qualitative studies conducted in the U.S. and in Sweden, and while 
informative and useful, the ability to generalize from these studies’ findings are limited at 
best. One must be mindful that, in terms of such small studies, there is the influence of bias in 
who chooses to respond and why. In effect, it becomes difficult for researchers studying 
victims’ perspectives to obtain a representative understanding of victims’ experiences with 
EM.  
According to Wennerberg and Holmberg (2007; see also Wennerberg, 2013), in Sweden the 
perspectives of both victims and their advocates seem to have shifted over time, as originally 
victims’ groups expressed opposition to EM reforms due to what they perceived as a lack of 
understanding of its impact on victims. However, victims’ perspectives of EM in Sweden 
since that time have been shown to be more mixed if not positive (Wennerberg and 
Holmberg, 2007; Wennerberg, 2013). In Wennerberg and Holmberg’s study (2007), the 
authors conducted interviewed with 39 victims (22 females, 17 males) where the offenders 
had been placed on EM release. They attempted to obtain victims of violent crimes (ranging 
from sexual assault to grievous bodily harm and attempted murder) and sexual crimes for the 
study, in order to reflect the significant proportions of these types of offenders in EM release 
(Wennerberg and Holmberg, 2007). In one of the first studies of its kind, and given the 
proportion of participants in the study who had been a victim to a violent and/or sexual crime, 
a particularly interesting finding was that most victims expressed the view that they did not 
feel unsafe during the period wherein which the offender underwent EM. In fact, the authors’ 
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findings indicated that feelings of safety were increased with the knowledge that the offender 
was being monitored, and that protocols and alerts would be followed if the offender 
breached their EM conditions (Wennerberg and Holmberg, 2007). Furthermore, some 
respondents had believed that EM release was less harmful than prison. Overall, the majority 
of the crime victims interviewed for the study showed positive perceptions “[of] the offender 
serving a sentence at home with electronic tagging” (Wennerberg and Holmberg, 2007: 20).  
The notion of alerting victims has become increasingly significant with the development of 
EM technology. Although it is not currently used extensively, increasing numbers of 
European jurisdictions like Albania, the Republic of Ireland, the Netherlands, and Norway 
are piloting or incorporating victim notification into their EM schemes, as well as victim 
involvement into bilateral electronic monitoring (BEM) (cf. Nellis, 2013c). Empirical 
literature on BEM remains limited, but this can be accomplished using RF or GPS 
technology, or hybridized RF/GPS tags. According to Graham and McIvor (2015), there is 
currently in Scotland the capacity for victim involvement through imposing ‘away from’ 
restrictions and exclusion zones which seek to prevent and reduce a monitored person from 
approaching a specified place, such as a victim’s home or a small or local business. This type 
of victim involvement is voluntary and requires the victim’s consent, and it is currently used 
only in a relatively small number of cases (Graham and McIvor, 2015: 81). It is important to 
note that who is notified will depend on the jurisdiction and when, for instance, an alert may 
first be received by the victim themselves, by probation, by police, or by the EM service 
provider, or combinations of these people. Describing how this technology works with a 
standard RF-based arrangement, Nellis and Lilly (2010: 362) state that the victim’s home is 
“equipped with a receiver sensitive to the signal from the offender’s ankle bracelet [personal 
identification (PID) tag]; if the offender goes near the home, both the victim and the police 
are alerted.” There are limitations to the RF-based arrangement, as this type of monitoring is 
limited to knowledge of whether the offender approaches the exclusion zone they are 
restricted away from. Additionally, such arrangements cannot account for the fact that 
victims are more likely to spend significant portions of time away from and outside the 
monitored exclusion zone. 
Where GPS EM technology is used, BEM can involve victims carrying or wearing a device 
on their person, such as a device in their bag or pocket or being tagged themselves (Graham 
and McIvor, 2015). In effect, the monitoring is not simply that of a specific place or property, 
“but tracking the location of the victim themselves in real time” (Graham and McIvor, 2015: 
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81). Indeed, Paterson and Clamp (2014) argue that the advent of BEM is a major shift from 
EM as an offender-focused approach to surveillance and punishment, to BEM as a victim-
centred approach, prioritizing surveillance towards victim monitoring in the interests of their 
safety and protection. The notification of victims, as well as of authorities (usually police) 
when alerts are generated, expands crime control into realms of surveillance never proceeded 
before (cf. Paterson and Clamp, 2014). However, Ibarra and Erez (2007) found mixed results 
which conveyed the tensions and opportunities of BEM, whereas later research conducted by 
Erez (2009) indicated more positive perspectives about benefits from victim involvement. 
Erez and Ibarra (2007) conducted interviews with criminal justice professionals (n = 22) who 
worked with victims, and female victims (n = 30) of domestic abuse involved in BEM. Their 
findings suggest that numerous victims cumulatively developed a sense of safety over time 
with the advent of BEM, and described the transformation of their homes from sites of 
conflict to spaces of refuge and shelter (Erez and Ibarra, 2007). Furthermore, victims stated 
they were better able to relax and experienced reductions in fear and stress (Erez and Ibarra, 
2007: 108). Some victims had even reported that they (and their children, if they were 
parents) felt that they could return to and resume an ordinary lifestyle again (Erez and Ibarra, 
2007: 110).  
In effect, Hoffman (2014) has argued that there is promise in both BEM and victim 
notification programmes, so long as we understand the limitations and constraints of the EM 
technology. When investigating the appropriateness and availability of the technology, it is 
important to remember that there are uncertainties about the technological functions and 
application of BEM “which may hinder effective operation at any given time” (Hoffman, 
2014: 2). Some questions we must ask ourselves include: “[Is] the monitoring device 
receiving a GPS and cellular signal; is the device charged and working properly; is the victim 
carrying the device; did the offender approach the victim intentionally or unintentionally; 
does the victim know the quickest route to safety; [and] can law enforcement arrive in time?” 
(Hoffman, 2014: 2). As Hoffman contends, all functions with the BEM system “must operate 
flawlessly” and must be seamlessly coordinated with the victim’s notification programme and 
law enforcement’s response “to enhance the victim’s safety” (2014: 2).  
Media and Public Opinion on EM  
Internationally, there is limited research on public attitudes toward and media representations 
of EM (cf. Graham and McIvor, 2015). In his study which documented and analyzed media 
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coverage of EM bail pilots, Nellis (2007b) argued that media discourses on EM in Scotland 
have been negative and skeptical. Such discourses have focused on the leniency of tagging 
offenders and the risk posed to the public through individuals charged with serious offences 
subjected to EM, while the ‘success stories’ of EM have been avoided (Nellis, 2007b). Media 
representations in England and Wales appears to have mixed findings, though overall still 
more negative media representations than positive in their orientation (Graham and McIvor, 
2015). Such a mixture of results could be partly attributed to the introduction and expansion 
of EM in England and Wales, which was originally characterized by limited media attention 
and debate (cf. Nellis, 2003b).  
In one study, three U.K. newspapers were analyzed for their respective coverage over one 
decade of media representations of people as the subjects of different types of surveillance 
(Finn and McCahill, 2010). The authors’ findings suggested that targets of surveillance where 
overwhelmingly labelled and described in terms of their offending behaviour, and were 
negatively constructed as ‘Others’ through the consistent use of terms such as ‘tagged 
offenders’ and ‘criminals.’ Finn and McCahill (2010) indicated that media discourses 
(re)produce notions of ‘bad’ surveillance and the EM technologies used to target ‘them’ to 
protect ‘us.’ In effect, the authors showed how such discourses enable their readership to 
differentiate between the tagging and monitoring of offenders versus the use of CCTV on a 
public road—the latter being a ‘good’ technology to target and protect ‘us’ (Finn and 
McCahill, 2010: 27).  
In contrast to the generally negative media representations of EM mentioned above, 
Scandinavian countries such as Sweden and Norway have had significant different 
experiences with media discourses vis-à-vis EM. For instance, Wennerberg (2013) argues 
that Swedish media tend to be relatively positive towards EM, despite some initial concerns 
by some media commentators that EM was not sufficiently punitive, would result in a 
mechanistic approach to offender supervision in the community, and was only suitable for 
people in relatively stable social circumstances. Per Wennerberg (2013), positive media 
depictions of EM were facilitated in part by a proactive and clearly defined media strategy by 
the Swedish probation service, by the gradual introduction and evaluation of EM with 
different target groups prior to a national EM rollout and implementation, and by the absence 
of serious and high-profile incidents involving monitored people. Similarly, in Norway the 
majority media representation of EM has been described as positive, following close liaison 
between media broadcasters and the Norwegian government both before and during the 
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implementation of Norway’s EM pilot (Kylstad Øster and Rokkan, 2012). In light of the 
initial opposition by political parties in Norway, the positive reception of EM by the media 
and the public has been viewed as remarkable, despite the original decision to initiate the EM 
pilot in Norway was described as “controversial” (Kylstad Øster and Rokkan, 2012: 90).  
European and American research has attempted to explore public attitudes towards EM; 
however, these studies have tended to use samples of students (usually from discipline(s) of, 
or related to, criminal justice), which means that the studies’ wider generalizability is unclear 
(Graham and McIvor, 2015). Research from the United States has indicated that public 
attitudes regarding EM may vary per demographic characteristics of respondents like gender 
or ethnicity. For example, Payne and colleagues’ (2009) study suggests that respondents from 
non-white minorities held more negative than positive views of EM. Such variances in 
demography, they argued, could reflect perceived inequalities in the use of EM with different 
ethnic and/or racial groups (Payne et al., 2009). Furthermore, a study conducted by Gainey 
and Payne (2003) asked criminal justice students their attitudes regarding EM before and 
after a guest lecture on EM. Their findings indicate that students held more positive attitudes 
towards EM following the educational input and, more specifically, students viewed EM “as 
a rehabilitative tool, as cost-effective, and as effective for family- and work-related reasons” 
while simultaneously considering the technology as “more punitive, [and] as an effective 
deterrent or method of control” (Gainey and Payne, 2003: 203). In effect, Graham and 
McIvor (2015) argue that there is some (albeit limited) evidence which suggest that public 
opinions about EM can develop and change in association with the provision of educational 
information. However, it remains unclear “how much and what types of information the 
public in Scotland (and elsewhere in the UK) would require in light of negative media 
depictions of EM” for meaningful changes in attitudes towards EM to be achieved (Graham 
and McIvor, 2015: 85).   
Ethics of EM  
Surprisingly little is explicitly written about the ethics of EM and community supervision (for 
exceptions, see Nellis, 2013a; Bülow, 2014). As mentioned above, it is important to 
recognize that EM technology is not value-neutral, neither in its technological design nor as a 
practice (Bülow, 2014). Even the technological design of EM bracelets, both in terms of its 
appearance as well as its potential technological functions and intentions, has ethical 
implications. As Nellis (2013a) and Bülow (2014) argue, there are many ethical issues to 
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consider that should be addressed in the ongoing development and design of EM both as a 
technology and as a punishment. Such issues include public risks and risks to the offender, 
the profit-driven industry of EM, offenders’ privacy, the stigmatization caused by the 
technology, using the home as a place of confinement, and the enforcement of spatial 
constraint and mobility monitoring to ensure rehabilitation, crime reduction, and deterrence. 
As a sentence of the court, or as a measure of penal administration, EM and RLO (through 
curfews and home detentions) places a degree of trust in the offender and requires their active 
participation to comply with the conditions imposed upon them (for example, to be home at a 
specified time, to take care of the equipment, to forgo certain spaces in the community either 
before or after certain times), as well as seeking, to some degree, prompt, responsible and 
law-abiding behaviour. Such behaviour is over and above mere obedience to schedules, and 
must be maintained at least for the duration of the order (cf. Nellis, 2009c, 2013). However, 
as Nellis (2009c) argues, it is a moot point to consider how comprehensively the offender’s 
mind is being targeted through this technology, and the ethics behind such thought 
alternation. In other words, attentiveness towards rules is required by the offender, “but 
compared to the aspirations of specific attitude and behaviour change programmes relatively 
little by way of cognitive change is (or can) be expected of [EM]” (Nellis, 2009c: 43). He 
asserts that it is “the presence or absence of the offender’s tagged body from specific 
premises at specific times” which is more significant to determine whether compliance has 
occurred (remotely registered as a trace on a computer screen at a national EM centre), rather 
than considering how the offender’s thinking has changed (Nellis, 2009c: 43; italics in 
original).  
Another ethical issue to consider is whether EM is a cause or modality of unfairness. As 
Bülow (2014) indicates, our basic intuitions about fairness and justice suggest that there must 
be proportionality between the level of crime committed and the punishment imposed (see 
also Nellis, 2015). Such reasoning dictates that if an offender commits a more severe crime 
then they should be given a more severe punishment (Duff, 2001: 133). Arguably, a 
proportionate punishment would be something that the offender undertakes without 
succumbing to humiliation, and that his fellow citizens, ideally, can respect the offender for 
undertaking.2 If punishment of the same severity is given to individuals each of whom have 
committed different crimes, intuition would inform us that such punishment would then be 
                                                          
2 For further discussion of the relationship between the offender, their civic roles, and punishment within the 
democratic republic, see Duff and Marshall (2016). 
46 
 
unfair. In effect, this constitutes a potentially worrisome aspect for EM as the punishment 
may be experienced differently by different groups and individuals (Bülow, 2014; see also 
Payne and Gainey, 2000a, 2000b).  Therefore, the type of EM technology implemented and 
the duration of surveillance and punishment should ultimately be proportional to the 
seriousness of the offence and the level of risk posed by the offender, with continuous GPS 
tracking reserved for examples such as “a high risk sex offender…upon their release from 
prison” (Nellis, 2015: 13).  
Additionally, Nellis (2015) argues for reflexivity and the need to unsettle taken-for-granted 
assumptions about the differential impact of different types of EM technologies on offenders. 
The presupposition that because GPS tracking is more ‘intrusive’ than RF EM technologies it 
should always be used on high risk offenders may be misleading; rather, “notwithstanding the 
greater amount of data that GPS generates, and the behavioural inferences that may be drawn 
from this, some offenders may experience this as less ‘intrusive,’ because it permits 
movement rather than requires confinement at home” (Nellis, 2015: 27-28, italics in original). 
Therefore, proportionate punishments should be assessed in the context of EM. In order to 
ascertain offenders’ perspectives and experiences of the different EM technologies, further 
research is required to investigate how such perceptions question proportionality, as well as 
help or hinder compliance, desistance and reintegration.  
Finally, the data collected by EM technology, coupled with personal privacy of the offender 
and the practice of inter-agency information sharing are additional ethical issues to consider. 
According to Graham and McIvor (2015), in some jurisdictions such as several regions in 
England & Wales and some US states, police either have ease of access to data about, or 
oversee the operation of, the electronic monitoring of offenders, including GPS-based EM. 
Where an EM initiative is not police-led, “the existence of surveillance data generated by 
GPS tracking may attract increased requests by police for access to that data” (Graham and 
McIvor, 2015: 94). Indeed, swift access to information regarding the whereabouts of 
offenders can be significantly appealing for the data’s potential to save police resources (in 
other words, time and money), resources that would otherwise be required for routine 
investigative procedures to find and obtain the same information. However, Nellis (2015) 
warns that some police may come to value the savings and benefits for police under the rubric 
of public protection and helping the public purse—put differently, “to value the intelligence-
gathering, investigative capabilities which GPS enables” (p. 11)—more than the technology’s 
capacity to assist offenders in compliance and their reductions in re-offending once back into 
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their community. Therefore, per Graham and McIvor (2015), a balance should be struck 
between stakeholders interested in EM, in which rights, responsibilities, protections and 
restrictions should be adequately and appropriate discussed and negotiated if EM is to be 
legislated and enforced. 
It is important to note that in the event the police do obtain the location of an offender for the 
purposes of a criminal investigation, GPS-based monitoring can neither directly prove nor 
disprove where said offender has committed a new crime, and this technology does not have 
the capacity to confirm whether others are present, unless they too are tagged (Graham and 
McIvor, 2015). The GPS technology can only locate the offender at any given point in time, 
which may or may not coincide with the timing and the location of a crime. Specifically, in 
the US, GPS monitoring technologies and systems, and the data generated from them, can be 
used in the court process and can be admitted as evidence (cf. Geoghegan, 2012). As 
Geoghegan (2012) contends, GPS-based monitoring can be beneficial in terms of ‘fighting 
crime’ and providing evidence to enable arrests and (re)convictions. Furthermore, the 
mapping practice of “crime scene correlation—in which locations of reported crime are 
overlaid on a daily basis against offenders’ movements—should be a key feature of new 
[EM] programmes” (Geoghegan, 2012: 65). While both Geoghegan (2012) and Nellis 
(2013a) recognize that some (but not all) offenders may exert legal pressure to use this data 
collection for exoneration—rather than used for incrimination—there is a dearth of literature 
which deals with the ethical implications of such practices generally, and within the Scottish 
context specifically.  
However, as it currently stands in Scotland, the police do not routinely have ease of access to 
this level and type of data for individuals serving other penal sanctions (for example, fines, 
unpaid work/community service, and/or Community Payback Orders (CPOs)). Additionally, 
such access to data is not provided to police regarding people monitored using radio 
frequency (RF)-based EM or curfew orders (Graham and McIvor, 2015). Similarly connected 
to the discussion above, there needs to be a more detailed consideration concerning the 
potential ethical and legal challenges to privacy, data protection and human rights. Scholars 
have issued greater warnings such as Nellis (2014) and Graham and McIvor (2015; see also 
McIvor and Graham, 2016), however more research is required to fully address the issues and 
impact of GPS tracking on personal privacy, and the potential illegality of continuous ‘real 




There are apparent variable perceptions of EM’s punitiveness that must be accounted for, and 
as the scholarly debates have indicated, such punitiveness will vary across individuals, social 
groups, time, jurisdiction and culture (cf. Payne and Gainey, 2000a, 2000b; Graham and 
McIvor, 2017). This chapter has demonstrated an interest in better understanding the origins 
and developments of EM cross-culturally to contextualize the current project and provide the 
project with an analytical advantage. Put differently, the adoption of EM in a particular place 
may have more to do “with the internal dynamics of the commercial-corrections complex 
operating at a local level” than one had expected (Lilly and Nellis, 2013: 37). To see how EM 
has sustained over time requires us to examine what technological infrastructures have been 
put in place to make this monitoring possible; whose interests in EM were championed and 
whose were opposed; and the role and influence of the private sector organization in 
promoting and maintaining EM. As Lilly and Nellis (2013: 37-38) indicate, whether “the 
contemporary forms of EM survive” matters not; the “geolocation of offenders is unlikely to 
be a ‘fad’” if EM remains a “cheap and [an] accessible means” of accomplishing punitiveness 
for offenders in the community.  
By critically examining the origins, developments, and prevailing forms, norms and patterns 
of EM use in both the US and the UK, it is clear that there are structural and cultural factors 
underpinning EM’s influence in the US and the UK “which are not likely to be ironed out 
anytime soon[,]” the force of which, “and the tension between which, may even intensify” 
(Lilly and Nellis, 2013: 38; italics emphasized). There is no reason to think in either the US 
or the UK, EM will have no future. EM has earned a niche for itself in both the American and 
British criminal justice systems, created new occupation of private sector monitoring officers 
(Hucklesby, 2011) and given new penal/surveillant experiences to a large number of 
offenders (Mair and Nellis, 2013: 78-79). However, the spread of EM worldwide and 
acceptance by these systems does not mean that we relinquish our ability to critique the 
technology and its place within the lives of the marginalized who come into contact with it. 
The capacity to question EM’s “future penal trajectory” still exists (Lilly and Nellis, 2013: 
37), and it is through this project that such reconsiderations of the presence and promulgation 































Chapter 3: Carceral Conversations 
Introduction 
The aim of the chapter is to address the ongoing conversations within and between core and 
cognate disciplines examining carcerality. Exploring these carceral conversations is a 
warranted discussion, given the use of electronic monitoring (EM) programmes in over 25 
nations for over more than two decades (cf. Nellis et al., 2013). The history and thematic 
debates surrounding EM lay a solid foundation for its theorization, yet an attendance towards 
brilliant and diverse carceral scholarship in this chapter will place the current study in a 
strong position to analyze the EM programme in Scotland and its associated experiences in a 
more critical fashion.      
This chapter begins by first describing and examining the spatial turn in the criminology and 
carceral studies. A greater appreciation between space and crime has become rightly 
recognized within criminology and between cognate disciplines, and I set out to revisit the 
space/crime nexus and focus upon these connections in greater detail. I then discuss the 
importance of conceiving the notion of the ‘carceral’ and couple this discussion by outlining 
the developments made within the core discipline of geography. A geographical focus has 
been shown in the literature to possess great potential towards exploring the carceral, 
especially in terms of the conditions which acknowledge both the contingency of a carceral 
designation and the importance of the circumstantial and subjective experiences found within 
and throughout the ‘carceral’ (cf. Moran et al., 2017a, 2017b). I then pair this critical 
appraisal of carcerality with the significant subdisciplines of carceral geography and carceral 
mobilities. The emergence of these subdisciplines is indicative of their connections to the 
wider body of work in geography and criminology, and of these subdisciplines’ “synergies 
with the praxis of social change aimed at challenging and transforming prevalent relations, 
systems and structures of inequality and oppression” (Moran, 2015b: 7). Arguably, there is 
more to the carceral than a mere anchorage to the prison; it is in the mundane, banal and 
normative spaces and places of everyday life where we must conceive beyond the current 
latitudes of the carceral, and where I argue a greater carceral geographical appreciation of 





The ‘Spatial Turn’ in Criminology and Carceral Studies  
Spatial analysis is fundamental to criminological inquiry, and when criminologists engage 
with human lived experience and the complexities of life we must also consider how such 
research benefits new ways of thinking about space and crime, a thought which may help 
“extend the boundaries of current spatial/geographic criminology” (Hayward, 2012: 442; see 
also Hayward, 2004, 2016a, 2016b). Such a challenge provides criminologists an exemplary 
opportunity to “think differently about the role and nature of space in our discipline” and 
those with keen interests in spatiality (Hayward, 2012: 459). Spatial analysis within 
criminology has significantly grown into leading areas of ecological interest, such as 
environmental criminology, the ‘journey to crime’ literature, and the criminology of place 
(Brantingham and Brantingham, 1981, 1984, 1991, 2008; see also Andresen, 2006; Andresen 
et al., 2013; Bernasco, 2007; Bernasco and Block, 2009; Bernasco and Nieuwbeerta, 2005; 
Eck and Weisburd, 2015; Rengert, 1996, 2004; Rengert and Lockwood, 2008; Rengert and 
Wasilchik, 1985, 2000; Rengert et al., 1999; Rengert et al., 2005; Weisburd et al., 2008). As 
the history of criminology is told, and when it comes to criminology’s relationship with 
‘criminogenic’ space, Hayward (2012: 443) contends that the work of the Chicago School is 
“one moment [which] stands out above all others.” When Park and colleagues published The 
City (1925) it was through their respective essays that they (and in particular, Burgess’ (1925) 
essay) solidified Chicago-style (urban) sociology. By linking ‘human ecology’ and 
competition for space to Park and Burgess’ concentric zone model and applying it to the city 
of Chicago, the School’s interpretation of ‘space’ highlighted the significance of the 
geography of crime within the criminological discipline, becoming one of the earliest 
influencers on criminology’s relation to space (Hayward, 2012; Bookman and Gacek, 2017).3  
Brantingham and Brantinghams’s (1981, 1984, 1991, 2008) research has also made great 
strides in developing ecological understandings to the space/crime nexus, specifically 
focusing on the criminology of place and crime pattern modelling. Crime pattern theory 
(CPT), conceptualized by Brantingham and Brantingham (2008), centres on the notion that 
offenders, like everybody else, learn about their environment in going about their legitimate 
and everyday activities. As the pair assert, an ‘activity node’ becomes a place where one 
normally stops and performs activities for more than a trivial amount of time (for example, a 
                                                          
3 However, Hayward (2004) asserts the Chicago School’s legacy within criminology is certainly not immune 
from problems of its own, nor is it the only early influence on criminology’s relationship to space. For further 
discussion, see Hayward (2004).  
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home, a workplace, a shopping centre, etc.). ‘Paths’ become the routes that one takes from 
one node to another. Taken together, paths and nodes form an individual’s ‘activity space’, 
and an ‘awareness space’ is the area normally within visual range of the activity space 
(Brantingham and Brantingham, 2008). In effect, CPT argues that offenders commit offences 
at places where their awareness space overlaps with an attractive target, and while critics 
point to environmental criminology’s overemphasis upon rational choice approaches which 
“too readily distil[s] lived human experience and the complex fabric of life to leave only the 
discourse of demographics, statistics and multi-factorialism” (Hayward, 2012: 442), 
proponents argue that this particular focus within the space/crime nexus “provides an 
excellent starting point for testing the role of awareness space in crime location choices” and 
the meaningful, ‘sentimental’ journeys offenders make to commit crimes in their social 
worlds (Bernasco, 2010: 394; see also Bernasco, 2007; Bernasco and Block, 2009; Bernasco 
and Nieuwbeerta, 2005).  
Indeed, we have also seen growing academic interest in terms of the offender’s journey itself. 
As Rengert (2004: 169) contends, there are three elements of the journey to crime: (1) the 
‘starting point’ or reference point we measure the journey from; (2) the direction the criminal 
moves; and (3) the distance of the crime scene to the reference point. As the journey to crime 
literature suggests, one must understand the components of the many journeys of which crime 
patterns are composed in order to comprehend crime patterns in toto (Rengert, 2004; see also 
Rengert, 1996; Rengert and Lockwood, 2008; Rengert and Wasilchik, 1985, 2000; Rengert et 
al., 1999; Rengert et al., 2005).  
It is clear then that understanding crime, criminals and crime patterns warrants greater 
attention to spatial inquiry and place-based meanings. However, notions of space and place 
also implicate a variety of fields, including but not limited to sociology, philosophy, cultural 
studies, political science, and criminal justice, to name a few (cf. Philippopoulos-
Mihalopoulos, 2011; Jarzombek, 2010; Ogelsby and Ross, 2009; Marcuse, 2009; Escobar, 
2001; Desfor and Keil, 1999; Bookman and Gacek, 2017). Extending this focus of space and 
place beyond criminology illustrates the importance of related disciplines to the spatial turn 
in academia. For example, social and legal geography investigate the spatialization of law 
(Mitchell, 1997; Ford, 1999; Blomley and Sommers, 1999; Blomley, 2003a, 2003b, 2004, 
2005; Valverde, 2011), which have examined the divided practice of conceptualizing space in 
public and private realms. Geographers themselves have also shown how space and place are 
not simply ‘things’ or geometric zones, remaining open to the idea about what ‘space’ and 
53 
 
‘place’ constitute within empirical research (cf. Peck and Tickell, 2002; Jessop et al., 2008). 
Urban sociology continues to critique the normative understandings of the city, questioning 
how cities have become new places of advanced systemic, structural and interpersonal forms 
of social control. Cities are places where structures and practices of state and economic 
power are most dramatically affirmed, sustained, and perpetuated (cf. Desfor and Keil, 2000; 
Escobar, 2001; Joyce, 2003; Keil and Boudreau, 2006; Hubber and Currie, 2007; Sanscartier 
and Gacek, 2016; Bookman and Gacek, 2017). Overlapping social processes and practices 
found within the city certainly contribute to its vitality and value, but also its ability to 
regulate punishment, social and crime control.  
Space and place have become significant resources and variables to the operations of policing 
(cf. Eick, 2006; Herbert & Beckett, 2006, 2010; Bennett, 2009; Walby & Lippert, 2012; 
Walby & Hurl, 2014), to studies of courts and legal proceedings (Merry, 2001; Mawani, 
2007; Auty, 2009; Valverde, 2009; Layard, 2010; Moran, 2016), and to examinations of 
prisons and jails (cf. Crewe et al., 2014; Gacek, 2015, 2017, 2018; Moran, 2012, 2013a, 
2013b; 2015b). Indeed, a growing contribution from prison ethnography has examined space 
as an embodied practice and performance within such spaces of confinement (cf. De 
Viggiani, 2012; Drake and Earl, 2013; Crewe et al., 2014; Moran, 2013a, 2013b; Moran and 
Disney, 2017). Particularly relevant to criminal justice studies, the study of spaces and places 
provide key resources to the criminal justice process, ranging from experiences of crime to its 
subsequent reactions. For instance, people typically refer and reflect on certain places when 
they talk about crime and justice, and vice versa (cf. Warr, 1992; Andresen, 2006; Fornango, 
2010; Vilalta, 2013). For some, place could mean a home, a neighbourhood or a community; 
for others, it could mean a larger area like a city, some area where people exist in or move 
through, or even a sense of place created by temporary social practices (Lehman-Frisch, 
2011). As Kohm (2009) contends, spatial studies of neighbourhood-level perceptions of 
crime reveal that even in areas statistically associated with high levels of property and violent 
crime. Per Kohm (2009), residents may be more fearful of encounters with other forms of 
socially marginal behaviour within the everyday micro-level contexts of daily routines and 
lifestyles. Moreover, when some people speak of crime and justice they experience emotions 
about place and proximity, and through their understandings and variations of race, crime, 
and gender (cf. Koskela, 1997; Pain, 2001). Even Girling and colleagues (2000: 12) have 
commented on the need within the social sciences to develop a “place-sensitive sociology of 
public sensitivities towards crime.” In effect, to study space and place is to examine, critique 
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and assess the spaces and places where justice and injustice unfold (Kohm, 2017). By linking 
spaces and places to questions of justice and injustice, we push the boundary of discipline 
demarcations and open up new frontiers and conceptualizations of justice in theory and praxis 
(cf. Crank, 2004). 
The recent development of carceral geography is significantly influenced by and directly akin 
to the ‘spatial turn’ in criminology and the spatialization of carceral studies (Moran and 
Schliehe, 2017b: 3). Per Frank (2009: 66) the spatial turn has been “one of the most recently 
proclaimed turns within the human and social sciences”, and far from being a unified 
movement, the thematic and methodological reorientation consists of a variety of often 
diverse approaches to understand and conceive space (see also Gacek, 2017: 75; Warf and 
Arias, 2009). By drawing upon intellectual developments provoked by the spatial turn in 
social theory (cf. Lefebvre, 1991; Massey, 2005), the impact of the spatial turn has been 
substantive and far-reaching, especially for certain forms of socio-spatial criminology (cf. 
Hayward, 2012: 442). Notable scholars who have begun to theorize space in this regard 
include Hayward (2004, 2012, 2016a, 2016b), Campbell (2012a, 2012b) and Kindynis 
(2014). Indeed, these scholars offer alternative, prospective ways to potentially interpret 
relationships between space and crime.  
As Kindynis argues, theoretical developments in the spatial turn of social theory “have begun 
to offer a more sophisticated rendering of the lived experience and socio-cultural 
complexities” of the space/crime nexus (2014: 232; see also Moran and Schliehe, 2017b: 3). 
Such research, like that of Hayward (2004, 2012, 2016a, 2016b) and Campbell (2012a, 
2012b) have engaged directly with theorizations of space from cultural geography and 
cultural criminology, examining the potential resonances between the pair. Rather than 
viewing the environment simply as a geographic site, they aptly reconsider conventional 
understandings of space and encourage inquiry in criminology and carceral studies to 
examine space as part in parcel of “power relations, cultural and social dynamics,” and 
“everyday values and meanings” (Hayward, 2012: 441). In particular, Hayward (2016a, 
2016b) has recently reflected on the relationship between space and crime and its emergence 
in the past decade, focusing on spatial models and theoretical concepts on the one hand (using 
notions such as ‘container space,’ ‘soundscape,’ ‘parafunctional space,’ etc.) and examining 
specific types of spaces on the other (such as borders, rural spaces, and mega-security zones). 
Hayward (2016a, 2016b) actively encourages both the proliferation of cultural criminological 
spaces and alternative ways of interpreting relationships between space and crime, as doing 
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so strengthens criminology’s position for developing real world applications in policy and 
praxis in a more nuanced and comprehensive fashion. As a result, approaching space through 
criminology should view space “not as an undialectical void, but as a complex constellation 
of social and power relations” through its nexus with crime and must be understood in greater 
detail (Hayward, 2012: 459).   
In addition, spatial criminologists have attended to geographical research with a 
criminological lens (and vice versa), developing “innovative and explicitly spatial(izing) 
methodologies with which to generate further empirical insights” into the space/crime 
relationship (Kindynis, 2014: 232). Such research has included or drawn upon different 
cartographic or map methods, including (but not limited to) geo-tagging, global positioning 
satellite (GPS) systems, photo-mapping, and spatial transcript projects to obtain diverse 
insights. In effect, we are witnessing a new wave of socio-spatial criminology which blends 
together participant observation and other qualitative methods with quantitative geographic 
information systems (QGIS) to, for example, help develop new, politically nuanced 
‘alternative crime maps’ (Hayward, 2016a: 213; see also Schuurman, 2009 regarding the use 
of QGIS to store qualitative information to aid map interpretation and geographic profiling).     
In sum, there are conversations occurring across core and cognate disciplines, all of which 
recognizing the significance of the spatial turn to academic scholarship generally and to 
criminological and carceral studies specifically. With every new conversation comes a greater 
appreciation for space and place, and it is clear that criminology and carceral studies are 
important to this cause. However, as indicated in the introductory chapter, what has eluded 
scholastic attention until recently has been the conditions to which an entity could define 
itself as ‘carceral,’ be it a place, a practice, an experience, or something else (cf. Moran et al., 
2017a). As Moran and colleagues (2017a: 15) contend, the significance and scale of this word 
demands critical attention: “Forty years since Foucault deployed the term ‘carceral’, and two 
decades since geographers adopted it, for carceral geography to meaningfully engage…with 
interdisciplinary scholarship of confinement we must consider the possibilities presented by 
interpretations of the term that has become central to both our academic inquiry and the 
functioning of the societies within which we live.” I supplement their clarion call for 
continued interrogation of the ‘carceral,’ and in the following sections I attend to this term 




Thinking about the ‘Carceral’  
As Moran and colleagues suggest, the definition of the ‘carceral’ should be broadly 
conceived to enable a critical appraisal of carcerality “without eliciting an introspective 
definitional debate” (Moran et al., 2017a: 15). The authors provide a robust and thorough 
exegesis of the term, and by tracing the etymology of ‘carceral’ they argue that the term 
should be disentangled from the prison, as framing the ‘carceral’ solely in terms of the prison 
delineates a limited analytical field in which scholars can examine and critique carcerality. 
Simultaneously, they acknowledge that incarceration extends beyond the prison into a range 
of spaces, including but not limited to the factory, the school, the workplace, and the 
neighbourhood (for further discussions and examples see also Comack, 2008; Gill et al., 
2016; Woolford and Gacek, 2016). They also turn to Foucault’s ([1977]/1995) notion of 
‘compact’ versus ‘diffuse’ carceral models—the former being factory-convents, almshouses, 
institutions for abandoned children, and so forth, while the latter include charitable 
organizations, housing associations, and moral improvement societies—in an attempt to 
reconcile visions of the carceral, wherein the prison represents the “touchstone” around 
which less severe sites of incarceration are modeled (Moran et al., 2017a: 7; see also Hamlin 
and Speer (2017) for a critical response to Moran et. al (2017) and Moran et al. (2017b) for a 
response to Hamlin and Speer’s commentary).   
Despite the term’s archaic origins, Moran and colleagues (2017a: 3) indicate that ‘carceral’ 
has become a significant word for our times, as arguably we now speak of living within a 
“carceral age” more so than ever before (for a further discussion see also Bosworth and 
Kaufman, 2011). Indeed, there continues to be ongoing debates surrounding the legitimacy of 
incarceration in all its manifestations, and how incarceration transcends and differentiates 
between local and national cultural norms and practices. Such a carceral age is unequivocally 
characterized by unprecedented fluidity between forms of confinement “be they state-
sanctioned, quasi-legal, ad-hoc, illicit, spatially fixed, mobile, embodied or imagined” 
(Moran et al., 2017a: 3; see also Moran and Schliehe, 2017a). This characterization includes 
the visibility and scales of deployment of carceral techniques and technologies, all of which 
must be granted further attention generally and within the context of EM specifically.  
Beyond Foucault ([1977]/1995), Moran and colleagues suggest there are three conditions 
“that bear on the nature and quality of carcerality” (2017a: 12). The three ‘carceral 
conditions’ do not qualify carcerality; it would be a fraught pursuit, according to the authors, 
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to delineate qualifications as it could potentially produce an overly simplistic binary 
categorization of “carceral-or-not” (Moran et al., 2017a: 12). Instead, these conditions 
acknowledge the contingent nature of a carceral designation while highlighting the significant 
subjective experiences found within and throughout the carceral. Per Jefferson (2014: 49), to 
understand the experience of confinement “we must look not only at institutions or sites but 
at practices and meanings, or more crucially at the relations between sites, practices, social 
relations and subjectivity.” Moran and colleagues (2017a) suggest that a move towards an 
enriched discussion of the carceral could consider three conditions of carcerality: (1) 
detriment; (2) intention; and (3) spatiality. Combined, these three conditions suggest that 
there exist gradations of carcerality, that incarceration involves the intentional imposition of 
harm through space, and that space itself is key to the enactment of incarceration both 
through mechanisms of confinement and restricted mobility, relatively speaking.   
First, detriment refers to the “lived experience of harm, as perceived by those suffering it” 
(Moran et al., 2017a: 12). This condition focuses on the way in which detriment is 
experienced rather than whether detriment was intended. While they acknowledge that 
detriment may be unintended or intentionally aligned with punishment, the authors afford 
primacy to those individuals whose loss is experienced as detrimental, as such detriment can 
encompass physical, emotional and psychological pain and suffering as well as comparatively 
mild inconveniences.  
Intention is the second carceral condition and refers to the state agent(s) intending detriment 
through their operations of carceral spaces, practices, policies and technologies. However, 
Moran and colleagues readily acknowledge the condition of intent as problematic, 
particularly due to “the decision-making of calculative governance” (2017a: 13). Indeed, 
many state policies, for example, are justified as beneficial to the public and/or pragmatic and 
are punitive in their effects (Hamlin and Speer, 2017). Temporal distance is another issue to 
consider, as carceral geographers have identified the detriment felt by those individuals 
originates within an intention to harm, and exists as a lasting effect that persists long after 
actual incarceration has ceased. Nevertheless, Moran and colleagues assert that both formal 
and informal structures or organizations that intend or administers punishment are essential 
for carcerality. While the formal confinement of one person or group by another is a clear 
example (such as the administration of punishment upon inmates of a prison by state agents), 
we must also become attuned to the informal structures behind intention—namely, the 
motivations, norms, and informal expectations of behaviour manifesting within intent. An 
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example of the latter would be a family structure and/or dynamic which restricts the 
movement and agency of certain members.  
Finally, the carceral is achieved through spatiality, which is the third and final carceral 
condition. If the first two condition exist, then there will be space(s) to which both detriment 
and intention will relate “but both the nature of the space(s) and the ways in which the 
carceral is enabled and determined by its spatiality may radically differ” (Moran et al., 2017a: 
14). However manifested, carceral spatiality seems characterized by a “technology of 
confinement: (intentionally) keeping-in, (detrimentally) containing, those ‘within’” and 
where it purposefully keeps people and things out it does so primarily to protect its ability to 
delineate and keep those inside in (Moran et al., 2017a: 14). Therefore, while carceral 
spatiality is related to but distinct from the first two carceral conditions, there is more to it 
than simply observing that the carceral is spatial. Carceral spatiality refers to diverse 
(im)material technologies and the spatial relationships between and through them; the former 
delivers intent, while the latter is through which detriment is experienced, contested and 
resisted.  
Taken together, the three carceral conditions “enable the achievement of carcerality”, 
illustrating the spatial phenomena which delineate and literally enclose, the processes through 
which diverse mobilities are restricted and/or regulated, and the ways in which detriment and 
intention take on effects of incarceration long after periods of actual incarceration have ended 
(Moran et al., 2017a: 14; italics in original). These carceral conditions benefit the current 
study, as what can be included here are the arguably elusive and (in)tangible techniques 
through which the carceral “adheres” to particular spaces encountered post-custody and 
assume a certain carcerality about them (Moran et al., 2017a: 14). The territorial processes of 
EM rely in part on such carceral adherence and to the (in)formal practices and expectations of 
behaviour by which state actors and the surveilled abide by throughout the EM period. The 
EM period is simultaneously state-sanctioned, mobile, and imagined; while state agents and 
the surveilled make meaning through its carcerality, simultaneously these same actors 
produce and/or embody territoriality to which it is proscribed. Moran and colleague’s (2017a, 
2017b) attempt to delineate the ‘carceral’ advances a strong position for further interrogation 
of the term, which ultimately provides us with an opportunity to further explore strategies and 
technologies of control and confinement within our current carceral age. To understand such 
processes requires us to reconsider the carceral techniques and technologies pervading a 
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range of spaces and attitudes in modern society. A geographical focus is well suited for such 
an examination, and is taken up in the following sections.   
The ‘Carceral Turn’ in Geography 
Per Moran and colleagues (2017a: 1), the so-called punitive turns by governments in both 
welfare and justice policy can be aptly described as the ‘carceral turn,’ characterized not only 
by the growth in legal, state-sanctioned incarceration sentenced to ever-longer prison terms in 
punitive conditions, but by “the extra-penal mass supervision of increasing numbers of 
people whose lives are penetrated by the criminal justice system” (see also Moran and 
Schliehe, 2017b). Engaging with such developments from a geographical perspective, the 
carceral turn illustrates the deployment of a range of strategies of social control and coercion 
that operate beyond the prison. Technologies of surveillance and control to track offenders 
are a prime example of this carceral turn, as such EM technologies “enable a carceral ‘fix’ to 
operate beyond conventional carceral spaces,” permitting people to remain mobile in their 
communities relative to the curfews imposed upon them at sentencing (Moran et al., 2017a: 
1; see also Peters and Turner, 2015, 2017).   
As indicated above, the popular impression of prison as an enclosed and impervious space, 
cut-off from the wider world is being challenged by rising prison populations and 
technological innovations that have precipitated all manner of circulation and mobilities both 
within prison walls and across them. Such challenges have also received scholarly attention, 
as the examination of strategies and spaces of confinement become significant to the future 
development of geographical scholarship and other cognate disciplines. Academia has 
become increasingly mindful of how the ‘carceral’ is conceptualized within any research 
project undertaken, and the trajectories through which the ‘carceral turn’ will lead future 
research (Armstrong and Jefferson, 2017; see also Moran et al., 2017a; Schliehe and Moran, 
2017).  Indeed, many scholars have critically discussed Goffman’s (1961) notion of the ‘total 
institution’ in order to call attention to the interconnectedness of prisons and other carceral 
spaces (cf. Moran, 2015b; Gill et al., 2016; however, see Foster, 2017; Schliehe, 2016, 2017; 
Gacek, 2018 for a recovery of Goffman’s work in this respect). The intention of this attention 
has been to counter the imagination of the cloistered carceral institution, discussing instead 
the liminal, carceral spaces “betwixt and between” the inside and outside of prison (Moran, 
2015b: 90; see also Peters and Turner, 2015, 2017; Turner, 2016; Turner and Peters 2015, 
2016, 2017). The EM of offenders provides us a way in which to attend to the multi-scalar 
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contexts witnessed within carceral spaces, as these technologies and techniques of 
confinement and restricted mobility “leach into everyday domestic, street and institutional 
spaces with which both former inmates and their loved ones…come into contact” (Moran et 
al., 2017a: 5).  
Geography is a strong discipline to engage in questions of what a meta-institutional 
geography of the carceral would look like, asking not simply what a geography (from) 
‘above’ carceral institutions entails, but rather questioning what lies beyond the carceral sites 
and examining such spaces through a combination of “supra-, sub-, inter-, intra-, and extra-
institutional imaginaries and perspectives” (Gill et al., 2016: 2; see also Moran and Schliehe, 
2017b; Peters and Turner, 2015, 2016, 2017; Turner, 2014, 2016). Unlike prison studies, 
geographers approach the subject of carcerality with an emphasis on the continuities that 
stretch across institutional boundaries (cf. Allspach, 2010; Moran, 2012, 2013a, 2013b; 
Moran and Disney, 2017; Moran et al., 2015; 2017; Peters and Turner, 2015, 2017; Turner, 
2013; Turner and Peters, 2015, 2016, 2017; Villanueva, 2017a, 2017b) and do not restrict the 
scope of analysis to the bounds of inquiry at the institutional-level.  
In sum, carceral geography attends closely to these issues through work which is both diverse 
and multi-scalar. This subfield is well suited to focusing on a range of carceral spaces and 
places, from institutional, political and structural contexts at the macro level to the minute 
experiences, practices and agency of everyday life. Yet if carceral geography is to be a 
significant focus within the current study, what objects of study have been instrumental to its 
development? What, if anything, lies beyond the latitude of a carceral geographical 
perspective going forward? We must reconsider what elements of carceral geography have 
been essential to the “exponentially mounting possibilities of the carceral,” the increasingly 
diverse application of the ‘carceral’ and its subsequently expansive analytical field (Moran et 
al., 2017a: 4; 2017b; see also Moran and Schliehe, 2017a, 2017b; Schliehe and Moran, 2017).  
Developments in Carceral Geography  
Carceral geography “is not just a fancier name for the geography of prisons” (Routley, 2016: 
1); rather, it is a perspective which examines what lies above, beneath, betwixt, between and 
beyond carceral sites, practices, regimes, technologies and schemes. Even the term ‘carceral 
geography’ (Moran, 2012, 2013a, 2013b, 2015b; Moran et al., 2012) was coined to describe 
the relatively new and vibrant field of geography and geographical research into practices of 
incarceration, viewing such carceral spaces broadly “as a type of institution… whose 
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distributional geographies, and geographies of internal and external social and spatial 
relations, could be explored” (Moran, 2012: 306). As previously stated, it is a relatively new 
terrain for exploration; yet, carceral geography has been able to account for and critique the 
so-called ‘punitive turn’ in the West (cf. Wacquant, 2002), which has brought about new 
ways of thinking about geography, the state, and spaces of incarceration, detention, and 
captivity (cf. Gacek, 2015, 2017, 2018; Woolford and Gacek, 2016).  
Carceral geography’s emergence as a sub-discipline of human geography was originally 
heavily influenced by mobilities researchers issuing a clarion call for greater examination into 
the experiences and forms of movement and mobility within the social sciences (cf. Sheller 
and Urry, 2006). Characterized by the tensions between “apparent fixity and forced mobility” 
(Martin and Mitchelson, 2009: 461), carceral geography and its subsequent scholarship take 
seriously regimes of imprisonment, detention, temporary-holding and captivity (cf. Conlon, 
2011; Gacek, 2015, 2017, 2018; Martin and Mitchelson, 2009; Moran, 2015b; Moran and 
Disney, 2017; Moran et al., 2012; Moran et al., 2013; Moran et al., 2017; Moran and 
Schliehe, 2017a, 2017b; Morin, 2013, 2016; Morin and Moran, 2015;Peters and Turner, 
2015, 2017; Turner, 2013a, 2013b, 2014, 2016; Turner and Peters, 2015, 2016, 2017; 
Schliehe and Moran, 2017; Woolford and Gacek, 2016; Villanueva, 2017a, 2017b). Indeed, a 
major contribution of carceral geography has been its suggestion that how we define 
‘carceral’ should be something more than merely the spaces in which people are enclosed 
(Moran, 2013b: 176; see also Gacek, 2017, 2018). Such carceral spaces typically maintain “a 
selective and imperfect degree of separation” between what lies beyond and what exists 
inside the ‘carceral’ (Moran, 2015b: 90), existing “outside of and different from other spaces, 
but still inside the general social order” of societies within late modernity (Baer and 
Ravneberg, 2008: 214). This body of work suggests that the carceral can be delineated by and 
through psychological and social constructions, of which can leave lasting impacts upon 
incarcerated, (im)mobilized people (Moran, 2015b). As Turner (2014) contends, carceral 
geography has the potential to both highlight, deepen, and enrich understandings of the 
cultural manifestations that permeate carceral spaces and their complex relationships to the 
world around them (see also Morin, 2013, 2018; Woolford and Gacek, 2016).  
As illustrated above, carceral geography research is heavily influenced by Foucault 
([1977]/1995), but it also draws upon Agamben (1998, 2005). The former has been included 
to consider the development of the prison, surveillance, the regulation of space and the 
docility of bodies (Foucault, [1977]/1995), while the latter has been tapped by carceral 
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geography to flesh out and further comprehend spaces of exception; spaces where sovereign 
power suspends the law and produces a zone of abandonment (Agamben, 1998, 2005). This 
ontology carves up the imagined geography of discrete institutions which men and women 
enter from all walks of life and from whence they are ‘released’ in favour of emphasizing 
continuity across institutional and (typically) urban settings (Wacquant, 2001, 2009; 
Allspach, 2010; Gill et al., 2016). For example, Allspach (2010) introduced the notion of 
‘transcarceral spaces’ to help appraise the complex geographies of carcerality. Allspach 
studied prison experiences of federally sentenced women (pre-, during, and post-prison) in 
Canada, and drawing upon in-depth interviews, her research highlights the everyday 
geographies of women subjected to racialized, gendered, classed and criminalized practices 
along the long trajectories of institutional and/or structural social control. Allspach concluded 
that even after women were released from federal prisons in Canada “the practices of social 
control…produce continuities of confinement beyond prison walls on multiple levels” 
(Allspach, 2010: 721). Community policing, therapeutic courts, residential placements for 
post-release prisoners exist as some of the ‘transcarceral spaces,’ coupled with the programs 
and institutional arrangements that have worked to extend the reach and scope of social 
control in the West (cf. Villanueva, 2017a, 2017b). In a similar vein, Moran (2014: 37) 
examined the embodiment of incarceration by former prisoners in Russia, noting that 
“transcarceral spaces exist alongside and perhaps also in combination with an embodied 
sense of the ‘carceral’”. Such an embodied sense of the carceral, she argued, was “similarly 
mobile beyond the prison wall through the corporeality of released prisoners” (Moran, 2014: 
37).   
Other developments within carceral geography are worth mentioning as well, for they are 
indicative of the breadth of empiricism this discipline has reached thus far. For example, 
Crewe and colleagues (2014) have examined the emotional geographies of carceral spaces; 
Woolford and Gacek (2016) drew on carceral geography to theorize ‘genocidal carcerality’ in 
Indian residential schools in Canada; Baer and Ravneberg (2008), Gill (2013), Schliehe 
(2016), and my own work explored the complex notions of inside and outside in carceral 
spaces (Gacek, 2017), and I have further drawn upon carceral geography to examine former 
inmates’ experiences of solitary confinement within Canada (Gacek, 2018). Moran and 
Disney (2017) centre upon the prison visiting room, and through carceral geography they 
examine the space as an embodied geography of both presence and absence in which certain 
types of multiple and overlapping experiences are keenly felt (for further exploration of the 
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prison visiting room and impact upon family dynamic, parenting and experiences see Moran 
et al., 2017). Villanueva (2017a, 2017b) drew upon legal and carceral geography to not only 
focus on how carceral spaces are legally constituted within France’s social housing estates, 
but to also demonstrate how ‘prosecutorial spaces’ (such as district, community, and youth 
courts, alongside judges’ and prosecutors’ offices) become “key sites for the practices of 
surveillance, disciplining, detention and confinement” (Villanueva, 2017b: 149). Peters and 
Turner (2016) examined carceral geography in terms of the (im)mobilities aboard convict 
ships sailing between the British Empire and Australian colonies (see also Turner and Peters, 
2016), while Turner (2013b) focused upon carceral geography through geographical 
considerations of the ‘home’ to attend to the struggles prisoners face as they attempt to 
reintegrate into British society; Moran (2015a) discussed animal geographies of carceral 
space with reference to animals as contraband that penetrates the prison; and Morin (2016) 
has examined similarities between human and nonhuman carceral geographies, looking at 
close linkages and ‘carceral comparisons’ between prison and animal carceralities (see also 
Morin, 2018). By no means is this an exhaustive list as such scholarship is many, expansive, 
overlapping, entangling, and synergizing. Nevertheless, we can see how the “multiplicity of 
carceral spaces” as Brown (2014: 386) contends, “ultimately work together to create the 
carceral society” that has become common in late modernity (see also Gill et al., 2016; 
Moran et al., 2017a).  
It is clear that carceral geography has become increasingly recognized beyond the geography 
discipline (Schantz, 2017; see also Gacek, 2017, 2018; Maddrell, 2017; Mincke, 2017; Moran 
and Schliehe, 2017a, 2017b; Schliehe and Moran, 2017; Turner and Peters, 2016, 2017; 
Villanueva, 2017a, 2017b), and although its development has been rapid, it still attempts to 
gain on the strategies and spaces of confinement which have vastly expanded, diversified and 
proliferated which have outpaced it. A striking characteristic of carceral space is the 
movement of people. Carceral geographers have begun to recognize the enrolment of 
(im)mobility to view and interrogate how punishment is transferred between carceral 
establishments, problematize their relocations from prison post-release, and can act as the 
initiation into a “disorientating and subjectifying system” of carcerality (Gill et al., 2016: 5; 
see also Feldman, 1991; Stoller, 2003; Svensson and Svensson, 2006; Gill, 2009, 2013; 
Moran et al., 2012; Hiemstra, 2013; Michalon, 2013). Furthermore, transfers of arrested or 
detained individuals, offenders, inmates, police, lawyers, criminal justice social workers and 
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so forth can be justified on a wide array of administrative procedures, cost, severity of 
sentence, informal punishment and/or improvements to system efficiency (cf. Follis, 2015).  
Regardless of the justification, we see how the spatial churning of criminal justice actors 
serves as an important function in shoring up and performing the symbolic power of carceral 
spaces. Incarceration is far from mere immobilization; on the contrary, physical confinement 
is but one aspect of a much more fluid, mutable, and complicated series of movements across 
time and space (cf. Gill, 2009, 2013; Moran et al., 2012; Michalon, 2013; Mincke, 2017; 
Peters and Turner, 2015, 2017; Turner and Peters, 2015, 2016, 2017). As the next section 
indicates, carceral geography has begun to explore such movement in greater detail. When 
carceral spaces are understood as relatively mobile, such a notion destabilizes the spatial 
separateness between prison and society (cf. Peters and Turner, 2017; Schliehe and Moran, 
2017). Arguably, the EM of offenders is an example of this continual blur between carceral 
regimes, technologies, practices and the wider communities’ tagged offenders and monitoring 
officers inhabit and experience in everyday life. To conceive carceral mobility and questions 
of agency is to allow us a better sense of the symbolic, social and material relations across 
and between spaces and places.    
Carceral Mobilities  
To confine attention to the movement of people within and between carceral spaces is to 
narrowly sharpen the scope of a much wider phenomena of circuitry involving people, 
objects and practices (cf. Gill, 2009, 2013; Schliehe, 2017). On the one hand, to require 
bailed, tagged and otherwise monitored individuals to move with greater sense of relative 
freedom, even when they are ostensibly not incarcerated, creates and reinforces comparably 
unfree conditions and experiences (cf. Peters and Turner, 2017). On the other hand, inmates 
are not the only subjects within spaces of incarceration to experience this carceral churn. For 
instance, correctional officers experience a significantly different carceral churn and spatial 
transfer than their elite counterparts (i.e. the judiciary and/or institutional directors or 
wardens). These groups of criminal justice actors orbit within a different, transcarceral space 
(Allspach, 2010; Gill et al., 2016). Therefore, the circulation of people, objects, practices and 
experiences can supplement a larger discussion concerning how spaces of incarceration and 
practices and processes (im)mobility—in other words, the study of carceral mobilities—
intersect, coalesce, and conflict simultaneously. 
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As Peters and Turner (2017) indicate, at first glance, the words ‘carceral’ and ‘mobilities’ 
appear to sit uneasily together. “Consider the brute physicality of a prison wall[,]” the authors 
suggest; whether the wall is “stone, brick, edged with barbed wire, or flanked with 
surveillance, the boundary between the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’ of this particular 
space...marks an assumed boundary between movement and stasis” (Peters and Turner, 2017: 
1). Outside, there is a presumed freedom of movement, a liberty to move freely at one’s own 
will; inside, however, there is an assumed prohibition of movement, an imposed stasis and 
immobility. Yet the authors contend that scholarship is now reconsidering the boundary, 
turning towards how “the key tenets of mobilities thinking might be reanalyzed in the context 
of the carceral[,] and how the carceral can be better understood through an attention to 
mobilities” (Peters and Turner, 2017: 4; see also Altin and Minca, 2017; Brown, 2017; 
Fishwick and Wearing, 2017; Gacek, 2017; Gutiérrez Rivera, 2017; Turner, 2016; Turner and 
Peters, 2015, 2016). Carceral mobility is another sub-discipline best suited to examining the 
“coerced, disciplined, and also emancipatory, minute, temporal, partial and laborious motions 
that are part and parcel of what it is to be incarcerated” (Turner and Peters, 2016: 99; see also 
Peters and Turner, 2015). Such literature unhinges carceral spaces from sedentarist ontologies 
that conceptualise spaces of detention, imprisonment and captivity as ones of stability and 
fixity, and allow us to explore “mobile lives…and…make sense of both historical events and 
the formation of mobility norms in the present” (Turner and Peters, 2016: 97).  
Indeed, mobilities research is now an established field of academic enquiry (cf. 
Faulconbridge and Hui, 2016). A proliferation of wide-ranging work on the politics 
underscoring the movements of people, objects, and information has emerged because of two 
significant papers that argued for a repositioning of mobilities scholarship within social 
science agendas (Hannam et al., 2006; Sheller and Urry, 2006). What this ‘mobility thinking’ 
has accomplished is a re-examination of how one might consider and study a world that is 
always ‘on the move’ in late modernity (Cresswell, 2006). The notion of mobility has 
generally been linked to autonomy, movement, freedom and transgression, but it did not 
always have these meanings (Cresswell, 2006). Current representations of mobility are 
connected to Western modernity, the expansion of global capitalism, and the rise of 
technologies (Gutiérrez Rivera, 2017). Aside from such representational meanings, mobility 
is also physical –put simply, mobility is “practiced, experienced, [and] embodied” 
(Cresswell, 2006: 2). Furthermore, mobilities is not value-neutral; it can be an instrument of 
power, of which not all people have equal access to its operation or implementation (Murray, 
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2009; Moran et al., 2012; Fishwick and Wearing, 2017; Gutiérrez Rivera, 2017). Similarly, 
EM is not value-neutral; as Bülow (2014) reminds us, EM’s technological design as well as 
its potential technological functions, as indicated in the prior chapter, can have ethical 
implications for both monitoring officers and the tagged offenders. Certain individuals under 
an EM period may have restricted movement or limited access to a place or area, while others 
may be forced to move (as is the case with EM programmes; see for example Nellis et al., 
2013). In any case, we must be mindful that both punishment and mobility is experienced 
differently between individuals and groups (Payne and Gainey, 2000a, 2000b), and while 
some may not be affected by the sanction, others may be unfairly punished through EM and 
the burden it places upon an offender’s mobility. 
As is well documented elsewhere (cf. Cresswell and Merriman, 2011; Adey et al., 2014; 
Jungnickel, 2014), mobilities research has ranged from a study of technologies of motion 
(bicycles, cars, buses, trains, airplanes), to the infrastructure that either enable or disable 
mobility (data centres, airports, rails, roads, sidewalks). This area includes the subjects made 
(im)mobile by regimes of control and regulation (tourists, migrants, commuters, and so 
forth), as well as the materialities which shape and are shaped by mobilities (passports, 
currency, fossil fuels, etc.) (cf. Jungnickel, 2014). Mobility can also draw attention to the 
psychosocial dimensions of spatiality. For instance, my own study with ten men who have 
experienced incarceration in Manitoba, Canada have focused in part upon the role of inner, 
mental spaces to disconnect from their physical existence ‘inside’ the prison to ephemerally 
‘escape’ their carceral lives (Gacek, 2017). Through the power of the mind, imaginative 
mobility became “a bridge towards phantasmagorical spaces” (Gacek, 2017: 81). Movement 
and place became essential components for existential travel between the real and the 
imaginary, and forging a strong connexion to the sacred inner sanctums of the mind as a sort 
of personal liberation (Gacek, 2017: 81-82).   
In effect, the “maturity” (Faulconbridge and Hui, 2016: 8) of the “mobilities paradigm” 
(Sheller and Urry, 2006: 207; see also Adey, 2006) relies upon the recognition that (carceral) 
mobilities research is moving forwards; drawing upon new spaces, subjects, occurrences, 
events and temporalities in order to generate fresh discussion for scholars investigating 
carceral environments (cf. Peters and Turner, 2017). In contemporary carceral studies, to 
move is to journey from one point to point, charting a geometric and horizontal trajectory 
across space. Yet as Turner and Peters (2016: 97) argue, rethinking mobility within 
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criminology and carceral studies is more than this trajectory; mobility is also the politics of 
motion in the process of moving:  
Accordingly, mobility is not the abstract macro-movement along a path or line: it 
is the minute, intimate, embodied, power-filled ways and methods of moving 
within the path or along the line. If we are to move (literally) beyond thinking 
carceral movements as ‘travels’ between fixed nodes to a more probing 
understanding of how, why, whom, by what means, and under what conditions 
subjects, objects, ideas and elements move—then the literature still has some way 
to go. With mobility studies exploring the ways in which motion is never 
straightforward—occurring forwards and backwards; horizontally and vertically; 
as well as under and over.  
Therefore, studies of mobility urge us to pay attention to what occurs during and in-between 
movement. These features of mobility require our attention as they have the potential “to 
fundamentally shape what it is, means and feels to move and not move and it is these that 
carceral scholars have yet to fully reveal” (Turner and Peters, 2016: 110; italics emphasized).  
New comprehensions of space, through a mobility lens, might be called what Thrift (2005: 
592) refers to as ‘movement-space’: “folded and animate because everything can be framed 
in perpetual movement.” This allows us to critically question how “mobility is part and parcel 
of carcerality” (Peters and Turner, 2017: 3), as “[m]obility is… a constant practical concern 
in the management of penal systems” (Moran et al., 2012: 339). No regime of incarceration is 
without movement, as movement dictates and predicates what is to be detained, imprisoned 
or held captive (Mountz et al., 2013; see also Altin and Minca, 2017; Comack, 2008; 
Fishwick and Wearing, 2017; Gill, 2009; Gutiérrez Rivera, 2017; Moran et al., 2012; Moran 
et al., 2013; Mountz and Lloyd, 2014; Peters and Turner, 2015, 2017; Turner and Peters, 
2015, 2016, 2017; Woolford and Gacek, 2016). While mobilities research expresses an 
explicit focus on how the dimensions of power are embedded in mobile (as well as how 
immobility is produced through power), it can also offer a framework for better 
understanding the operation of power that works to confine, detain, contain, immobilize, and 
“also make mobile incarcerated peoples” (Peters and Turner, 2017: 3; italics in original, see 
also Peters and Turner, 2015 and Turner and Peters, 2016). Likewise, carceral settings and 
environments provide fertile ground to generate fresh understandings into queries of “how, 
why, [and] in what ways are people and objects able, unable, and restricted in their 
movement” (Peters and Turner, 2017: 3; see also Schliehe, 2017 regarding complex micro-
scale mobilities of objects, people and locomotion).  
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Of course, one must be cautious of exploring mobility within and between sites and spaces of 
incarceration; the possibility exists that “if we explore mobility in everything” as Adey 
asserts, “and fail to examine the differences and relations between them, it becomes not 
meaningless, but, there is a danger in mobilizing the world into a transient, yet featureless, 
homogeneity” (2006: 91). Undoubtedly, this is a caution which I recognize. Nevertheless, 
carceral mobilities, in line with carceral geography, is in a strong position to assess the 
gradations of carcerality betwixt and between spaces and sites of EM, and provides an 
opportunity to assess the ways in which “movements are (re)made and (re)produced in sites 
that have established, concretized, and enduring appearances as ones of relative stasis” 
(Peters and Turner, 2017: 9; see also Peters and Turner, 2015). Its distinction of the relations 
between inside/outside and (im)mobility is evidenced in sites of detention, captivity and 
holding, such as the prison, the migrant camp, the detention facility, and the quarantine 
island, to name a few. Carceral spaces, moving beyond normative frameworks and 
knowledges which cements rigid dichotomies between inside/outside and (im)mobility, 
should be conceptualized as spaces which reach into, beyond, spill over, muddy, and “blur 
any socially and materially constructed boundaries” (Peters and Turner, 2017: 2; see also 
Turner, 2016). To borrow from actor-network theory, the carceral landscape could be 
conceived as “fibrous, thread-like, wiry, [and] ropy’ (Latour, 1997: 3). In this landscape, 
routes, courses and pathways that constitute carceral spaces are addressed in their own right 
through (im)mobility, rather than as interstices (Gill et al., 2016). To maintain fixed attributes 
and aspects of carceral spaces is to uphold an illusory image of immobility; a “visual 
trickery” of sorts (Peters and Turner, 2017: 2; Turner and Peters, 2016), which limits the 
possibilities of engagement to unlock new knowledges of (im)mobilization, as well as the 
degree to which (im)mobilizing carceral regimes (such as EM and other likeminded 
surveillant technologies) have extended into and proliferated within everyday spaces and 
places.  
Furthermore, the circulation of people around the carceral space is occasionally substituted 
for, and complimented by the material circulation of objects (Schliehe, 2017; see also Turner 
and Peters, 2015). Within spaces of incarceration, detention, long-term captivity or relative 
mobility, these material objects link incarcerated individuals to their families, previous lives 
and legal supports, and positions these individuals within broader circuits of global forces 
which center on supply and demand, labour and exchange, and production and consumption 
(cf. Conlon and Hiemstra, 2014, 2016; Schiller, 2014). Such circuity of objects includes, but 
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is not limited to, “possessions, memos, letters, stamps, books and magazines, photographs, 
food items, toiletries, as well as packages and gifts that express emotional attachments and 
needs” (Gill et al., 2016: 5). As Michalon (2013: 50) notes, “[t]he spatial dimensions of 
confinement is not only a matter of fences” and this is exemplified in the case of EM. The 
surveillant technologies of the EM bracelet, the home monitoring unit (HMU) installed in the 
offender’s residence, the electronic ID badge worn by Guard 4 Securior (G4S) agents and the 
unmarked vehicles which they drive to such residences are examples of objects which 
circulate within the wider ‘surveillant assemblage’ (as discussed in subsequent chapters) and 
should be considered within the carceral circuitry of objects (cf. Haggerty and Ericson, 2000). 
EM regimes are predicated on complicit self-monitoring and self-management, 
simultaneously permitting and sentencing the monitored person “to take up their social 
responsibility and continue to fulfill their work-related and familial obligations” (should they 
have any) (Gill, 2013: 22), and exacerbating the dynamic and “often contradictory state of 
betweenness” that comes with experiencing community penalities (Baer and Ravneberg, 
2008: 205). Therefore, the control and regulation of mobility between G4S agents and 
monitored persons works with other institutional processes to constitute the criminalizable 
‘other’ as someone locatable, knowable, and pathological (for an example of how mobility is 
regulated and controlled within the juvenile court system, see Brown, 2017). By tracing the 
circuity of material objects through carceral spaces, not only can we gain insight into the 
social and cultural significance of ‘things,’ but we further interrogate the tightness with which 
carceral and surveillant authorities spatially restrict various materials, populations, and 
territories (cf. Gill et al., 2017; Brown, 2017).  
Finally, both carceral geography and carceral mobilities also require an attention to scale and 
reflection, two geographic tropes for understanding the operation and dissemination of 
power. The scales in which carceral mobilities operate—from national level-regimes that 
function to constrain and immobilize (such as the National Electronic Monitoring Centre 
(NEMC) based in Glasgow, Scotland and the NEMC’s strategies, policies and technologies to 
monitor offenders) to the local scale of movements within everyday spaces and places which 
feel carceral (such as the shifts in offender’s routines while undergoing EM, which (re)shape 
their lifestyles into pseudo-punishments). Although not intrinsically punitive, the ‘surveillant 
control’ of offenders is not an ethically or politically neutral capacity. Focusing on the 
carceral geographies and mobilities beyond the prison highlights the ways in which EM can 
be seen as fulfilling a ‘shadow’ state function of surveillance and governance, thereby 
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potentially being experienced as an extension of the ‘Panoptic’ functions of the prison, and 
relying upon compliance through “ethical self-steering mechanisms” (Rose, 2000: 321; see 
also Maddrell, 2017: 223). In its essence, the current forms of EM help to check that required 
restrictions are adhered to (cf. Nellis, 2006), and this can be done either through Radio 
Frequency (RF) or Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) systems. In either case, these 
technologies constitute a distinct form of surveillance, one that has enabled restriction in 
public and private spaces to become a meaningful punishment in ways that were not possible 
before (Nellis, 2006).   
Conclusion 
This chapter illustrates the interdisciplinary conversations surrounding the conceptualization 
of the ‘carceral.’ New comprehensions of space can be witnessed when we examine the 
possibilities the carceral can create for criminology, carceral studies, geography, and mobility 
research. While the debate ensues, it is clear that the experiences, practices and agency 
associated with carceral spatiality continues to increase, resulting in expansion, 
diversification and proliferation of strategies of control and coercion to which carceral 
conversations are attuned.  
Thinking about the carceral has demonstrated that carceral geography is well suited to further 
interrogate EM and its associated surveillant technologies. Per Moran (2015b: 149), carceral 
geography “has already made substantial progress, has already established useful and fruitful 
dialogues with cognate disciplines [like] criminology and prison sociology, and is attuned to 
issues of contemporary import such as hyperincarceration and the advance of the punitive 
state.” Nevertheless, while the latitudes of carceral geography are vast, going forward there is 
still much more to examine beyond conventional associations of the carceral to the prison; the 
everyday spaces and places—and degrees of mobility between them—must be where we 
focus upon EM in greater detail. Arguably, to feel the carceral, yet not critique the nature of 
its presence, demonstrates the normative nature of the carceral age in which we find 
ourselves. Indeed, the societal spread of the carceral becomes a “great carceral network” 
which “reaches all the disciplinary mechanisms which function throughout society” 
(Foucault, [1977]/1995: 298). Such spread needs to be recognized as an embodied, 
imaginative experience, “with the capacity to co-produce the mundane and the symbolic” 
(Maddrell, 2017: 222; see also Maddrell, 2011, 2013). The carceral conditions to which 
allows EM its mundanity, banality and normativity needs to be redressed, and it is through 
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the current study that I shed light on the territoriality of EM’s carcerality. EM is part in parcel 
to this carceral system; reaching far beyond the prison, it both draws upon and exudes 
disciplinary control, and supplements the most “coercive technologies of behaviour” the 
carceral system can produce (Foucault, [1977]/1995: 293). Only by examining the 
mobilisation of the practices and performances of EM can we then become attuned to 
potential new ways of seeing and thinking about EM, and the interdigitations between EM, 
the carceral system, and society at large (cf. Gale et al., 2015: 7).  
It is clear that academic scholarship has explored in great detail, but not likely exhausted, 
“the range and multiplicity of material, virtual and imagined spaces with which the carceral 
has been articulated” (Moran et al., 2017a: 14; italics emphasized). However, the carceral 
conversations witnessed in this chapter recognizes that my current study stands on 
scholarship that has come to form the bedrock of insightful carceral analyses. The carceral 
conditions of detriment, intention, and spatiality are not enough to fully appreciate the 
complexities of EM; we must also examine the territoriality at play within this technology. 
My study brings together the notions of the carceral and the territorial in order to analyze 
EM. As the next chapter articulates, EM, as a form of carceral territory, contributes to these 
carceral conversations, and it is through the societal spread of the carceral that we can 
continue to explore the material, virtual and imaginative aspects of territoriality imbued 













Chapter 4: Electronic Monitoring – A Case for Carceral Territory 
Introduction 
A critical appraisal of carcerality demonstrates how diverse scholarly conversations have 
become when conceptualizing the notion of the ‘carceral’. As I have indicated in prior 
chapters, electronic monitoring (EM) manifests as an explicit symbol of punishment for the 
individual while they remain within their home and community and a notion which is already 
explicitly discussed in literature addressing community sanctions, penalties, and alternatives 
to confinement (cf. Bottoms, 1995, 2001; Bottoms et al., 2004, Nellis, 2004, 2010, 2013a). 
However, what has eluded attention until now has been a scholastic exploration which 
interweaves together a critical appraisal of carcerality with the practices and experiences of 
EM.  
Indeed, such an exploration further begs the question of how aspects of carcerality directly 
hook up with and connect to individual lives on the outside of traditional spaces of 
incarceration. If the carceral is more than a mere anchorage to the prison, as Moran and 
colleagues (2017a) suggest, then is it possible to explore aspects of carcerality within the 
private space of the offender’s home? What effect do these aspects have upon offenders and 
their routines and behaviours, family and friends? There exists a greater exploration of how 
EM, as one tool of the carceral regime, literally and legitimately territorializes spaces in the 
community to monitor offender compliance and its violations. EM is but one technological 
advancement of the government’s arsenal among many, which spreads the carceral beyond 
the anchorage of the prison and into the community spaces and places of everyday life. In 
doing so, a fuller discussion must be had in terms of how EM takes place—not only through 
its protocols and procedures (whether they be directly controlled through government or 
contracted out to the private sector, the latter being the case of G4S Scotland), but also 
through its manifestation in the physical residence of the offender.  
This chapter makes a theoretical case for ‘carceral territory’ which I refer to here as the 
inscription and/or imposition of punishment upon the personal territories, routines and 
lifestyles of inmates and their loved ones. As a form of carceral territory, EM geographically 
spreads the carceral out into society, permeating the homes and residences of those it seeks to 
monitor and punish. In order to explore this notion, the chapter is structured as follows. First, 
the chapter will outline the significance of territory to the current study, drawing upon Sack’s 
(1981, 1983) and Brighenti’s (2006, 2007, 2010) respective research on territoriality. A 
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greater attention to territoriality may be the best strategy for exploring EM practices in 
Scotland, as it provides a fuller examination of how territory sutures the criminal justice 
system, the private sector, the offenders and those associated to offenders (i.e. family and 
friends) together, configuring a continuum of contact and control amongst a variety of actors 
through a particular space and place (i.e. a physical residence). Drawing upon Sack’s (1983) 
three primary territorial tendencies—classification, communication, and the enforcement of 
access—I endeavour to parse out a richer discussion of how these tendencies are essential to 
consider in order to conceptualize territory within and across the particular spaces and places 
of an offender’s everyday life. Next, I define and draw upon important aspects of space, 
place, and time, and reconsider their significance in relation to territory. Following this I 
make significant connections between territory and temporality, visibility, and surveillance, 
addressing how each interdigitates with territory. A common thread between visibility and 
surveillance is the recognition of the boundaries which delineate what can and cannot be 
made visible and/or surveilled, a topic of which I further discuss and analyze in greater detail. 
I then return to the question of time and space, examining the extent to which time and 
space—with further attention accorded to scale and jurisdiction—are necessary elements of 
territory, especially in terms of the ‘timespaces’ socially constructed within the carceral 
territory and the ‘timepass’ experienced by those subjected to EM conditions. In effect, I 
view carceral territory as an apt frame of reference to geographically contextualize EM 
alongside the embodied experiences of those whom are tasked with installation and 
maintenance of the EM system and those subjected to monitoring upon release from carceral 
spaces. A more capacious conception of how carceral territories are created, sustained, and 
perpetuated in the spaces and places of everyday life. In conclusion, I argue a focus on 
carceral territory is not limited to the geographical contexts and embodied, emplaced 
experiences of EM subjects; as a significant frame of reference, the originality of the notion 
has the potential to critically query the societal spread of the carceral, to make a meaningful 
contribution to existing carceral scholarship, and to provide a more robust understanding of 
alternative measures to confinement and community sanctions going forward.    
‘Taking Place’: Talking about Territory  
As Brighenti (2006: 65) contends, one of the main difficulties in talking about territory is that 
this concept is transversal to many different disciplines—geography, sociology, ecology, 
anthropology, and law, to name a few—all of which “assume to have a clear understanding of 
their own object. Consequently, the wide interest in territorial phenomena, territorial 
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dynamics, and territorial features paradoxically [fail] to generate an open debate on the 
topic.” Focusing on territory in a non-conventional way has the potential to problematize 
unstated assumptions about the realities of everyday life, while allowing us to remain open to 
different discourses and epistemic frameworks. A mainstream view of territory, 
commonsensical in the social, legal and political sciences, conceives the concept as “a 
portion of land under the authority and within the jurisdiction of a local or central agency” 
(Brighenti, 2006: 66). While Brighenti indicates that various disciplines have made important 
contributions to demystifying the traditional image of territory and reshaping our 
understanding of the nature of the relationship between territory and society, “the concept of 
territory underpinning numerous analyses, even by critical scholars, remains surprisingly 
naïve” (2006: 66).  
Elden makes a similar assertion to Brigenti, insofar as Elden argues that although it is a 
central term within political theory, geography, and international relations, “the concept of 
territory has been underexamined” (2013a: 3; italics in original; see also Elden, 2013b). 
Rather than undertake a definitional task in attempting to bring all perspectives on territory 
into one coherent form—a fraught task which leads toward an impossible synthesis (cf. 
Brighenti, 2006, 2010)—territory should be explored here as a working concept, whose 
starting point “is not the question of what is territory in the first place” (Brighenti, 2006: 66; 
italics in original). Instead, we should begin to question what can be grasped by describing a 
series of relational phenomena rather than a series of objects as a territory, and what one can 
learn through relationships as a territorial endeavour. Therefore, to explore a constellation of 
attributes which can be predicated upon territory allows us to further address possible 
analytical traits of the territory concept. This shift from treating territories as “a priori givens” 
(Murphy, 2012: 159) to focusing on how territorial structures, practices and relationships 
coming into being and are maintained allow us to further question “what…territorial 
arrangements mean or represent, and how they function in relation to other geographical 
processes and practices” (Murphy, 2012: 159). Indeed, rather than accept the concept of 
territory as a hard fact which provides the visible support or backup of invisible social ties 
and relationships, understanding territory as a working and relative concept explores how 
every type of social tie and relationship “can be imagined and constructed as territorial” 
(Brighenti, 2006: 66-67; italics emphasized).  
Of course, one remains mindful that not all territories are identical, and that territories differ 
dramatically in terms of degrees of their visibility. Nevertheless, if the most visible ones are 
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recognized as proper territories, then such visibility effects depend in part upon specific 
relational arrangements: “Only once relations among subjects, rather than space, are put at 
the conceptual core of territory, it becomes possible to capture the ways in which spatial and 
non-spatial territories are superimposed one onto the other and endowed with multiple 
reciprocal connections” (Brighenti, 2006: 67; see also Brighenti, 2010). In doing so, this 
relational conception strives to avoid reducing territory to mere space imbued with power, 
and highlights the dimension of power involved in and crucial to human interaction and 
relations.  
Drawing upon this conception allows us to attend to two important points about territory: (1) 
the function of territory; and (2) territory as an imagined entity. The first point is that territory 
has fundamentally to do with functions, insofar as for both animals and humans, these 
functions are usually understood as control, defense, reproduction, and access to resources 
(cf. Brighenti, 2006, 2010). Second, territory as an imagined entity indicates a space which is 
“carved out, excerpted and circumscribed in view of a set of tasks to carry out” (Brighenti, 
2006: 68), a point which has similarly been raised within geographical literature focusing on 
carceral spatiality (cf. Gill et al., 2016; Moran et al., 2015, 2017; Moran and Schliehe, 2017a, 
2017b; Woolford and Gacek, 2016). Territory is not solely a physical setting whereby 
someone is recognized as an intruder or insider (or other equivalent qualification) to one’s 
territory; rather, such recognition and subsequent separation become what Brighenti (2006: 
68) refers to as “two basic types of cospecifics”. In other words, this is what territory is all 
about; to be territorial(ized) is part and parcel to processes of inclusion and exclusion—as 
well as processes of (im)mobility and (in)visibility—in both the constitution and order of 
social groups (cf. Brighenti, 2007). Therefore, territory becomes relational, a type of 
intraspecific communication which recognizes dimensions of power and captures the 
superimposition of multiple relationships and interactions within its parameters. While such 
relationships and interactions are the product of how territories are imagined and constructed, 
we must further consider the strategic dimensions of power embedded within territory and 
particular tendencies associated with its functioning, a discussion of which I turn to next.  
Primary Tendencies of Territory 
Sack’s (1981, 1983) research on territoriality has been considered one of the most fruitful 
theoretical reflections on territory as a crucial and strategic dimension of power (cf. 
Brighenti, 2006, 2007, 2010). Indeed, to conceive of EM within a carceral territorial 
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framework is to rightly draw upon such theoretical reflections. As will be discussed below, 
Sack’s (1983) ‘territorial tendencies’ or primary conditions of territory are significant to this 
study, as such tendencies enable us to comprehend the processes of both MOs and MPs all 
the while supplementing a further theorizing of the parallels between the ‘carceral’ and the 
‘territorial.’  
Rejecting naturalist determinism and reframing the question of territory as inherently 
political, Sack defines territoriality as “the attempt by an individual or group to affect, 
influence or control people, phenomena and relationships, by delimiting and asserting control 
over a geographic area” (Sack, 1981: 19; see also Sack, 1983: 55). By making strategy a 
central concern, this point of view has the advantage of identifying crucial—yet often 
neglected—features, such as highlighting how territories may exist in degrees, and that they 
can be switched on and off according to strategic aims (Sack, 1981, 1983). In effect, such 
research foregrounds the potentially flexible and selective quality of territoriality. Of course, 
control of space is just one—albeit an important one—function among many territorial 
functions, and while different people live together within shared social patterns and 
institutions, they are territorialized on them. However, as Brighenti (2006: 69) indicates, 
these groups of people often interpret strategies and territories “in contradictory, controversial 
and even conflicting ways.” While a territorial framework may work towards full control 
within a territory’s parameters, such an ideal can never fully be accomplished, and no 
presumptions should be made regarding “one-to-one correspondence between as single 
territory and a single strategy” (Brighenti, 2006: 69).  
Indeed, Sack argues that such correspondence will be along a continuum “from direct 
contact, which means touching, to degrees of indirect contact, from speaking face to face to 
transmitting information via electromagnetic waves” (1983: 56). He asserts that these forms 
of correspondence and contact remain predominantly contingent upon technological 
advancements, and while not explicitly referring to EM, it becomes clear that aspects of this 
continuum can be witnessed within the surveillant technology. EM involves a continuum of 
correspondence, from the radio frequency (RF) emitted from the tag and the home monitoring 
unit (HMU) installed in the home, which is then received by the EM systems located in the 
National Electronic Monitoring Centre (NEMC); the phone conversations between monitored 
persons (MPs)4 and monitoring officers (MOs); and the direct interactions between MPs and 
                                                          
4 Discussions with staff at the NEMC indicated that ‘MOs’ and ‘MPs’ are the terms they use to carry out 
monitoring services at G4S Scotland. 
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mobile MOs in the field when MOs engage in select visits with MPs whose statuses have 
changed in the EM system (for example, through an EM strap tamper or a breach in curfew, 
etc.). Therefore, we can see how the continuum of correspondence is significant to the 
configuration of the territorial process inside the MO’s physical residence; throughout the 
EM period, the interactions between MPs, MOs, and associated objects, spaces and places of 
restricted mobility are configured to ensure appropriate relationships and territoriality are 
established and maintained. In effect, territoriality becomes a means by which one can affect, 
influence, or control another, and gradations of territorializing (i.e. how one space or places 
exists as more territorial than others), much like gradations of carcerality, will rely upon the 
extension of action through a continuum of contact and its configuration within a particular 
spatial carrier. Per Sack (1983), regardless of the innumerable kinds of territoriality which 
exist in society, territoriality is always socially or humanly constructed and should be defined 
within a social context. While territoriality may exist in various forms, and will be contingent 
upon society’s “levels of hierarchies, forms of technology[,]… historical conditions and 
reasons for control,” the relationship between x and y will not exist within a territory unless 
specified by the definition to which we ascribe it (Sack, 1983: 57).   
Given certain conditions, Sack argues that there are three predominant tendencies of 
territoriality which come to the fore: (1) classification; (2) communication; and (3) enforcing 
control. These three tendencies are not mutually dependent of each other, and have the ability 
to overlap and synergize in many ways. Nevertheless, Sack asserts that classification, 
communication, and enforcement of control “are by definition essential attributes of any 
territory. That is, all examples of territoriality would contain them. They are necessary and 
sufficient attributes of territoriality” (Sack, 1983: 58). The first territorial tendency is 
classification, in which territoriality classifies at least in part by area, rather than by type. For 
example, when we say that anything in this room (i.e. area) is ours, or is off-limits to you, we 
are classifying such as ‘ours’ or ‘not yours’ according to their location in space. As a result, it 
is not necessary to stipulate the kinds of things in place that are ours or not yours. To varying 
degrees, territoriality avoids the need for classification and enumeration by kind yet still 
allows one to assert control if one cannot enumerate all of the significant factors and 
relationships to which we have access.  
The second territorial tendency is communication, which can be easily formed because it 
requires only one kind of marker or sign—the boundary. As discussed below, the boundary is 
an important aspect of territoriality, and in terms of communication, in most cases the 
78 
 
territorial boundary may be the only symbolic form that combines direction in space and a 
statement about exclusion or possession (Sack, 1983: 58). For example, the walls and door to 
my academic office physically demarcate the private space of my office from the more public 
spaces of the academic department corridor, communicating that which is my area for 
students to find me.  
Finally, territoriality can be the most efficient strategy for enforcing control. In terms of the 
third tendency, enforcing control provides a means by which resources or things to be 
controlled are required to be distributed in a particular fashion through time and space and 
such distribution “falls somewhere between ubiquity and unpredictability” (Sack, 1983: 58). 
As Sack asserts, models of animal foraging demonstrate that territoriality is more efficient for 
animals “when food is sufficiently abundant and predictable in space and time whereas 
nonterritorial actions are more suitable for the converse situation” (1983: 58-59).  
Taken together, these three tendencies are significant aspects to territory, as they provide a 
means of reifying power and potentiality. In other words, classification, communication, and 
enforcing order provide a structure to which actions, interactions and relationships between 
individuals, objects and space can develop and take place. In other words, by pointing out 
that territories may exist in degrees, and that they can be switched on and off according to 
strategic aims, Sack reimagines territory through not only one’s agency within a territory but 
their relations to others and the territory which surrounds and operates within and through 
them. Through the three territorial tendencies it becomes possible to witness polymorphic 
power relationships (re)shape within a formed territory, making the potential of power 
“explicit and real by making them ‘visible’” through the strategic, flexible and selective 
qualities of territoriality (Sack, 1983: 59).   
However, Brighenti (2006) indicates that three critical observations can be made of Sack’s 
(1983) perspective of territoriality. The first observation is that while agency may be a 
significant factor in the establishment and maintenance of territory and the territorialisation 
process, no one-to-one correspondence between a single territory and a single strategy should 
be assumed. Rather, “a plurality of strategies, which may reinforce as well as conflict with 
each other, may characterize a single territory” (Brighenti, 2006: 69). Different people live 
together within shared institutions and social patterns, and while they all may be 
territorialized through the same process, they may all interpret territorialization in 
controversial, contradictory and even conflicting ways. Sack remains too preoccupied with 
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the correspondence between the individual and the territory and fails to recognize that where 
there is power there is also resistance to power, and that even if it were possible to identify a 
hegemonic territorial strategy, the habituation of social groups in society is neither immune 
nor comes without resistance. As Brighenti (2006: 69) asserts, “[s]eldom, if ever, can control 
from a single agency upon patterns of social relationships be absolute. Consequently, the 
existence and proliferation of conflicting strategies need to be accounted for.” While a 
territorial framework may tend towards a strategy which is a harmonious ideal of 
homogeneity, it can never be fully accomplished through this ideal. As a result, Brighenti 
argues that perhaps it would be more preferable to say that control, not territory, happens in 
degrees, in order to begin to account for the plurality of strategies required to characterize 
territoriality.  
Second, Sack appears too concerned with differentiating his own approach to territoriality 
from an ethological understanding, which according to his view is prone to biological 
determinism and reductionism (cf. Sack, 1983). However, Brighenti indicates that such a 
rejection of ethological insights or influences “entails the opposite risk of hyperrationalist 
anthropocentric exceptionalism” (2006: 70). Put differently, associating territory exclusively 
to the strategic dimension of human interaction suggests an “over-cognitivization” of the 
territorial experience to the detriment of human affectivity (Brigenti, 2006: 70). While 
significant to territory, strategy cannot account for the whole import of the territorial 
phenomenon; there is something to be said about the affective dimensions of territory—in 
other words, how it feels for territory to happen, occur, or take place. Territory breeds 
attachment and identification which, according to Brighenti, “humans happen to share with 
animals” (2006: 70). In effect, further exploration and territorial processes should be mindful 
of territory’s affectivity and to avoid both biological and sociological reductionism as an 
explanation for how a territory is formed and maintained.  
Third and final, Brighenti argues that control “cannot be taken as the territorial redux” (2006: 
70; italics in original). Put differently, the control of space is just one among the many 
functions of territory. While Sack (1983) rightly asserts that one can control a territory one 
does not occupy, his conclusion is ultimately still consistent with the thesis of the selective 
nature of territory, a notion advanced through biological and ethological perspectives which 
Sack argued to eschew (Sack, 1983: 55; Brighenti, 2006: 70). Examining territoriality then 
requires us to reconsider the intentions and power relationships behind territorial activations 
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as control per se does neither fully account nor explain why, when and how select territories 
are activated.    
Notwithstanding, Sack’s comprehensive approach to territoriality is important in terms of 
viewing territory as a product of human behaviour that needs to be further examined and 
explained. His territorial tendencies aptly demonstrate how a critical understanding of 
territoriality has “the advantage of…reifying power; of streamlining understandings, of 
depersonalizing certain relationships; of diverting attention away from power relations; of 
promoting spatial compartmentalization; of altering the relationship between people and 
things; and of promoting other forms of territoriality” (Murphy, 2012: 161). For Sack, 
territoriality is a phenomenon worthy of attention and analysis, as it is an important shaper of 
the social world in which we live and not solely a vehicle for recasting how human 
interaction is conceived and practised. Indeed, his approach is well suited to analyses of the 
human differentiated spaces of everyday life, as Sack’s territoriality “provides insight into 
how a particular system works—one with extraordinary implications for patterns of conflict, 
identity, and…exchange. As such, it [Sack’s approach] serves as a powerful tool for 
analysing structures and actions that are part of that system” (Murphy, 2012: 168).  
Boundaries and the Territorial  
Yet to talk about territory is to also analyze how boundaries become a constitutive 
prerequisite for territory. Territory cannot but be delimited, and as the current geographic 
literature articulates, the activity of drawing boundaries is significant for territory and its 
associated relationships (cf. Peters and Turner, 2015, 2017). Whether we are demarcating the 
shore from the ocean, the property parameter of a residence from the city street, or a 
separation line between two nation-states or between two children sharing the same bedroom, 
the activity of boundary-making demonstrates how territory is made through interactive 
imaginings. At times, boundaries may be implicit or explicit, visible or invisible, static or 
dynamic. While territory serves as an imaginary—but no less effective—prop for social 
relations, it is more than simply the setting for social interactions; the crucial dimension of 
power must be recognized to understand the processes of boundary-making. We must ask 
ourselves: who is drawing the boundaries, and what gives this entity the authority to draw? 
How are the boundaries delineated? What kinds of boundaries are being delineated? And 
finally, what is the purpose of delineating these boundaries (Brighenti, 2006: 70-72; see also 
Brighenti, 2010, Peters and Turner, 2015, 2017)? In effect, boundaries, imbued with 
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meaning, become the object of an ongoing work of enactment, reinforcement and negotiation, 
all of which can be “more or less effective, impressive, memorable, and affectively powerful 
according to specific circumstances” (Brighenti, 2006: 72).  
Whenever a territory appears, the creation of a territory generates a basic discontinuity 
between the inside and the outside. New functions are created, pre-existed functions are 
reorganized, and each boundary delineation determines effects of deterritorialization and 
subsequent reterritorialization. These basic territorial operations generate and maintain an 
ongoing process and dialectical relationship of separation and fusion, with the two 
movements embedded into one another. Contemporary surveillance processes can serve as an 
example of de/re-territorialization, especially in terms of nation-state boundaries (Lyon, 
2004). In a post-9/11 world, we have witnessed a deterritorialization of national boundaries 
of Western countries not because these countries are disappearing, but because of their 
multiplication across the globe (Lyon, 2004). The displacement of boundaries by way of 
de/re-territorialization is affected through a series of surveillant technologies which aim to 
control people preventatively and limit the mobility of people profiled as ‘posing a threat.’ In 
effect, ‘social sorting’ and profiling could be construed as forms of territorial reshaping 
(Lyon, 2001, 2003, 2004; see also Brighenti, 2006, 2010).  
It is clear that territory can be imagined and drawn upon different aspects to serve several 
different functions in the pursuit of different ends. While functions may range widely, a 
common thread throughout is that in most cases, co-presence defines territory. Indeed, 
territories may vary in terms of the degrees to which tolerance, negotiation and spatial 
sharing occur, but it is not the complete denial of interaction. Territory exists as a “positive 
framework for interaction which requires interaction itself” (Brighenti, 2006: 75). Within a 
territory, exclusion and co-presence are two sides of the same coin; two opposing forces 
which come together to define the relational range of territory. In effect, the focus of territory 
is not exclusion from a particular area, but the creation of ordered social relations and co-
presence, which are, in many cases, relations of dominance. It becomes an explicit display of 
superiority and submission which facilitates the making of hierarchies. By ‘anchoring’ the 
ownership of territory upon the co-presence and social relations within the territorial bounds, 
one entity will dominate and ‘possess’ the relationship over another, stabilizing patterns of 
relationships between the two (cf. Brighenti, 2006, 2010; see also Sack, 1981, 1983).  
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Such a focus can be witnessed in the practices and procedures of EM, insofar as the 
installation of the surveillant technology in a physical residence requires ordered social 
relations between those subjected to the monitoring (i.e. the offender) and those whom 
consent to its installation (i.e. family member, friend, or person of significance to the 
offender). Certain patterns are then stabilized within the territory between the pair as they 
regulate their movement according to the EM conditions outlined by G4S Scotland, and 
sanctions are imposed upon the offender when the conditions are contravened or breached. 
Co-presence exists within this physical residence until the consenter no longer authorizes the 
offender to remain within the physical residence, and as such relations of dominance and 
hierarchies are formed between the pair: should the offender no longer wish to remain at the 
residence or abide by the territorial conditions of the consenter, the consenter has the power 
to punish the offender by withdrawing their consent which ultimately recalls the offender 
back to court, prison, or both.    
Therefore, while a demand for consensus surrounds the maintenance of territory, territorial 
relationships are not solely established and maintained through displays of dominance and 
aggression. The demand for respect “constitutes the consensual side of territorial 
relationships, a consensus which makes order-through-territory much more attainable” 
(Brighenti, 2006: 76). As a pivotal regulator social device, respect sets up “a visible stage for 
the taking place of the relationships” which are played out through interaction (Brighenti, 
2006: 76; italics emphasized). In doing so, territory exists as a reminder of some form of past 
command, decree or proclamation which has gained both temporal stability and acceptance. 
Recognizing and respecting boundaries are significant to the maintenance of territory, yet to 
make the case for carceral territory we must briefly consider how notions of space, place, and 
time connect the intimate realities and microcosms of offenders’ everyday lives to aspects of 
carcerality at large, as I demonstrate below. Doing so highlights the importance of the human 
experience of being within the social world, and the sociality inherent in within the practices 
associated with carceral territory.  
Space, Place, and Time 
As indicated in the prior chapter, the ‘spatial turn’ in academia provides thought-provoking 
empirical accounts of space and place and has generated insightful understandings of how 
social beings engage with the spaces and places of everyday life. However, notions like 
space, place, and time are multifaceted and nuanced concepts which can be defined in many 
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ways. As such, it is important at this point to clarify these terms to usefully apply them 
properly and appropriately to carceral territory going forward. Space and spatiality is the 
world around (an actor) in its pertinence to and involvement in human activity and 
understanding. Put differently, our world is involved in and pertinent to human activity—and 
the hermeneutics associated with such activity—in providing a platform for, and comprising 
entities that have places in, human activities. A place denotes the socio-spatial bounding of 
ideology and context to space, resulting in particular regularities and orders (cf. Cresswell, 
1996; Sanscartier and Gacek, 2016). As Cresswell (1996) contends, places are static, insofar 
as relations and contexts are naturalized within them; things ‘are the way they are’ for 
individuals in all sorts of categories (wealthy, poor, men, women, elderly, youth, etc.) 
because places themselves do not physically change, at least not abruptly. A place is a place 
to perform a particular activity, and connecting one place to another in a set number of 
directions would be what are constituted as paths. As a person goes about their day, they 
proceed via an array of places and paths that both, in various degrees, reflect and determine 
their and others’ activities within the same day. Furthermore, places and paths are anchored 
to objects, and the physical entity at which a place or a path is anchored also yields the 
location in objective space where the path or place exists (cf. Schatzki, 2009). Finally, places 
and paths which converge, overlap, and/or intersect with one another form settings, which 
interlock with other settings and form locales or regions. As Schatzki (2009: 37) indicates, 
which settings, locales and regions that exist in a particular geographical area “depends on 
the physical arrangements that exist [in the area] and what practices are carried on amid or in 
relation to those arrangements.”  
Time is an essential dimension of territories, and understanding territory as a socially 
constructed and imagined relationship implies appreciating its processual and temporal 
dimension. Territories are created, reproduced and terminated according to temporal periods, 
rhythms and cycles (Brighenti, 2006; see also Lefebvre, 1992). Arguably, one point in history 
which initiated the turn from pre-modernity to the modern era was the establishment of 
‘clock’ time (i.e. time which is both homogenous and desacralized). To understand the 
temporal experience of routine, one must be mindful of the various temporalities which exist 
alongside of modernity’s clock time. In a sense, everyday life is a “polyrhythmic ensemble” 
of competing and overlapping rhythms, and that the most central conflict and imbrication is 
between “the linear rhythms of rationalized modernization and the cyclical rhythms of 
nature” (Highmore, 2004: 322). As Lefebvre and Régulier contend, the victory that clock 
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time possessed over cyclical temporal experiences changed how modern societies viewed 
their organization and pace of life:  
[Once clock time] became the time of the everyday, [it] subordinat[ed] other 
aspects of daily life to the spatial organization of work: times for sleeping and 
waking, times for meals and private life, relationships between adults and 
children, entertainment and leisure, relationships in the home. However, everyday 
life is shot through and cut across by the larger rhythms of life and the cosmos: 
days and nights, months and seasons, and more specifically still, biological 
rhythms. In everyday life, this results in constant interaction between these 
rhythms and repetitive processes[.] (1985: 190) 
Furthermore, the body can and should be seen in terms of its relations to biological and social 
arenas, and as the locus and seat of these interactions, the body becomes subjected to various 
spatio-temporal experiences and rhythms (Lefebvre and Régulier, 1985: 196). In effect, 
disturbances such as stress, frustration and involuntary memory have the ability to “poke 
holes in the smooth surface of the present[,]” reminding us that time remains a series of 
consistent and continuous instantaneous moments of which our body attempts to attune to 
such rhythms and routines (Highmore, 2004: 325). 
Finally, in terms of time and territory, territories are rhythmic, insofar as they can be 
observed through the lens of their specific rhythmic constitution. For example, public spaces 
such as desks in classrooms or libraries or tables at restaurants are only temporally 
appropriated by some people according to an implicit norm (cf. Goffman, 1963, 1972). The 
effects of territory through time is similar to the temporal dimensions of the ‘carceral’ 
inasmuch as the detriment and pains perceived through territorial effects can persist long after 
actual territory has been terminated (Moran et al., 2017a). Therefore, the duration of these 
types of territorialization become intimately linked to the type of activity that is considered 
legitimate within the given context, such as the activities one is expected to perform while 
seated on a bus versus in a theatre, at a restaurant table, in a classroom, and so forth.  
Per Schatzki (2009), when social theorists and laypeople alike refer notions like to ‘time’ and 
‘space’ they typically mean objective time and objective space. Objective time and space are 
notions conceived of as features of reality that persist independently from human activity and 
understanding. While human activity and understanding can comprehend or affect objective 
times and spaces, however, what they can comprehend or affect exists independently of the 
activity or understanding. Furthermore, a key feature of objective reality is succession: that is, 
whenever instants or events occur one after another, there is succession which can be 
established in a chronological fashion. Taken together, Schatzki argues that most social 
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theorists who consider time and space examine either time or space—in other words, time 
and space are taken to be separable matters, between which only contingencies exist in their 
relations: “Social theory is replete with accounts of either… time or…space that mostly 
ignore or elide the other phenomenon” (Schatzki, 2009: 36).  
However, the last several decades have witnessed a variety of theorists analyzing space-time, 
such as Hägerstrand (1975), Parkes and Thrift (1980), Giddens (1984), Ingold (2002), 
Castells (1996), Harvey (1996), and Lefebvre (2004). While a full reconsideration of these 
scholars’ respective accounts of space-time is beyond the scope of the project, Schatzki 
(2009) is quite right to contend that when such theorists are taken into consideration together 
there are two particular features which characterize these accounts of space-time. First, these 
social theorists typically, though not always, consider and treat space-time as an objective 
phenomenon; and second, they always treat space-time as “a conjunction of space and time 
conceived of as separable phenomena[;]” that is, as phenomena that is not intrinsically related 
to one another (Schatzki, 2009: 36). In so doing, these social theorists consider space-time as 
an entity which is not unified, as this conception of space-time solely embraces contingent 
connections between spatial and temporal phenomena, or between the spatial or temporal 
properties of social phenomena (Schatzki, 2009).  
In a similar vein to Schatzki (2009), I have no qualm with such considerations of space-time 
as an objective phenomenon or as a phenomenon which generally connects space and time 
into an inseparable entity. However, it is the exclusivity of the contingent connections which 
bind phenomena where I raise concern, much like how Schatzki (2009) has similarly 
problematized. Such a configuration of space-time may not fully grasp, or significantly 
reduces, the tentative, interwoven instants and moments required to imbue meaning into 
human activity and understanding. Social life, and the meaning we attach or associate our 
experiences within it, relies upon both contingently related and objective spatial and temporal 
properties and phenomena. Arguably, there exists a duality between objectivity and 
subjectivity within our understanding of the space-time connection; a need to theorize both 
time and space from either an objective or a subjective lens of scrutiny that can be upheld 
through empirical validation. Yet what must be further grasped, as Schatzki (2009) contends, 
is how our comprehension of space-time not only centers on temporal and spatial properties 




To grasp the spatial and temporal properties of social life is to both embrace and emphasize 
the sociality of the space-time connection. As Schatzki (2009: 36) argues, social life 
possesses significant attributes of social space-time, of which he refers to as “timespace.” 
While the objective time-space connection may be more noticeable than timespace, timespace 
is, arguably, at least as essential to understanding human activity and the hermeneutics of 
meanings imbued within society as the former, if not more so. Indeed, “interwoven 
timespaces are fundamental to human society” (Schatzki, 2009: 36). Human activity institutes 
and thus bears a timespace “whose temporal and spatial dimensions are connected 
inherently—and not contingently as with objective space-times[,]” and as a result, social life 
then amalgamates timespace with objective space-time and forms “a temporalspatial spatial-
temporal phenomenon” (Schatzki, 2009: 38).  
Carceral institutions have also been associated with such fundamental and interwoven 
timespaces in terms of two figurative senses of time, space, and place: (1) the deaths among 
incarcerated and detained individuals (euphemistically, the ‘passing on’ of prisoners, 
offenders and detainees) (cf. Glamser and Cabana, 2003; Hooper, 2009; Erfani-Ghettani, 
2015); and (2) the slow passage of time in prison (cf. Jeffrey, 2010; Conlon, 2011; Mountz, 
2011). The second figurative sense of timespace is of greater interest here, as prison scholars 
have long recognized the pains associated with the passing of time in prison. However, what 
characterizes contemporary carceral systems is a new type of relationship between carceral 
institutions and time. Carceral time, or the impact of ‘doing time’ (Jewkes, 2005, 2013; 
Moran, 2012a; Moran et al., 2013) suggests that those incarcerated or detained lack the 
ability to control their time in terms of their ‘biological clock’—indicating their lack of 
control over the aging process—and the length of sentences offenders will receive post-
conviction, which slowly passes by as these individuals endure the carceral space (Moran, 
2012a; see also Cope, 2003). Such endurance can be also understood as ‘timepass,’ which 
refers to the institutionalized disposal of time (cf. Jeffrey, 2010). Timepass is the organized 
warehousing of sections of the global population which have been forced to wait purposefully 
on the margins of developed economies in prisons, detention centres, camps, and slums in 
response to global political-economic conditions. As Gill and colleagues (2016: 8) contend, 
the calibration of carceral space to accommodate the institutionalized disposal and/or wastage 
of time, over and above aspirations to reform, rehabilitate or even punish the incarcerated, 
has become “a hallmark of the neoliberal carceral landscape.” In effect, the continuation of 
timepass, coupled with the wastage of human life within carceral institutions, demands 
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further attention from carceral and surveillance scholarship alike. There exists an urgent need 
to address how “surplus populations” are treated as “disposable,” considered “expendable,” 
and are ultimately rendered “stagnant” within postmodern society (Tyner, 2013: 701-708).  
In sum, notions of space, place, and time are essential to theoretical case for carceral territory. 
Taken together, they supplement a more nuanced understanding of how social beings 
generally and offenders specifically are caught within and part in parcel to the spatial and 
temporal properties of social life. Emphasizing such timespaces also attunes to how carceral 
regimes embrace aspects of timepass, and the extent to which timespaces and timepass are, 
much like the carceral, carried out beyond the anchorage to the prison. However, to 
reconsider carceral territory and make a case for it further requires us to reconsider the 
significance of visibility for surveillance, a notion which is key to EM as a first and foremost 
surveillant technology. Such a discussion is one which I turn to next.    
The Significance of Visibility for Surveillance: Seeing and Searching Territory   
As Brigenti (2007) asserts, visibility is a complex phenomenon which lies “at the intersection 
of the two domains of aesthetics (relations of perception) and politics (relations of power)” 
(Brighenti, 2007: 324; italics in original). Indisputably, vision has become a sense of power, 
or perhaps, a sense which confers a sense of power (Brighenti, 2007: 328). The theoretical 
stake for social scientists in interpreting visibility is not finding one way to meaningfully talk 
about paintings, landscapes, films, figurative images and so forth; visibility is both a 
metaphor for knowledge and “a real social process in itself” which must be examined in 
greater detail (Brighenti, 2007: 325). In an ideal natural setting, the general rule is that if I can 
see you, then you can see me, and vice versa. However, as Brighenti (2007: 325) argues, 
things are never that simple:  
The relation of visibility is often asymmetric; the concept of intervisibility, of 
reciprocity of vision, is always imperfect and limited. In military strategy, it is 
well known that when I am on the peaks of the mountain and you are down in the 
valley, I can easily track your movements for hundreds of miles around, but you 
can track my movements only in a much more limited way. Complex and less 
complex technological devices, from curtains to stone walls, from video cameras 
to satellites, enhance visible asymmetries according to planned arrangements, 
liberating it from the spatial-temporal properties of the here and now…The 
relational aspect of visibility points precisely to the fact that asymmetries and 
distortions of visibility are the norm, vis-à-vis the exception of perfect 
intervisibility.    
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In effect, asymmetries transform visibility into a site for strategy. Similarly, Goffman (1971) 
explored this notion with a central concern towards relations of visibility as they intersect and 
overlap with perceptions of danger. He demonstrated that normalcy represents a state of 
invisibility of the environment; put simply, in the lack of cautionary or alarm messages, the 
environment exists in a ‘transparent’ state to the observer it surrounds (cf. Goffman, 1971). 
Building on this difference between an observer being at ease versus being alarmed, it then 
becomes possible to understand the characteristics of normal as those of the invisible: “the 
normal is unmarked, unnoticed, unthematized, untheorized” (Brighenti, 2007: 326). As we 
will see in subsequent chapters, the commonsense and commonplace characteristics of EM 
attests to the normalcy (and arguably, legitimacy) of the practice by both EM operators and 
offenders, transforming (in)visibility into a site for control and maintenance of carceral 
territory.  
However, while Goffman explored visibility from the origin of the individual, Brighenti 
(2007) argues that there exist other flows of power at work within the relations, asymmetries 
and distortions of visibility. When a transformation in reciprocal visibilities occurs, it 
becomes imperative to question who is acting on and reacting to the properties of the field of 
visibility, and which specific relationships are being shaped and managed. In other words, to 
question when something or someone becomes more or less visible than before is to examine 
the work of shaping and managing visibility, and to critique “what is worth being seen at 
which price—along with the normative question of what should and what should not be seen” 
(Brighenti, 2007: 327). Such questions are inherently practical and political, and not simply a 
matter of technique.  
Visibility is closely tied to recognition, but it is not linked to recognition in a linear, 
straightforward way. Thresholds of visibility come into play here; a minimum and a 
maximum of what Brighenti (2007: 330) refers to as “fair visibility”. Below the threshold, 
one becomes socially excluded; such invisible subjects could be discursively constructed, for 
example, as the populations who inhabit ghettos and slums around the world. Advanced 
neoliberalism has lead to the rise of new and invisible forms of poverty, constructing these 
people into categories of unseen, excluded populations (cf. Brighenti, 2007). Conversely, 
above the threshold, one enters into a zone of “supra-visibility, or super-visibility, where 
everything you do becomes gigantic to the point that it paralyzes you” (Brighenti, 2007: 330). 
Media representations of criminals is an example of supra-visiblity, in which these forms of 
moral panic are selectively focused onto actors deemed to be representative of immoral or 
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deviant populations. In effect, one’s positioning behind or beyond the thresholds of fair 
visibility raises concerns for the management of one’s social image in one’s own terms. 
Seeing and being seen simultaneously affects the observed and the beholder, and once we 
understand how recognition is embedded within visibility, new ways of framing old problems 
open up.  
The mixing of visible and invisible human relations is a significant dimension of assessing 
sites, subjects and effects. As Brighenti contends, some sites and subjects are more visible 
than others: “Because sites and subjects interact relationally, social effects of visibility 
depend on who is more visible in which site. Effects of one’s visibility feed back from and to 
effects in one’s visibility” (2007: 331; italics in original). To an extent, visibility “curdles” 
into representations, insofar as representations, in the absence of dissonant messages, tend to 
settle down and stabilize themselves; those who have a voice in the production of 
representations, in effect, have access to these sites and places of invisibility (Brighenti, 
2007: 333). More precisely, the styles and modes of access become significant to consider as 
well; it is not simply true or enough to say that if I am disempowered or an outsider in 
society, then I am invisible. Rather, it becomes necessary to question when and how I access 
such sites and places of visibility, and in ways they have become areas largely or completely 
outside of my control; the extent to which my access is broadened or limited within these 
areas, and to which others are accorded access to these areas as well.  
The issue of access to the sites, places and territories of visibility arise issues of identification 
(cf. Brighenti, 2006). Visibility breeds identification and makes seen and being seen possible. 
Of course, surveillance is an activity that goes through a procedure of individual 
identification and is also aimed at social classification of people. Surveillance operates to 
individually identify the subject(s) to which we have been instructed to watch. At the same 
time, however, the procedures of surveillance function to construct and classify categories 
which delineate ‘safe’ subjects from the ‘dangerous’ while we watch (Brighenti, 2007: 333). 
If we accept that deviance is a relational moral quality (cf. Durkheim, 1982), then under 
surveillance a deviant action exists only if it is framed on a visible threshold of moral 
difference. Therefore, visible and invisible social acts depend upon how and which subjects 
act in which places. Through surveillance, visibility can be a double-edged sword: it can be 
empowering as well as disempowering (Brighenti, 2007; see also Smith, 2004, 2008, 2014, 
2016). Researchers of surveillance and the technologies of control have explored this kind of 
effect (cf. Ball, 2005; French and Smith, 2016; Haggarty and Ericson, 2000, 2006; Haggarty 
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et al., 2011; Smith, 2004, 2008, 2014, 2016). Tracing the origin of the word ‘surveillance’ 
reveal a completely different meaning of being watched and seen: “no longer recognition, but 
subjugation, imposition of conducts, means of control” (Brighenti, 2007: 336). In a 
disciplinary society, visibility means disempowerment and “[v]isibility is a trap” (Foucault, 
[1977]/1995: 200). The mere fact of being aware of one’s own visibility status effectively 
influences one’s behaviour, rather than the fact of being under actual control.  
Per Brighenti, such a means of control is a reason why “surveyed people, insofar as they 
cannot look back and they cannot establish any eye-to-eye contact, always look suspect to a 
certain extent, if not culpable, for the very fact of being looked at one-way in a mode of 
surveillance” (2007: 337). Inherent in the one-way gaze is a kind of dehumanization of the 
observed, which illustrates another pervasive issue with surveillance, insofar as its non-
reciprocal gaze leads to a qualitatively different way of seeing. This is evidenced within EM 
practices, insofar as installation of the EM within a physical residence only requires one 
instance of eye-to-eye contact (i.e. the G4S Scotland MO and the MP). Throughout the period 
of EM, the only contact made between MOs and MPs are between the home monitoring unit 
(HMU) and its attached telephone. This kind of dehumanization can influence how one 
interacts with the other on the phone, especially in terms of how the offender makes sense of 
G4S Scotland surveillance as they undergo the monitoring themselves.  
Furthermore, the pervasiveness of contemporary surveillance reveals more than subjects 
being seen or watched; it operates complex activities focused upon the tracking of 
information. By relying upon advanced technologies, surveillance has become more abstract 
then ever before, tracking flows of information as the crux of contemporary surveillant 
technologies (cf. Lyon, 2001, 2004). Surveillance is no longer interested in solely watching 
people; instead, surveillance has focused upon tracking movements and information 
(including but not limited to people, choices, money, customs, and so forth). Deleuze (1990) 
first spoke of a transition from a disciplinary society to a ‘society of control,’ in which 
enclosed institutions and their logic are superseded by new formations. A new scenario was 
established: the corporation replaced the factory, a new being called the ‘dividual’ replaces 
the individual, and the concept of the ‘password’ becomes the central tool of control and 
access, which enables surveillance agencies to differentially regulate access (and its denial) 
for specific subjects into specific sites and places (cf. Deleuze, 1990). In effect, the whole 
process shifts from a focus on people to a focus on codes, texts, and surveillant system 
statuses and updates. This is further evidenced in EM practices by MOs, insofar as the 
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telephone call made to MPs is a minimal amount of communication which humanizes the 
surveillant technological process; often times, shift changes between MOs, and the associated 
paperwork of the MP they are watching, means that an MO could be more readily 
knowledgeable of the ‘dividual’ than the individual they may have to speak to on the 
telephone.   
Drawing from the work of Deleuze and Guattari (1987), Haggarty and Ericson (2000) move 
beyond Foucault’s disciplinary society to describe an assemblage which consists of a 
“multiplicity of heterogeneous objects, whose unity comes solely from the fact that these 
items function together, that they ‘work’ together as a functional entity” (Haggarty and 
Ericson, 2000: 607). This type of mixed network-like control—referred to as a ‘surveillant 
assemblage’—has a composite central-and-polycentric character, functioning from above as 
well as from below. According to Haggerty and Ericson (2000: 607) the surveillant 
assemblage is “part of the state form” but that one should not confuse this form with those 
“traditional apparatuses of governmental rule studied by political scientists.” Rather, the state 
form seeks to create “bounded physical and cognitive spaces and introduces processes 
designed to capture flows to ‘striate the space over which it reigns’” (Haggarty and Ericson, 
2000: 608; Deleuze and Guatarri, 1987: 385). At the same time, an ‘actuarial gaze’ emerges, 
a “structural visual regime of threat perception” which crosscuts politics, public safety 
concerns, geographical planning, media, and so forth (Brighenti, 2007: 337).  
The view from above remains, however, the dominant image of control, yet the concept of 
assemblage allows us to conceive how diverse surveillance practices, institutions and 
knowledge systems enter into relationships and interact to make visible and knowable many 
aspects of social life, while simultaneously installing mechanisms of governance and identity 
(cf. Hier, 2003; Brighenti, 2007; Murphy and Anderson, 2016). The assemblage is 
characterized by relations of exteriority, by which independent components join and interact, 
but also exist independently, separate and destabilize over time (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987). 
Therefore, power “can be conceived as a form of external visibility (visibility of effects) 
associated with internal invisibility (invisibility of identification)” (Brighenti, 2007: 338). In 
other words, the effects of power are visible to everyone, but what power is in its essence, 
where it is really located, will not be disclosed. Indeed, the installations of EM equipment 
occurs all across Scotland in hundreds of different flats, houses, and physical residences, and 
while these individual territories are constructed and maintained by individual offenders, 
where the power is really located is not so readily disclosed; while some MPs may believe it 
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is G4S Scotland monitoring them, others could believe it is the government watching them in 
their homes. While some MPs may believe that the MO on the phone with them has the 
power to recall the MP back to court or prison for breaching EM conditions, others could 
believe that the staff are just ‘doing the job,’ working within a hierarchy where their superiors 
are those with such power. In effect, asymmetries of visibility exist as asymmetries of power 
in a further meaning besides that of surveillance: “it is the style in which seeing and being 
seen take place that carries the most important consequences” (Brighenti, 2007: 339; italics 
emphasized). The exercise of power is always an exercise in activating selective 
(in)visibilities, and while secrecy “lies at the heart of power,” it also lies at the core of the 
possibility of escaping and opposing power (Canetti, 1973: 253).  
Territory: A Question of Space?  
According to Brighenti (2006: 79), there is an inherent value in examining territory as more 
than space itself, as “to describe territory as a piece of land is, so to speak, one misses the 
whole picture”; while the carrier is hardly irrelevant, the carrier is not the sole mechanism 
which gives the territory ascribed within it meaning. While it is important to note that not all 
physical spaces are territories, and not all territories are spaces, territory is more than a simple 
region of land which demarcates the geopolitical location of nation-states and countries, nor 
is it merely space with a function. As similarly indicated in Chapter 3, the carceral can be 
more than mere spatiality; the practice of space’s division and administration is one of the 
most powerful ways of creating and maintaining social order, and while space can be 
described “as a capacity to host and to become the recipients of objects and relations, 
territory can be best understood as a relationship in itself, which may subsist even without 
any spatial dimension” (Brighenti, 2006: 79; italics in original).  
This is not to deny the existence of fundamental spatial constraints to human inaction; indeed, 
space remains the most visible territorial carrier, and while notions like the ‘carceral’ and the 
‘territorial’ have the potential to be aspatial, we cannot presume that aspatiality is the most 
appropriate for one individual or group’s maintenance of authority or power over another (cf. 
Brighenti, 2006, 2010). Indeed, there exists ways of living non-spatial experiences and 
relations that are territorial just as there are ways of living spaces that are not territorial: “The 
persistent difference between territory, on the one hand, and the space it occupies and the 
places in which it manifests, on the other hand… entails the recognition that there can be 
more than one territory in the same place” (Brighenti, 2006: 79-80; italics in original). For 
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example, while G4S Scotland may install an HMU into the physical residence of an offender, 
the offender may have personal territories within the residence itself which establish their 
domain or co-presence with those that share the space. Understanding territories as mutually 
exclusive is an oversimplification of the reality in which territories find themselves; in 
practice, territories are constantly coexistent, merged, and stratified one onto another within 
(more than) one spatial carrier. And while the possibility exists for both the carceral and the 
territorial to be aspatial, it is clear that in terms of EM, regardless of how they manifest, the 
carceral and territorial require a visible spatial carrier to take place; put differently, an 
anchorage point within which one may imbue meanings, experiences and relationships with 
spatiality. This anchorage point, coupled with spatiality, can be then recognized through 
visibility and surveillance. In effect, to talk of carcerality and territoriality in the case of EM 
is to render it legible through a spatial context, and it is through diverse measures of visibility 
and surveillance that such anchorage points, especially within the intimate geographies of the 
home, can be established.  
Like visibility, scale is also a pivotal variable which appreciates the relational features of 
territory (cf. Marston, 2000; Brighenti, 2006, 2007, 2010). Scale matters in both practical 
security enterprises and in our analyses of these activities (Valverde, 2014: 385). While the 
rule of thumb associates larger scale with higher visibility, Brighenti argues that this 
correlation is not always valid: “Rather than simply large-scale ones, the most visible 
territories are the institutionalized ones” such as the nation-state, the city, and public spaces 
for civilians (2006: 80; italics in original). In addition to these institutionalized territories, EM 
and its associated surveillance complex provides a strong example of such territorialization. 
Similar to the above territories, which lie along a clear continuum ranging from micro- to 
macro-level organization and social ordering, more challenging, less intuitive territories—
which incorporate objects, rituals and culture worlds—can also be considered. While they 
may vary in visibility, surveillance systems and technologies are certainly institutionalized 
(and non-intuitive) examples of territorialization, insofar as tracking and identifying people 
through relational databases gives shape to strategies for territorializing (i.e. including, 
differentiating, and providing access to) and de/re-territorializing (i.e. excluding, isolating, 
and denying access to) people (Brighenti, 2006: 81-82; see also Lyon, 2001, 2003; Haggerty 
and Ericson, 2000, 2006).  
However, scale is more than the amount of space that is included in either the actual security 
project at hand or in our analysis. Temporality is also scalar, as a particular temporality (i.e. 
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the retrospective reconstruction of a crime that took place in the past) may have a particular 
spatialization (Valverde, 2014) and as such we should be mindful of the multi-scalar analyses 
of territory. G4S Scotland currently uses an RF-based EM system, which requires the MOs to 
retroactively reconstruct breaches or technical violations of curfews. Simultaneously, the EM 
system is part and parcel to the crime prevention work which G4S undertakes; while crime 
prevention work typically looks to the future rather than the past, it also encompasses an 
indefinite series of possible future events which takes on broader temporalities and 
spatialities in scope (Valverde, 2014: 386). While the space to be secured in crime prevention 
may be relatively small (i.e. the physical residence of the tagged offender under an EM 
curfew), the project to monitor the whole of the space alongside a series of other spaces 
across a series of communities in Scotland suggests a larger multi-scalar organization of EM 
at the institutional, national and local levels. Scalar effects shade into jurisdiction, and as 
Valverde (2014: 386-87) contends, there are “important jurisdictional divides in non-state or 
informal systems of governance, which means that those interested in informal social control 
and extra-state security should therefore include jurisdiction into their analyses.” However, as 
Valverde (2014) reminds us, jurisdiction should not be conflated with spatial scale; while the 
latter encapsulates many spaces, persons and issues to consider, the former designates the 
‘who’ and ‘how’ of governance—namely, who is the authority over the jurisdiction and how 
they will govern within the bounds of the jurisdiction. 
Similar to carceral regimes, territories can become instruments of social sorting, and coupled 
with surveillance the territorial imaginary reveals complex connections between territory, 
populations, government, and sovereignty over, within, and through space (cf. Foucault, 
2007). For example, at the core of ‘governmentality,’ the practice of “[the] disposition of men 
and things towards the realization of specific aims,” Foucault examined how the 
governmental state is not so much focused upon territory per se, but on populations, security 
apparatuses and the discursive knowledge used to govern populations (Foucault, 2007: 87). 
While Elden (2007) argues that most of what Foucault says about territory specifically is at 
best misleading, Brighenti (2006) interprets Foucault as taking territory in its intuitive 
understanding, insofar as Foucault examined and criticized the centrality of territory within 
the definition of sovereignty (cf. Foucault, 2007). Per Brighenti, once we progress towards a 
more radically relational concept of territory and its functions and features, it becomes clear 
that what keeps sovereignty and government together is territory: “The link between 
sovereignty and government is indeed the territorial relationship par excellence. In order to 
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work properly, government needs to territorialize a given population on its own framework of 
sovereignty” (Brighenti, 2006: 78; italics in original).  
Conversely in Foucault’s account, the link between sovereignty and government is precisely 
the aim that disciplines help to achieve, and that in any case, what counts is not the place per 
se, but the relationship amongst people built throughout and even beyond it (cf. Foucault, 
2007). Nevertheless, it is clear that territory “needs to take place” insofar as that in order to 
be, territory needs to be somewhere (Brighenti, 2006: 83; italics in original). We must 
recognize that this dimension of taking place not only exists within the constitutive tension 
between scale, visibility and space, but through surveillant technologies, systems, law, and 
the responses and responsiveness between individual and groups. Such movements and 
processes of territorialization and de/re-territorialization are embedded into one another in the 
form of differences and repetitions (cf. Fitzpatrick, 2001). While differences are the 
variations in how territory takes place (and how one responds to it), repetitions are the 
extensions or reoccurrence of territory taking place. Taken together, differences and 
repetitions determine the territorialization of people, populations, and spaces.  
Electronic Monitoring: A Form of ‘Carceral Territory’? 
So far this chapter has outlined the relational aspects of territory, centring on significant 
attributes which shape territory such as space, place, time, visibility, and surveillance. 
Drawing upon the influences of cognate disciplines, it is clear that to theorize EM is to look 
beyond the geographic conventions of space as physical carrier and territory as demarcated 
landscapes, and to consider whether a case can be made to examine EM territorially. 
Analyzing the ‘compliance work’ of both monitored persons (MPs) and monitoring officers 
(MOs) through a geographic lens reveals a potential to look beyond the carceral spaces 
typically associated with the criminal justice system (i.e. police detention, the jail cell, the 
prison, etc.); there exists a territoriality of monitoring compliance for both MPs and MOs, a 
focus which must be brought to the forefront of discussions, debates and disciplines which 
centre upon how the carceral is defined and produced in everyday life.    
Human territoriality is a vast, yet often neglected, facet of human behaviour. Instead of 
simply reducing it to biological drive or instinct, I draw upon aspects of Sack’s (1981, 1983) 
research to theorize how EM, through processes of creating and maintaining a territory, are 
significant to strategies for influence and control, particularly exerted from carceral systems. 
While I realize that not all territories exude aspects of carcerality, there is an inherent worth 
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in examining EM as a ‘carceral’ territory, considering and drawing upon Moran and 
colleagues’ (2017a) conditions of carcerality. Taken together, the territorial tendencies and 
carceral conditions of EM provides a robustly theoretical perspective for future carceral 
conversations.     
EM is a unique form of territoriality, one which is gaining momentum in tandem with and 
alongside other techniques and technologies of confinement within the “new carceral project” 
witnessed in the West (Mincke, 2017: 237). While the conventional carceral project “is to 
detain and immobilise people behind walls as a form of retaliation for the crimes they 
committed[,]” the new carceral project, which has expanded in the last several decades to 
include community sanctions, is based upon “mobility as a value in itself” (Mincke, 2017: 
237; italics emphasized). While territory typically establishes differential access to things, 
places and people through mobility, time and space, a carceral territory includes the added 
enforcement of a temporal and pseudo-spatial zone of carcerality which permeates the MP’s 
private residence, indicating both the proximity (i.e. how far I can move away from the 
HMU) and duration (i.e. when the curfew is enforced, and how many weeks/months I must 
wear the EM ankle tag) of confinement.  
However, what makes the territoriality created by EM ‘carceral’? As a unique form of 
territoriality, EM requires the active participation of humans in order for the territory it 
imposes to be imagined, constructed, and sustained. It is through an MP’s fixed personal 
space and private property that a carceral territory is established, one which superimposes the 
intentions of a carceral system upon the MP’s domain (i.e. house, flat, or permanent residence 
in the community). In this sense, punishment is not the physical confinement of prison walls 
or absolute immobilization per se, but the regulation of the MP through legitimated 
participatory confinement. The ends are more significant than the means, so to speak; the 
reasons behind an offender’s compliance matter less so long as the curfew and territorial 
bounds of the EM technology are enforced, maintain and co-produced between MP and MO.  
It is the creative carceral extension by the state into the community and into the lives of 
offenders and their families where the measures of EM programmes creates self-monitoring 
subjects in concert with long distance social control, self-discipline, and punishment over a 
broad geography (cf. Garland, 1996, 1997, 2001; Rose, 2000). Indeed, such measures can 
coerce, restrain, and potentially “immobilise the lived time and spatial freedoms” of the 
offender’s everyday (Fishwick and Wearing, 2017: 44; see also Brown, 2014; Gutiérrez 
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Rivera, 2017; Maddrell, 2017; Moran et al., 2012). The movement encompassed within EM 
should also be construed as forms of ‘carceral mobilities’; as we will see in subsequent 
chapters, the rational and technical means of governmental (or private security) control over 
offenders’ spaces in the community generally and the personal territories of the home 
specifically speaks to forms of mobility inherent in the process of carceral territory-making.  
Finally, the continuation of timepass in the personal territories of offenders’ lives reifies 
carceral territory. The calibration of the home (now a pseudo-carceral space under EM 
conditions) legitimizes the disposal or wastage of time, ultimately renders these marginalized 
populations further stagnant in a world that is forever ‘on the move’ (cf. Cresswell, 2006). 
Carceral territory is taking place by putting punishment and offenders in place; rendering 
these individuals stagnant is a punishment with which they must endure, a punishment one 
can readily view from conventional carceral spaces (Jeffrey, 2010; Moran, 2012a). In doing 
so carceral territory becomes another promise of the “neoliberal carceral landscape” (Gill et 
al., 2016), a promise which ensures that calibrating the residence in this way will ensure the 
state can extend its penal arm and impose a punishment upon the offender, even while they 
remain in their community. This promise also imposes further pains on the offenders 
associated with the passage of time beyond their control. The passage of time in the home 
becomes an endurance test, one which the offender must fill their time with activities to cope 
with the pains of being rendered and feeling stagnant or ‘stuck’ (see Chapter 8) in a world 
which is passing them by.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the possibilities opened by the shift in our understanding of 
territory “from object to relationship” (Brighenti, 2006: 84; italics emphasized). Indeed, as 
Elden (2013a: 18) makes clear, territory contains a mixture of elements that are constantly 
under construction and negotiation: “Territory is not simply an object: the outcome of actions 
conducted toward it or some previously neutral area. Territory is itself a process, made and 
remade, shaped and shaping, active and reactive.” In doing so Sack’s (1981, 1983) approach 
to territoriality provides a framework of considerable usefulness and importance, “as long as 
we are cognizant of the conditions under which the framework can be expected to provide 
explanatory insight” (Murphy, 2012: 170; italics emphasized). Viewing territory as a process 
reminds us to query the extent to which the reach of the carceral state can grasp or touch the 
lives of the marginalized, incarcerated, or both, and whether this reach coalesces or conflicts 
98 
 
with the personal territories of their lives. A case for carceral territory suggests that we can 
view carcerality manifesting directly into individual’s lives on the outside of carceral spaces.  
In varying degrees, carceral regimes hinge on mobilities—that is, the perceived need to 
govern mobilities through the processes and control of how, where and when offenders can 
and cannot move through spaces and places. The geographical turn to carceral mobilities has 
enabled “a deeper socio-spatial understanding of how everyday spaces are governed, 
creating…spaces of semi-confinement” through acts, practices and mechanisms of self-
monitoring (Fishwick and Wearing, 2017: 54). As this chapter has demonstrated, the 
inscription of punishment upon the personal territories, routines and lifestyles of inmates and 
their loved ones indicates how EM, as a form of carceral territory, spreads the carceral out 
into society. By inscribing and/or imposing punishment within the personal territories of 
offenders’ lives and impeding their routines and lifestyles, the presence, proliferation and 
expansion of EM is an appropriate example of the way in which we can view and recognize 
the spread of the carceral beyond the mere anchorage of the prison, undoubtedly (re)shaping 
the carceral age we currently find ourselves.  
Given the increasing number of (quasi-)state actors in the West assuming tasks and 
responsibilities of safety and security, a further examination of EM generally and carceral 
territory specifically is especially warranted. No longer does the government have the sole 
monopoly on resolving challenges facing their populations; contracting out and/or 
transferring such tasks to other parties in the private sector can slightly reduce or redistribute 
the government’s exclusive right to punish (for example, see Johnston, 2006; Johnston and 
Shearing, 2003; Wood and Kempa, 2005). Yet as a community penalty, EM is an appropriate 
tool for investigating how this punishment is enacted, processed and experienced by those of 
whom work with the surveillant technology and those of whom are subjected to its 
monitoring. In effect, carceral territory is an apt frame of reference to further interrogate the 
intimate realities and microcosms of everyday life, pushing the territorial and scholastic 
bounds on how we view the carceral beyond the anchorage of the prison, and redefining 
































Chapter 5: Methodology and Methods 
Introduction 
The methodology and methods discussed in this chapter attempt to make sense of 
(im)mobilities, surveillance and punishment in a host of settings. Considering the methods 
used to conduct the current study allows us to focus upon and question how actors engage 
with surveillant technologies and the ways in which the qualities of carcerality and 
territoriality are filled with restrictions and limitations, curtailments and exceptions. In effect, 
an ontology, influenced by a hybrid of mobile and institutional ethnographies can enhance 
researchers’ examinations of electronic monitoring (EM) of offenders in Scotland specifically 
and speak to the structural processes and practices of surveillance and punishment generally.  
This project attempts to provide a novel frame of reference for EM, shedding light on the 
disciplined and coerced mobilities of those doing the surveying and of those who are under 
surveillance. Doing so provides further thought to EM as a form of carceral territory, and the 
subjects, objects, practices and experiences bound up with carceral and surveillant regimes. 
Furthermore, my study provides a greater attention to the movements of objects and subjects 
through specific sites and places, as such investigations highlight “the tensions in such 
allowances for those who have had everyday liberties legally curtailed” (Peters and Turner, 
2017: 11) which can assist in understanding regimes of surveillance, security, and offender 
supervision in the community.  
Although carceral environments like prisons and detention centres present only an illusion of 
stasis, carceral spaces are in fact filled with a plethora of regulations and restrictions which 
govern this illusion (Peters and Turner, 2017). Not only do these same constraints impact the 
access of actors doing and undergoing surveillance, but also the researchers gaining access to 
carceral spaces in the first instance and its continuous examination (cf. Comack, 2008; Altin 
and Minca, 2017). Such an issue is typically associated with studies of carceral spaces like 
jails, prisons, detention centres, migrant camps, and mobility tracking centres established 
within the federal and private sectors. Whilst there are spatial differences in access (for 
example, access to such spaces of incarceration and surveillance in the Global North rely 
upon different requirements and permissions from those in the Global South), and cross-
cultural differences in access (i.e. the unequal mobilities which pervade societies, or 
inequalities to access which run across racialized, classed, and/or gendered axes), it is 
important to note that researchers themselves must abide to rules and regimes that govern 
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their own movement once within and between such sites. In many cases, the researchers 
permit such limits as they are necessary to protect themselves and vulnerable people, research 
participants or otherwise. Yet the capacity of research to provide understanding, give voice to 
unheard populations, and to even evoke positive social change demonstrates the need for 
continued ‘carceral work’ (Peters and Turner, 2017; see also Armstrong and Jefferson, 2017; 
Gacek, 2017, 2018; Moran and Schliehe 2017a, 2017b; Schliehe, 2016; Schliehe and Moran, 
2017; Woolford and Gacek, 2016).  
Therefore, we might ask ourselves how one should methodologically research the subjects, 
objects, practices and experiences of the ‘carceral’ and the ‘territorial’ more effectively. 
Alongside the invaluable and diverse methods of ethnography, might there be a place for 
mobile methods in researching the ‘carceral’ (cf. Büscher and Urry, 2009), and can the 
‘territorial’ be included in this discussion? What can the (im)mobilities of populations and 
places inform us about the intersections between the carceral, surveillance, and punishment? 
And following on, how can this method, coupled with a nuanced understanding of carceral 
territory, be employed to make sense of criminal justice actors’ movements and routines as 
they engage with surveillant technologies in Scotland? The ensuing chapter is directed 
towards answering these questions.  
First, this chapter will discuss the methodology and methods which underpin the study. I 
argue that both ‘institutional ethnography’ (Walby, 2005a, 2005b, 2006, 2007, 2013; Taber, 
2010) and ‘ethnographic commuting’ (Büscher and Urry, 2009; Murray, 2009; Jungnickel, 
2014) are key methodologies to the study. These ethnographic practices provide insight into 
how criminal justice actors engage with surveillant technologies both within the National 
Electronic Monitoring Centre (NEMC) and in travelling to and from tagged offenders’ 
residences. Understanding how the work involved in monitoring both offenders (monitored 
persons, or MPs) and fellow agents (monitoring officers, or MOs)5 is socially organized 
supplements the ways in which we make sense of surveillance and punishments. 
Furthermore, the mobile interviewing methods implemented (i.e. ‘go-along’ or ‘ride-along’ 
interviews) illustrates how the surveillance work of the MOs in the field or ‘on the ground’ is 
experienced and managed as they visit the homes and residences of those they are charged to 
survey. Following this, data collection and analysis are then discussed for both (1) fieldnotes 
                                                          
5‘MOs’ and ‘MPs’ are the actual terms used by G4S staff to carry out monitoring services at G4S Scotland.  
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and ethnographic observations; and (2) conducting inmate interviews. Reflections on the 
methodology and the methods implemented in this study will conclude the chapter.  
Methodological Foundations to the Thesis  
A qualitative research paradigm was used in this study, as I situate my epistemological 
position within social constructionism (cf. Berger and Luckman, 1966; Bogdan and Taylor, 
1998). In this type of approach, data are grounded in the perspectives of the participants as 
well as the researcher himself. As Bogdan and Bilken (2003: 2) argue, this approach of data 
collection is “rich in description of people, places and conversations.” In terms of research 
questions, this approach formulates such questions “to investigate topics in all their 
complexity” (Bogdan and Bilken, 2003: 2). Finally, they suggest that the qualitative 
researcher becomes “bent on understanding, in considerable detail, how people think…and 
how they came to develop the perspectives they hold” (Bogdan and Bilken, 2003: 3; see also 
Schwartz and Lutfiyya, 2016).  
This chapter does important work in bringing diverse and/or disparate groups to the forefront 
of discussion. While some studies may speak inadvertently for such groups from the top-
down perspective of the researcher, my methodological aim is to give voice to the range of 
persons caught within regimes that survey, curtail and limit movement. The ethnographic 
observations I undertake illustrate the complex and multifaceted system monitoring officers 
(MOs) engage with on a day-to-day basis. In sharing their experiences, monitored persons 
(MPs) reveal the everyday, mundane realities of mobility, surveillance and punishment.as 
EM maintains a carceral territorial hold upon the spaces they inhabit. However, this carceral 
territorial picture is not complete without incorporating the experiences and perspectives of 
those whom are drawn into such marginalized circumstances. Inviting my respondents to 
describe their own subjections brings to light various and memorable experiences of and 
struggles with EM practices. In essence, the stories shared by these Scottish criminal justice 
actors capture the quotidian atmosphere of surveillance as it is lived and understood by the 
people doing the surveying and those undergoing the surveillance. How these actors make 
sense of and work with surveillant technologies illuminates the impact of EM within the daily 
routines, rituals and lifestyles of all of those involved.  
Institutional Ethnography  
Institutional ethnography (IE) seeks to preserve the presence of subjects and the experiential 
features of subject’s every-day and -night lived realities (cf. Walby, 2005a, 2006). In part IE 
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is a method of inquiry which allows the researcher to question and reflect upon their own 
experiences with the organization and organizational cultural practices. At the same time, IE 
treats text—namely the documentary materials used by MOs to monitor MPs, and the verbal 
scripts and observations compiled by the researcher—as active in shaping and (re)producing 
social relations. Social interaction is increasingly mediated textually, by paper, electronic, 
and televisual media. Institutional ethnography problematizes these relations at the local site 
of lived experience, while examining how series of texts contribute to the perpetual 
structuring and coordination of actions, consciousness, and forms of social organization in 
extra-local settings (Smith, 1987; 1999). Participants within the relation are not necessarily 
known to one another, yet they are connected through the text and the work that texts 
organize. Examining these documentary materials as well as the researcher’s own fieldnotes 
have the potential to focus on the people working within the organization, the occupational 
culture and rituals, the origins, history, and developments of the institution over time, and so 
forth. Indeed, seeing individuals as real and relationally producing their own conditions of 
existence, Smith (1999: 75) contends that discursive, managerial and professional forms of 
governance and knowledge are socially constructed, and that whatever is brought into being 
is done so by people “at work.”  
Research conducted by Walby (2005a, 2005b, 2006, 2007, 2013) has made significant strides 
in promoting institutional ethnography as a critique and a method of sociological inquiry, as 
well as centring institutional ethnography within the comprehensive debates encircling the 
surveillance studies literature. As Hier (2003) contends, one should not easily assume that 
surveillance has become, primarily, horizontal instead of hierarchical. While there has been 
growing evidence in the literature to witness the rhizomatic characteristics of contemporary 
surveillance, we should not so easily presume that surveillance has radically altered 
hierarchies of organization, as asymmetries of organizational power still exist (see also Lyon, 
2003). Research attention must be accorded to further examining the continued existence of 
centralized institutions which serve as sites for the unification of regulatory surveillance 
projects (Walby, 2005b).  The connection between surveillance agents and subjects is 
mediated through various technologies, most notably through commonplace forms of texts, of 
which refer here to “words, images, sounds that are set into a durable material form of some 
kind that can then be read, seen, heard, or watched” Walby, 2005b: 160, citing Goody, 1986). 
In the case of EM, such texts are compiled into electronic dossiers which become constitutive 
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of the NEMC’s bureaucratizing process and are the constituents of rational knowledge 
systems through which bodies are administered and organizational power flows.  
Texts hold and generate power in our society (Smith, 1992: 93) and whether they be in paper 
or digital formats, texts are instrumental to institutional organization (Smith, 1984). Differing 
from traditional sociological methods of investigation, institutional ethnography views texts 
as the ‘material relations of surveillance,’ in which the actual and material object of a text is 
recorded, written or read in one place and time as the recorder, writer or reader engaged with 
them, and then sent to various other recorders, writers and readers who process and work 
with the textual information provided. In effect, the material relations of surveillance matter 
to institutional ethnographers as we seek to redress “how human relations are mediated by 
texts that coordinate social monitoring practices” which enhance, transform, and/or govern 
surveillance subjects and agents (Walby, 2005b: 161). Such material relations are actual 
conveyances of texts which have sustained the distanciated surveillance relationships 
between people.   
This method of inquiry explores how everyday life is caught up and coordinated through 
organisational processes. Interested in local knowledges, institutional ethnography treats 
people not as the object under analysis but as an entry point into understanding the conditions 
placed upon people’s lives. In terms of methodological practice, institutional ethnography 
involves what Walby (2013: 141, citing Smith, 2005: 135-39) refers to as ‘data dialogues.’ 
The primary data dialogue in institutional ethnography is between the interviewer or 
participant observer and one or more persons that the researchers talks with or observes. A 
secondary data dialogue occurs between the researcher and the interview transcript and/or the 
fieldnotes. In effect, data analysis in institutional ethnography cannot simply focus on one 
individual standpoint; instead, the trick of analysis is to find a way to do it that “locates 
individuals and their experiences within a complex institutional field” (McCoy, 2006: 113, 
cited in Walby, 2013: 142). By starting from this standpoint, “lines of fault between peoples’ 
own embodied knowledge and the ways of knowing ‘written out’ of conceptual practices of 
power become revealed” (Walby, 2013: 143). Conceptual practices of power, which as Smith 
(1990: 31) argues, “subsume people’s actual speech and what they have to tell about 
themselves” are tied to organisational forms of ruling. 
Therefore, institutional ethnography examines the linkages between experience, sociality and 
work. Put differently, we see how this method is interested in what people do, how they 
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work, and how this process of doing and working links together with other people’s doings 
and workings in a web of ruling which has becoming increasingly mediated through 
surveillance texts. The interpretive work that people do to activate and/or add to the text 
coordinates organisation “of what happens in the setting in which the reading takes place and 
the multiple sites in which the same text is read, as well as the local settings of work 
connected in the ongoing process” (Turner, 2002: 309). To further explicate the relations 
between people and extra-local institutions, institutional ethnographic studies explore the 
everyday work-text-work activities done by people in their local settings.  
Mobile Methods and the Ethnographic Commute  
Mobile methods and the ‘ethnographic commute’ are increasingly used for research which 
examines mobile practices and/or techniques (Büscher and Urry, 2009; Murray, 2009; 
Jungnickel, 2014). Predicated on research in context, mobile methods encompass the 
exploration of movement and situate it within physical and social spaces under investigation 
(Murray, 2009). Multisensory techniques which examine aspects of everyday life 
acknowledge the importance of the bodily experience of space, place, time and routine, as 
well as the perceptual memory of humans (Degen and Rose, 2012). The last decade has seen 
a surge in the innovation and use of mobile methods to study mobilities—the journeys 
themselves—in place-making practices (Sheller and Urry, 2006). The growth of mobile 
methods has seen a renewed focus on the study of human experience, as these methods focus 
on the reciprocal relationship between people and place (Wolifson, 2016).  
This exploration involved the use of adapted version of the “go-along” interview (cf. 
Kusenbach, 2003). “Go-alongs,” and more specifically “walk-alongs” (Lynch, 1960) are a 
micro-ethnographic method (Smith, 1967) of the mobilities turn (Sheller and Urry, 2006). 
The technique involves combining participant observation and interviewing while 
accompanying subjects on their familiar outings and routines to understand their “authentic 
practices and interpretations” (Kusenbach, 2003: 464). This combination has the effect of 
grounding the research in situ and prompts access to participants’ experiences in and 
perceptions of the surrounding environment. For instance, the use of mobile methods in the 
day- and nighttime spaces garner a more nuanced understanding of how expeditions to visit, 
check in and monitor tagged offenders are perceived and experienced by field agents using 
those spaces. In this way, mobile methodologies supplement the excavation and access to the 
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meanings of human construction of the social world, a world which has become increasing 
shaped by mobility (Anderson, 2004; Murray, 2009).   
‘Go-alongs’ are emplaced, mobile methods significant for examining how agents and 
offenders, in practice, make sense of surveillance and punishment through EM technologies. 
It is important to note that I use the term ‘emplaced’ here to describe the setting of methods 
within the physical spaces, locales, routes and routines being examined: the day- and 
nightscapes of Scotland, and particular spaces within it, including the NEMC, the vehicles of 
field agents, and the residences of offenders.  
The second mobile method employed in this study is the ethnographic commute. A key 
feature of the ethnographic commute is an openness to engage with sites as they emerge; in 
other words, to follow and move with the research participants and to go where they go, 
rather than solely rely on a predetermined spatial nature of the stationary field-site prior to the 
start of research. This openness of engagement pushes the ethnographer to go outside “the 
citadel of expert knowledge to the viewpoints of lay groups” and their practices and routines 
(Hess, 2007: 236).  
On its surface, the researcher’s routine journey from one site to another and back can be 
considered a mundane and boring practice. However, exploring and implementing the 
ethnographic commute has potentially valuable interventions in the craft of qualitative 
research (cf. Jungnickel, 2014). Typically, when the researcher identifies a site to investigate, 
a central and indubitably practical aspect of any ethnographic study entails a form (or forms) 
of ethnographer mobility. This mobility involves a variety of items to consider: looking up 
the location on a map or through online searches; planning routes; choosing appropriate 
means of mobility; negotiating a constellation of factors, including weather, people, devices 
and materials to bring or leave behind; and then getting to and from identified places. 
Distances might be minutes or months between events or sites, and may require the assistance 
of cars, bicycles, trains, plans, trams, or boats to reach them. For example, qualitative 
methods literature has examined the selection of research sites (Fetterman, 2010), methods 
for gaining entry into the sites (Hine, 2000), how to negotiate relationship upon entry 
(Silverman, 2006), the ethical issues and implications researchers should consider within 
these sites and throughout data collection (Murphy and Dingwall, 2007; Skeggs, 2007; 
Ferguson, 2016), managing multiple site visitations (Falzon, 2009; Coleman and Von 
Hellerman, 2011), and advice on when and how to leave the field (Hammersley and 
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Atkinson, 2007). In sum, ethnographers do not simply turn up at a research site as if by 
magic; rather, it is a complex interplay between body, landscape, time, and routine, all of 
which are connected and understood intimately. Although ordinary, trivial, and often 
overlooked, these activities, choices, and practices are imperative to the doing of 
ethnographic research (Jungnickel, 2014).  
Utilizing a multi-sited approach, the current study fits into Marcus’ (1998) argument that 
ethnographers who engage in this approach should “follow the people”; “follow the thing”; 
“follow the metaphor”; “follow the story, plot or allegory”; “follow the life or biography” or 
“follow the conflict” across a range of locations. Marcus insists that multi-sited studies are 
useful for “suturing locations of cultural production that have not been previously connected 
and consequently, for creating empirically argued new envisionings of social landscapes” 
(1998: 93). It might involve moving between field-sites or the selection of two or more 
contrasting (or similar) field-sites to study one theme, and then having to move back and 
forth because the comparison is analytically useful. In doing so ethnographers are constantly 
adapting to accommodate shifts and changes in the configurations of field sites, and the act of 
movement then is revealed as both practical and necessary to the nature of the research.  
Indeed, as Jungnickel (2014: 652) contends, there are advantages to encompassing mobility 
into both ethnographic process and analysis: 
Recognising how we plan routes, get lost, ask directions, find our way, meet 
people, see unexpected things, get hot, cold, attacked by birds, buffeted by wind 
and caught in the rain and do it regularly on a daily basis can add… another layer 
of texture to the study of ‘ordinary, small troubles’ in everyday life that we 
attempt to understand.  
While it might not make sense at the time, the deliberate choices of how ethnographers enter 
and leave a field, coupled with the practicalities of moving between sites in the field, suggests 
that ethnographic mobility has a significant role in research. The ‘ordinary, small trouble’ of 
how the ethnographer gets there and back becomes quintessential to the subtleties and 
complexities of experiencing, researching, and participating in everyday life.  
Data Collection for Fieldnotes and Observations 
Participant observation for institutional ethnography (IE) was employed, the purpose of 
which was is to generate descriptions of what people do in their everyday lives (Taber, 2010) 
particularly while they engage in electronic monitoring (EM) work at the National Electronic 
Monitoring Centre (NEMC). Observations at NEMC were conducted for six months (June - 
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December 2017) and ranged from 3-5 hours in length per shift, with most shifts beginning at 
7pm until 7am the following day. As I further discuss in Chapter 6, data collection with IE 
was significant to the study as it allowed me to engage in my own experiences with the 
organization, organizational cultural practices, and organizational official and unofficial texts 
(Taber 2010). Doing so provided the necessary bedrock to stand upon to assist me in 
understanding the procedures and processes of EM under the operation of G4S Scotland, as 
well as the foundation necessary to consider a more capacious conception of carceral 
territory.  
The “go-along” method was conducted within the same six month period of observation at 
the NEMC (June – December 2017), and was employed to reveal individual experiences of 
EM field work and to interrogate how multiple and multilayered discourses, memories and 
worldviews of participants framed these experiences. While a fuller understanding of how 
this project utilized the ‘go-along’ method is discussed in Chapter 7, its significance can be 
briefly mentioned here. By using this method in place, and moving through place, I sought to 
reveal how valuable and meaningful encounters unveil complex narratives of those places 
first hand. More generally, I sought to interrogate how the routines of both surveyors and the 
surveilled shape experience, an interest which would lead me to further understand how these 
criminal justice actors engage make sense, engage in, comply with or resist ‘carceral work’ to 
co-produce and maintain a carceral territory through EM.  
‘Go-alongs’ were selected in part because of their capacity to engender a collaborative 
approach between the research and the researched (Anderson, 2004). This power relation in 
the ‘go-along’ allows for a more free-flowing and dynamic interview or observation, all of 
which is accompanied by the surrounding environments (Ross et al., 2009). Go-alongs were 
not filmed, but extensive field and research notes were taken immediately after and in the 
days following the go-alongs, when memories were freshest. This approach enabled me to 
remain cognizant of the various sensory levels of complex conscious and unconscious 
relationships between self, routine, time and landscape (Bingley, 2003; Wolifson, 2016; 
Finlay and Bowman, 2017). Furthermore, the go-along method facilitates access to memories 
in place and routine “whilst staying connected to the present experience” (Bingley, 2003: 
330). This method’s flexibility can put participants more at ease than the seated interview, as 
it is more conducive to frank conversations with natural breakpoints involving stories and 
personal experiences (Finlay and Bowman, 2017). Through this method, participants are less 
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concerned with trying to give the ‘right’ answers (Evans and Jones, 2011) and can be more 
engaged in fluid, open dialogue.  
The informal settings and the ample timeframes of the go-along allows for comfortable 
expeditions for the researcher and the respondent that may not be obtained in a traditional 
interview setting. Go-alongs with MOs in the field usually lasted approximately 7 hours in 
length per shift (i.e. a field MO shift always began at 5pm and they can visit an MP’s 
residence at midnight at the latest). In effect, the informality of such settings can reveal 
insights on behaviours, attitudes, and efforts exerted to engage in EM work on a day-to-day 
basis. 
Finally, I recognize the ethical aspects inherent within qualitative research, such as obtaining 
consent from interviewees, interview confidentiality, risks and benefits of the research project 
to the sample of respondents interviewed, ethnographic observations recorded, and 
dissemination of project findings. To ensure the progression of the study, I sought ethics 
approval prior to the commencement of the research project. This study received ethics 
approval from the Research Ethics and Integrity Committee based in Edinburgh Law School 
at the University of Edinburgh. Separate attention is accorded to the ethics’ approval process 
of ethnographic observations and ‘go-alongs’ in Chapters 6 and 7, respectively, while the 
approval process of inmate interviews is examined later in this chapter.   
Data Analysis for Fieldnotes and Observations  
By coupling institutional with mobile ethnographies, this study relies on interview transcripts, 
participant observation (i.e. respondent ‘shadowing’) and field notes as data. Triangulating 
this method of inquiry best serves the study as it treats such sources of data not as the object 
of interest but as conceptual entry points into human experience and sociality (Hammersley 
and Atkinson, 1983; 2007). Furthermore, this triangulation illustrates the respondent as a 
contact point through which a number of experiential dialogues and networks meet and 
intersect, making evident to the researcher the organizational arrangement of the institution, 
the impact of EM as a form of carceral territory, and the efforts required to maintain routine 
EM compliance.   
By observing and/or asking a respondent how they work with texts or how they are subjects 
of surveillance we can explicate the way surveillance reaches down into people’s lives and 
connects up with extra-local, institutional processes (Walby, 2005b, 2013). The talk of 
surveillance agents (i.e. G4S monitoring and field agents) in their work settings demonstrates 
110 
 
they perform and facilitate extra-local organization as well as coordinate lived social realities. 
As the constituents of social relations, surveillance texts—such as the documentary materials 
required by MOs—expose the subjective aspects of recording/writing/reading involved in 
EM text production and the extra-local institutions the surveillance text joins and connects 
into the surveillance circuit (Walby, 2005b). It becomes important to ask about and listen for 
texts or sequences of texts while interviewing and observing, of which allows for “a kind of 
listening and probing oriented toward institutional connections” (Devault and McCoy, 2002: 
765). Human experience and text are produced within specific interpretive and institutional 
frames, and because the ethnographer is located within a range of workplaces throughout the 
research process (in the current study, this can include the NEMC, the unmarked G4S 
monitoring vehicle, the offender’s address to install the HMU, and the roads and routes taken 
between these sites in the community, etc.), it is possible to examine how different 
interpretations of the same surveillance text could be made. Indeed, in the cases where both 
the surveillance agent and the ethnographer can view the same surveillance text, different 
interpretations can occur. 
Once collected, the content from the fieldnotes and interviews were coded to facilitate the 
analysis process. The type of coding implemented is what Coffey and Atkinson (1996: 29) 
refer to as “coding as an analytic strategy” in which each piece of data was (re)read to 
examine broader assumptions, themes and meanings underpinning what was articulated 
within the text. Rather than focusing on specific quantities of words or phrases, this strategy 
emphasizes the presence and absence of information within the data. In effect, this coding 
process made the data more manageable, while simultaneously allowed for a more complex 
and in-depth analysis (Coffey and Atkinson, 1996: 30). 
The primary data supplements research and evidence on EM in the Scottish context from 
other secondary sources (for example, see Graham and McIvor, 2015, 2017; McIvor and 
Graham, 2016a, 2016b). It is acknowledged that the sample size is relatively small—albeit 
one that is, arguably, appropriate in the context in the smaller European jurisdiction of 
Scotland, in combination with other sources of evidence. Nevertheless, there is inherent value 
in the qualitative research conducted in this study. The significance of this qualitative method 
suggests that hypothetically, even a sample size of one—whether it be, for example, one visit 
to the NEMC, one ride-along, or one interview with an MO or MP—can provide a significant 
amount of knowledge, information and perspective that enriches criminological and 
geographical inquiry, an argument which I have made elsewhere (cf. Gacek, 2017, 2018). 
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Data Collection for Inmate Interviews  
To further this capacious conception and affirm carceral territory as an appropriate frame of 
reference to consider EM, semi-structured interviews were employed over a six-month period 
(January – June 2017) with inmates at Her Majesty’s Prison (HMP) Edinburgh. In total, ten 
interviews were conducted with inmates. These interviews were audio-recorded and then later 
transcribed. These inmates were serving a sentence within the Scottish Prison Service (SPS) 
and had been either available for early release into the community with a period of electronic 
monitoring (EM), or had a period of EM coupled with their period of incarceration at 
sentencing. These inmates were offenders who had breached their Home Detention Curfew 
(HDC); in other words, these individuals were released to a period of EM but had breached 
the conditions imposed on them within the EM period and were sent back into SPS.  
Inmates were identified and recruited for interviews using snowball sampling. Central to 
accounts of snowballing is a ‘referral’ model of “using one contact to help you recruit another 
contact, who in turn can put you in touch with someone else” (Valentine, 2005: 117). This 
method of sampling can be beneficial to qualitative research, generating a unique type of 
social knowledge that is emergent, interactional, and potentially political (Noy, 2008: 327). 
These inmates were serving a sentence within the Scottish Prison Service (SPS) and were 
either available for early release into the community with a period of electronic monitoring 
(EM), or had a period of EM coupled with their period of incarceration at sentencing. These 
inmates are Home Detention Curfew (HDC) offenders, and as indicated earlier in the project, 
these individuals were released to a period of EM but had breached the conditions imposed 
on them within the EM period and were sent back into SPS. The sample of inmates reported 
that the majority of the four prisons which they have been incarcerated include HMP 
Edinburgh, HMP Polmont, HMP Addiewell, and HMP Corton Vale. HMP Edinburgh is a 
large community facing prison receiving offenders predominately from courts in Edinburgh, 
the Lothians and Borders, but also offenders from the Fife area. This prison manages male 
and female offenders for those on remand, short term offenders (serving less than 4 years), 
long term offenders (serving more than 4 years), and offenders with life sentences (Scottish 
Prison Service, n.d.). HMP Polmont is Scotland’s national holding facility for young, male 
offenders aged between 16 and 21 years old. Sentences range from 6 months to life, and the 
average sentence length at HMP Polmont is 2-4 years (Scottish Prison Service, n.d.). HMP 
Addiewell is situated in the village of Addiewell, which is in the central belt of Scotland. This 
village is between Scotland’s two largest cities, Edinburgh and Glasgow. This prison houses 
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all offender types the exclusion of female offenders and convicted young offenders (Scottish 
Prison Service, n.d.). Finally, HMP Corton Vale is the national facility for only female 
offenders for both remand and convicted prisoners, while HMP Edinburgh and HMP Polmont 
have the capacity to hold both male and female offenders. It is important to note that there are 
additional prisons within Scotland which house inmates, however, the inmates interviewed at 
HMP Edinburgh did not mention these additional prisons when they recalled their 
experiences in the interviews, and as such are not included in my discussion.  
 
HMP Edinburgh provided a small room inside the prison where these meetings between the 
men and myself could take place. Given the personal nature of the inmates’ experiences, and 
coupled with the highly controlled prison environment, interviews were carried out off-wing 
(i.e. away from inmates’ accommodations) in private interview rooms within the ‘Agent’s 
Visit’ area of the prison (i.e. in spaces reserved for private consultation with legal 
representatives, social workers, psychologists, and this gracious researcher himself). 
Although for security reasons HMP Edinburgh staff were present in the corridor outside the 
interview rooms, interviews could not be overheard. HMP Edinburgh provides one 45 minute 
per visit per inmate, and depending on the participants’ talkativeness, the length of interviews 
ranged from 15 to 30 minutes. The interviews with inmates were audio recorded and later 
transcribed. Any information that could identify the participants personally was kept 
confidential. The audio-recordings of the interviews were downloaded to a computer file that 
was password protected, and the audio-recording device was wiped following download to 
computer. No names or names of agencies or businesses (besides G4S Scotland) were 
included in the transcripts. Pseudonyms were assigned to each respondent to further ensure 
confidentiality in the research encounter and anonymity from the public. In a similar vein to 
Ricciardelli (2014: 417), included quotations from participants have been slightly edited “to 
remove any non-prison slang, non-word utterances, speech fillers… and to assist with 
comprehensibility and flow. To stay true to the voice of a participant, grammar was less 
frequently modified.” 
 
Participation in the study was voluntary, and the participants were initially recruited via 
assistance from SPS operations management. Prior to each interview, consent was obtained 
from each respondent and each respondent was always thanked for their time and 
contribution. Although the face-to-face interviews were semi-structured, a 30-item interview 
guide was used when needed to draw participants into conversation (see Appendix B). The 
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intention for the interview guide was to not strictly direct how each interview would progress; 
rather, the guide offered extensive leeway for the interviewer to probe conversational paths as 
they surfaced while touching on topics related to the inmates’ backgrounds, observations 
regarding incarceration, perceptions of community re-entry with the monitoring ‘tag,’ their 
return to SPS once they have breached their conditions of EM, and perceptions of their 
residence and neighbourhood. Questions posed to participants focused on several aspects of 
the project, including how the inmates constructed their experiences in carceral spaces in 
relation to community release, the struggles of abiding by the conditions of being monitored 
through G4S Scotland, and in what ways was living post-release similar to the experiences of 
being incarcerated. In posing these questions, probes were kept to a minimum, and used only 
to seek further elaboration of the inmates’ responses.  
 
In terms of potential risk from participating in this research, participants were informed that 
they may feel emotional or psychological stress from recounting their experiences of 
incarceration. It is important to note that SPS offered to assist participants if they required 
further counselling from recounting such experiences or sharing their stories.  
 
Recollections of time served in SPS were approximations at best. The inmates found it 
difficult to exactly remember the range of time spent for each prison sentence they had 
received, or the total number of months or years spent within a particular prison. 
Nevertheless, the incorporation of the inmates’ narratives into the study, coupled with an 
understanding of what the narratives are trying to say about carceral experiences, highlights 
the significance of acknowledging the very real human aspects that exist within qualitative 
data collection and analysis (Gacek, 2017, 2018).  
 
Additionally, I am aware of the possibility that there may be a bias in snowball sampling, 
insofar as inmates interviewed could have similar ideas and experiences and give each other’s 
references to SPS operations management or to the researcher himself (Flick, 2009: 110). 
Furthermore, I recognize this type of sampling strategy “as convenience (based on contacts 
available), non-random and non-probability (not necessarily reflective of a broader 
population, making wider inferences difficult) and often purposive (targeting certain groups 
or types)[,]” so of course the usual caveats will apply (Geddes et al., 2018: 347-348). 
Notwithstanding, the study generates “context-dependent knowledge” pertaining to the 
impact of incarceration through the experiences chosen by the inmates to be shared 
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(Flyvbjerg, 2006: 222). As indicated in the methodology chapter, I incorporated aspects of 
Bourdieu and Wacquant’s (1992) self- reflexive sociology to understand how to position 
myself in relation to the respondents at HMP Edinburgh, the research encounter, and the 
analytical themes that arose from the data. This allowed me to engage in a critical and 
reflexive analysis of my own social location in amongst my observations, interactions, and 
conversations with those interviewed in the prison (cf. Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992).  
 
Indeed, while the information obtained by the sample of inmates is in no way generalizable to 
the inmate populations in Scotland generally, nevertheless I see the inherent value in 
recognizing and examining the small sample’s experiences. I also recognize that limiting the 
sample size to ten may impact the other knowledges and perspectives that could be construed 
and shared to the public. However, similar to my arguments above, the inherent importance 
of qualitative research suggests that even a sample size of one interview or one narrative 
shared can assist the ongoing knowledge mobilization inherent within criminological and 
carceral geographical inquiry and the minute yet complex intricacies of everyday life. 
 
Data Analysis for Inmate Interviews  
The data collected from these interviews were coded in order to facilitate the analysis 
process. The type of coding indicated aligns with the coding practice discussed above (cf. 
Coffey and Atkinson, 1996). This coding process is significant for inmate interviews as it can 
make the data more manageable, while at the same time it allowed for a more comprehensive 
analysis of my sample’s experiences (see also Gacek, 2015, 2017). The general themes were 
developed based on the research questions; specifically, how the inmates at HMP Edinburgh 
constructed their experiences of carceral and community spaces, their perceptions or their 
own engagements with being ‘tagged’ upon release from prison, and how they struggled with 
returning to SPS once they breached their conditions of EM. Interviews were coded 
individually and without the use of coding software. Individually coding interviews allowed 
for themes to be drawn out of the existing literature, and others were identified as they 
emerged (Kotova, 2018). These themes are important to consider as such knowledge 
produces an enriched understanding of carceral spaces, in terms of forging connections 
between experiences of incarceration, being released onto a period of EM, and returning back 




It is noteworthy that the participants’ choice of stories impacts the analysis. Choosing 
narratives to discuss in the research encounter, according to Somers (1994: 630), becomes a 
deliberate way of rejecting “the neutrality and appearance of objectivity typically embedded 
in master narratives.” Such rejection further promotes the expression of “multiple 
subjectivities” that permeates the self when participants choose a narrative to represent 
themselves (Somers, 1994: 630). In effect, the struggles over narrative choice and narrations 
“are thus struggles over identity” (Somers, 1994: 631) to ascertain and reify authorship, and 
to invite my participants to talk ‘territorially’ is to recognize how EM coalesces and/or 
conflicts with their own personal territories of everyday living.   
 
Furthermore, by situating the narratives within the context of spatiality and mobility, it 
became useful to examine, along Foucauldian axes, the ways in which a spatial methodology 
assists us in ‘mapping out’ how power is exercised in unequal and unstable relations that 
produce knowledge (Youngblood Jackson, 2013). As Youngblood Jackson (2013: 841) 
contends, a spatial reading then involves “disentangling the complex production of 
subjectivity as an effect of power/knowledge relations and practices.” Understanding the 
multiple effects of social, cultural, and material practices within such relations of 
power/knowledge illustrates how these inmates-as-social subjects are in a continual process 
of “constructing and transforming their selves and their worlds” through their interactions 
with others (Youngblood Jackson, 2013: 841), while concomitantly highlighting how spaces 
form chains of relations that advance, multiply, and branch out deeply into social networks. 
Practices of power/knowledge are spatial, insofar as they spread out and connect to/with other 
forms of power/knowledge as inmates move through various and diverse spaces. As authentic 
vehicles of power/knowledge practices, these inmates and their subjectivities shift in response 
to the contextual demands of the spaces they encounter, both behind and beyond the prison 
walls. Indeed, while power is acted upon them, “they also acted on power” (Youngblood 
Jackson, 2013: 844), such as when these inmates respond to the contextual demands of EM 
upon release.  Therefore, situating power relations in terms of spatiality and mobility then 
allows us further analysis of “how things change, transform themselves, migrate,” disconnect 
and reconnect, in order to (temporarily) produce different desires, different affects, and 
different practices, all within a wider space of ontological becoming (Foucault 2000: 294, 




Respondent Representation and Researcher Reflexivity  
As Rapley (2001) contends, qualitative interviews are inherently sites of social interaction. 
Indeed, what the self experiences is not only in relation to another, but to time, place, and 
power, all of which shifts how experiences of an actor will become embedded within and 
constituted through narratives, action, social processes, practices and interactions (cf. Somers, 
1994: 621).  
Ethnographers are aware that their own subjectivity has effectivity in research situations, and 
so are reflexively monitoring at all times their position in relation to the presence of an 
interviewee and the local setting (Smith, 2005). As indicated above, while the primary 
dialogue is between researcher and their respondents, a secondary dialogue occurs between 
the researcher and the transcript, audio recorded interview, or written field and research 
notes. It is often in the secondary dialogue where the ethnographer’s experience as subject of 
the research process and the traces of both the institutional organization and the social 
organization of the local setting in the ethnographer’s experience become apparent (Smith, 
2005).  
It is through our experiences that we come to know, understand and make sense of the world 
and our place within it (Somers and Gibson, 1994). However, it is important to remember that 
although researchers intend to encounter the knowing, experiencing subject of our 
investigations, researchers cannot know that subject or field site to the fullest extent (Doucet 
and Mauthner, 2008). There may well be something ‘beneath’ or ‘behind’ what the subject 
tells the researcher and what the researcher can infer from the sites visited, yet all we can 
come to know is what the subject narrates, as well as our interpretations from their 
experiences “within the wider web of social and structural relations from which narrated 
subjects speak” (Doucet and Mauthner, 2008: 404). In terms of the subject, the lived life is 
more than just what is comprised within a story of set of experiences; how subjects are 
embedded within their lives speaks “all around the life: [a story] provides routes into a life… 
[and] lays down maps for [other] lives to follow” (Plummer, 1995: 168; italics emphasized). 
Yet the fragment of experience the subject chooses to share to the researcher from the 
subject’s larger knowledge prism—while incomplete and unknowable in principle—is not 
fruitless. In fact, the experience the subject provides to the researcher may be one of the most 
important tools researchers have for understanding lives and the wider cultures, social and 
structuring processes and practices the subject is part of at large (Plummer, 1995).  
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Self-reflexivity is quintessential to understand how to position oneself in relation to the 
respondents, the researcher encounters at and along the way to sites under investigation, and 
the analytical themes which arise from the data collected. Such researcher reflexivity allowed 
me to engage in a critical analysis of my own social location while I attempted to make sense 
of in my observations, interactions, and conversations with the criminal justice actors I 
travelled with and interviewed (cf. Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). My interactions with all 
three elements relay how unspoken power relations and surveillance govern each point of 
interest, the extent to which all three elements interdependently operate, and the potential for 
each to influence and further develop notions like the ‘carceral’ and the ‘territorial’.  
I readily accept that I am an outsider to the criminal justice system of Scotland specifically 
and to the United Kingdom generally. I am also foreign to the conviction, sentencing and EM 
processes and practices underpinning the Scottish criminal justice system, and to the 
experiences and impact of such practices that infuse the lives of the criminal justice actors I 
encounter. I sought to use a self-reflexive approach in conjunction with my own set of 
cultural assumptions, and methodological and analytical frameworks. Put simply, my 
experiences as a White, straight, working class, young Canadian male influence my 
epistemological standpoint (cf. Gacek, 2015, 2017; see also Mao et al., 2016). There is no 
synchronicity between my own life-course trajectories and those MOs or MPs I sought to 
observe and/or interview. This leads me to believe that full comprehension of the experiences 
these actors have with surveillant technologies and the locales of carceral territory they 
navigate cannot be achieved in toto. At best, this study enriches the fragments and pieces of 
knowledge and experience these respondents decide to share with me. While the experiences 
and standpoints between the respondents and myself are not on equal footing, at the very least 
I can report on, examine and discuss my own ethnographic observations, what my 
respondents have to say, and provide a venue for our collective insights to be voiced and 
heard to greater, diverse audiences (for a further review and examples of researcher 
reflexivity, see Berger, 2013; Mallozzi, 2009; Mao et al., 2016; Walby, 2010).   
Conclusion  
This chapter has demonstrated the methodological underpinnings of the current study, 
considering first the significance of both institutional ethnography and mobile methods for a 
further examination of the carceral territory of EM. Institutional ethnography is a method of 
inquiry that explores organisations and textually-mediated relations whilst attempting to 
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preserve the presence of the self in the account. It problematizes social relations as the local 
site of lived experience, while examining how series of texts coordinate actions, 
consciousness, and forms of organization in extra-local settings (cf. Walby, 2005a, 2005b, 
2013). Smith (2005: 219) suggests that institutional ethnographies carried out by different 
researchers contribute to a diverse, ‘collective work’ as they share the same focus on how 
texts influence and organise human relations.   
Emplaced, mobile methods shape our encounters in a way that valorises their significance, 
revealing a multitude of individual experience and unveiling complex narratives of place, 
routine, surveillance, and punishment (cf. Wolifson, 2016). Indeed, as Jungnickel (2014: 652) 
contends, “mobile positioning matters.” Despite ethnographic training, it becomes easy to 
overlook the mobility of ourselves and the people and practices to which we observe; yet 
much of following the person, thing, idea, and so forth is actively about making choices and 
connections, and it is the mundane and boring aspects of mobility “that offer unique insights 
into everyday practice” (Jungnickel, 2014: 652). Ethnographic mobility observes and charts 
different ways of making coherence (and incoherence) across different sites, all of which 
serve to tie people, places, decisions, and experiences together in a complicated yet 
comprehensive manner.   
Yet the capacity of this research to continue understanding ‘carceral work’ also relies upon 
semi-structured interviews with inmates. By inviting the respondents to speak of their 
struggles and movements between the prison and the community, methodologically this 
research attempts to give voice to unheard populations of society while attempting to 
comprehend experiences of the ‘carceral’ and the ‘territorial’ more effectively. The 
inscription of punishment upon the personal territories, routines and lifestyles of inmates and 
their loved ones indicates how carceral territory spreads the carceral out into society, 
permeating the homes and residences of those it seeks to monitor and punish. Taken together, 
the triangulation of the methods used in the study crystallize a more capacious conception of 
how carceral territories are created, sustained, and perpetuated in the spaces and places of 
everyday life, both in terms of those tasked with installation and maintenance of the EM 
































Chapter 6: Observing the National Electronic Monitoring Centre  
Introduction  
This chapter examines the National Electronic Monitoring Centre (NEMC) of G4S Scotland 
through ethnographic observations. As the service provider contracted by the Scottish 
Government, G4S Scotland provides electronic monitoring (EM) services for the monitoring 
of both court-ordered offenders and offenders post-release from prison. To explore how 
everyday life is caught up and coordinated through organisational processes of what work 
people do in the NEMC, how they work, and how these doings and workings connect to each 
other in a constellate web of ruling relations, institutional ethnography (IE) is a useful way to 
pursue these procedures, practices, and experiences in greater detail.  
As indicated in Chapter 5, IE attempts to understand the institutional conditions placed upon 
people’s lives, rendering the structure of the institution and its ruling relations knowable, and 
examining how text coordinates organization in such a way as to reveal individuals and their 
experiences from within a complex institutional field and its ongoing practices (Walby, 
2013). Starting from this standpoint, IE allows the researcher to examine the linkages 
between experience, sociality and work engaged within the organization itself, and in terms 
of my study, provides a solid bedrock for me to stand on to crystallize and promote a more 
capacious conception and broader understanding of carceral territory.  
First, this chapter discusses the importance of placing IE within the context of NEMC. In 
particular, notetaking and field notes provided an insightful way to examine more than simply 
the work G4S monitoring officers (MOs)6 engage in on a daily basis, presenting the 
organizational structure, culture, practices, ruling relations. I then segue to a discussion which 
highlights the institutional barriers faced in data collection and the access negotiated to 
observe G4S staff at the NEMC. Researchers are constantly faced with issues gaining entry 
into sites they wish to observe (Hine, 2000; Silverman, 2006), not only in the first instance 
but its continuous examination. There is also a plethora of regulations and restrictions which 
govern how certain institutions, especially ones working under the banner of criminal justice 
(or those working alongside it, as is the case of G4S Scotland), would like to be observed (cf. 
Peters and Turner, 2017). These same constraints to access for the researcher are important to 
consider, and are further examined. Following this, I discuss how EM generally operates 
                                                          
6 The institutional lingo used in this chapter will be similar in Chapters 7 and 8. In effect, certain terms like 
MOs, monitored persons (MPs), the home monitoring unit (HMU), etc. will be used as warranted.  
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within the NEMC and couple this understanding with a more specific focus upon the work 
MOs engage in to sense and manage disruption produced by monitored persons (MPs) under 
EM surveillance. I then turn the attention to the operational constraints of freedom witnessed 
through my observations of the MOs engaging in this type of surveillance work, and the ways 
in which responsibilization strategies and participatory surveillance were used to co-produce 
EM compliance. Reflections on significance of the analytical themes in relation to carceral 
territory as an appropriate frame of reference to consider EM will close the chapter.   
Placing Institutional Ethnography: Notetaking at the NEMC 
My observational role within the NEMC was as “background ‘sociological voyeur’” (Smith, 
2007: 288), insofar as I was centered within three detached yet technologically 
interconnected realities: (1) the embodied, perceptual action and behaviours occurring 
between MOs within the NEMC monitoring centre; (2) the distanciated, mediated action 
taking place between individual MOs and their the NEMC monitoring screens; and (3) the 
disembodied, verbal action over the communicational telephone networks between MOs and 
MPs. The NEMC is a complex environment for ethnographic observation, and it took some 
time to satisfactorily settle in and get to grips with the multiple layers of reality undermining 
the EM of offenders. Moreover, I recognize that “the sheer volume of visual, aural, sensory, 
semiotic and symbolic information circulating” in the NEMC makes this “a particularly 
difficult meaning world to realistically capture, interpret and understand” (Smith, 2007: 289).  
Notetaking and field notes produced entry-level data for this phase of the project. As Walford 
(2009: 119-120) indicates, one of the clear things to come from notetaking and field notes is 
that “there are similarities as well as differences in the ways…ethnographers actually 
construct field notes and in the terminology that they use to describe what they do.” While 
there are always subjective perception about what is constructed in the written record or what 
ethnographers have seen or wish to record in a field note—especially with memory erosion 
and the limitations of what ethnographers see and hear in the field—the important point 
underscored here is that so long as ethnographers arm themselves with some sort of notebook 
or pad to write in, and couple this material with an enthusiasm to record and understand, then 
the role of field notes in ethnography can be a viable resource for qualitative research (cf. 
Walford, 2009).  
By conducting ethnographic observations, the purpose of which was to generate descriptions 
of what people do in their everyday lives, I was able to question and reflect upon my own 
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experiences with the organization (cf. Taber, 2010). MO wariness of my presence and what I 
was doing in ‘their’ domain is certainly understandable, and because of this observations 
were recorded in situ in the form of scribbled notes and quotes, which were then typed up 
more fully after observation at the first available opportunity.7 Furthermore, none of the 
observations or interpretations drawn upon in the chapter have been ‘checked’ for accuracy 
or validity by MOs. In a parallel vein to Smith’s (2007: 289) ethnographic observation of 
CCTV operators, such a course of action to have operators ‘check’ for accuracy and validity 
“would only reaffirm my identity to them as ‘outside’ researcher/investigator rather than 
passive, empathetic observer.” Adopting such an approach might have alienated, angered or 
affected MOs in such a way that would place them on the defensive and thus jeopardize my 
access to future ethnographic observations at the NEMC. From the outset my aim within this 
period of ethnographic observation at the NEMC was to limit unnecessary disturbance of the 
socially constructed nature and interaction order of the NEMC setting. Rather than to ‘check’ 
or glean information in an inauthentic or ‘staged’ setting where both memory and self have 
had time to reflect upon what was said and done between fellow MOs, and between MOs and 
MPs, a position of limiting unnecessary disturbance felt to be more scientifically accurate in 
collecting and recording data in context as natural and free flowing as possible, where “the 
minute to minute pressures and workplace cultural practices and rituals” are present (Smith, 
2007: 289).   
Research conducted in this phase of the study followed an open-ended process; it was not 
random and unfocused, but was without a predetermined outcome (Taber, 2010). I began 
with a very specific research idea and a research plan: I wanted to know how EM practices 
and procedures operated within Scotland, and I wanted to examine how G4S Scotland staff, 
as EM operators, experienced this work as work. My original plan was to observe this staff 
operating EM at the NEMC and conduct interviews to invite them to share their thoughts and 
experiences of doing this type of surveillance work. By engaging in an active inquiry, I was 
then able to adapt my research as applicable as I progressed. It was through the initial 
ethnographic observations at the NEMC that the focus and format of my research changed, 
my theoretical framework was modified, the texts I had intended to analyze changed, and my 
analytical focus shifted, all of which has made my research much more solid, relevant, and 
                                                          
7 As Smith (2007: 289) acknowledges, it is clear that, due to memory erosion, this method of recording has 
some implications for the authenticity, accuracy and validity of the research findings presented in this chapter. 
Similarly, I recognize and openly acknowledge this limitation.   
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rigorous. In doing so, I let my research analysis take me to unintended and significant places, 
which brought me to considering carceral territory as a geographically contextual frame of 
reference for EM. As Taber (2010: 17) contends, “[i]n the spirit of IE, what was previously 
invisible to me became visible, enabling me to make unanticipated connections between 
everyday practices, texts, and institutional ruling relations.” By adopting IE, the themes and 
following discussions emerged purely from spending time in the field as opposed to being 
formulated by any predefined hypothesis or deductively framed research question. Over this 
period of time, what started as mere intrigue into how EM operates in Scotland became a 
larger investigation into an attempt to further understand how EM, as a form of carceral 
territory, supplements the spread of the carceral throughout society, and how NEMC and G4S 
Scotland practices and procedures imagine, create and sustain such carceral territories across 
Scotland.  
 
Organizational Constraints to Access: Getting a ‘peek’ inside the EM Black 
Box 
The NEMC is a part of G4S Scotland, located in the Tannochside area of Glasgow, Scotland. 
My original study was directed towards a more comprehensive engagement in the subjective 
experiences of MOs. My intention was to interview MOs as well as management as they 
cogitate their roles in the NEMC, in order to “reveal the negotiated, contested, messy and 
affective character of supervisory labour” (Smith, 2014: 22). I wanted to reveal the role of 
watching and monitoring through EM, from managing the conversations and disruptions 
external from the NEMC to managing selfhoods of MOs within the NEMC. In effect, my 
initial aim was along a similar vein to Smith’s (2014) ethnographic work of CCTV operators 
and operations in the UK. While Smith demonstrates how the CCTV gaze “borne from 
camera work is mediated by social factors that define its daily orientation and that construe 
its retrojected reflection” (2014: 162), my original focus was to examine how EM as a 
surveillant technology could be mediated by social factors as well, not only redefining its 
daily orientation but how ‘compliance work’ made sense to the MOs whom operated it, and 
how MOs construed EM as a form of punishment to be meted out to offenders in the 
community.  
Unfortunately, efforts to begin the original aim of the project were quashed. I had met with 
the research director of G4S Scotland in February 2017 to discuss potential ideas for 
ethnographic work inside the NEMC. While communications went smoothly, the difficulty 
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lay in the contingency of obtaining approval from the Scottish Government—in order to 
obtain access to interview MOs and management I would need the Scottish Government to 
confirm the project I was willing to progress. However, after many attempts to contact and 
liaise with the research director of the Scottish Government (with many numerous emails left 
unanswered), it became clear that full access of the NEMC would not be obtained. As a 
Canadian researcher foreign to Scotland’s governmental authorities, and the limited 
assistance I could obtain from criminal justice networks (academic and otherwise), I realized 
that this venture may not be successfully accomplished. Once I informed the NEMC 
researcher director of the lack of communication between the Scottish Government and 
myself, the director informed me in another informal conversation that my project could still 
be allowed to proceed at the NEMC; however, I was not allowed to interview staff, and could 
only draw and make observations of my own inferences. Furthermore, I was only allowed in 
the main monitoring room (see below) and would not have access to institutional paperwork 
in full—in order to better familiarize myself with the NEMC operations, I was allowed 
instead to email the research director for further questions about any observations I had made 
during my visits at the NEMC and she would provide her own thoughts on the operations and 
on the information NEMC staff would typically input into paperwork.  
Taken together I decided to slightly amend my project, and discussed with the NEMC 
research director that field notes would be taken in place of interviews with NEMC staff. 
While I recognize that interviews and full access into the EM ‘black box’ of supervisory 
labour (cf. Smith, 2014) would be more comprehensive methods, the ‘peek’ into the workings 
of NEMC, I argue, can still illustrate insight into how EM as a form of punishment is 
currently operated within Scotland. Furthermore, by reconfiguring my project in this way, the 
limited access my research may have had does not devalue the project’s undertaking of how 
compliance work at the NEMC operated and made sense to those workers whom engaged in 
it on a daily basis.  
Accounts presented in this chapter are reflexive extracts taken from my field notes. In total, 
26 hours were conducted in observation MO work at the NEMC. While I recognize that a 
greater amount of time spent observing the NEMC could construe a larger range of 
observations, for several reasons I found it necessary to end collection at this point. First, due 
to G4S Scotland being a private sector company, with its own mandate and schedules, it 
became difficult for the NEMC research director and myself to schedule dates and times for 
my research visits. In effect, I was able to visit once per month and to observe and note as 
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much as I could during those visits. Second, time and financial limitations played a major 
factor in my ability to schedule more research visits. Put differently, a foreign international 
PhD student with severely limited funds and time to complete the doctoral degree meant that 
my data collection period would be considerably shorter than desired. Thirdly, institutional 
barriers from the NEMC prohibited me from observing for longer amounts of time within 
each visit. In other words, I did not have institutional clearance to remain on the 12-hour 
evening shift, and so more research visits would have to be arranged with the NEMC research 
director. Fourth and final, after several visits to the NEMC I felt that data saturation through 
my observations and notetaking had been accomplished, and as Snow (1980: 102) reminds 
us, “the researcher leaves the field when enough data has been collected to sufficiently 
answer…emergent propositions, or to render an accurate description of the world under 
study.” After 26 hours of observations and notetaking I felt I could generate a sufficient 
description and more accurate understanding of what NEMC staff do in their everyday work 
environment, their ruling relations and the organizational culture at play. Furthermore, I was 
then able to ruminate and reflect upon not only my experiences and observations of the 
NEMC, but how these descriptions, understandings, and experiences connect back up to EM 
as a form of punishment and to the bigger picture of carceral territory. 
Although the fact that I was denied formal interviews with staff and management of NEMC 
forced me to alter my research approach, nevertheless it was through ethnographic 
observations and field notes I found that I had rich data as opposed to a shortage. Access, 
time and funding dilemmas certainly plague qualitative research projects, and it became clear 
that my student project would not be immune to such unfortunate circumstances (for further 
examples see Hesse-Biber and Leavy, 2011; see also Morrison et al., 2012 regarding why 
qualitative research terminates, and Russell, 2005 regarding the difficulties of timelines). 
However, the lack of interview and institutional access pushed me to explore an exciting 
methodological landscape, challenging me to become more observant of what I could note 
while visiting the NEMC, especially in terms of how the EM system operates at the NEMC 
and the ways in which MOs engage in compliance work as everyday work. The notes I 
produced became the text of which I could coordinate the organization of the NEMC, and 
coupling this data with the surveillant text I observed (i.e. the computer screens of the MOs 
operating the EM system), my project persisted in revealing experiences from within a 




How the EM System Works: Carceral Territory Within and Beyond the NEMC 
From the outset of the project my intention was to obtain a better understanding for and a 
more nuanced appreciation of the operations of the EM programme in Scotland. In a sense, I 
felt it necessary to begin to capture such appreciation at its source; namely, the headquarters 
of EM in Scotland. It was here that I wanted to not only witness how surveillance of 
offenders in the community took place, but also see how this compliance work is made sense 
through the practices and mobilities of the NEMC staff as surveillant technology workers. 
Described below is my initial impression of G4S Scotland where I began my IE journey:   
G4S Scotland is located in Glasgow, Scotland in what appears to be as unmarked 
building. I say this because the signage for G4S Scotland is quite minimal at best upon 
entering their parking lot from the road. An identification (ID) badge is required for 
entrance into the building. From the train station a G4S monitoring officer (MO) picked 
me up in their car to take me to the G4S Scotland building. To physically enter the 
building requires a member of G4S Scotland to be with you at all times. The MO 
scanned their badge across the entry door sensor and we walked inside. Upon entering, 
staff and visitors alike must identify themselves in a sign-in binder in the foyer to keep 
track of all arrivals to and departures from the building. Interesting, the windows 
marking the front of the building were all one-way (so those on the inside of the building 
were able to look out, yet outsiders would not be able to look inside). It appeared to me 
that such windows were installed for security purposes, and was one of my first 
instances of observing the physical securitization of G4S Scotland.  
 
Every door I walked through within G4S Scotland required an ID badge. It seemed like 
bathrooms were placed in the foyer to reduce intrusion of persons to a minimum and 
slow the flow of traffic walking through the building. From the foyer I was taken 
through several sets of doors, each requiring a scan of the ID badge by the MO. The MO 
and I finally arrived into the main monitoring room—arguably the heart of the 
operations for electronic monitoring (EM) in Scotland. This room monitors all EM tags 
in Scotland, and all of the monitored persons (MPs) with it. The room itself was quite 
rectangular, and almost imperceptibly bland. Minimal furnishings were in the room; 
however, it was sectioned off into various spaces: a conference room; a small kitchen; an 
office spaces for inventory and EM equipment; the main monitoring area (which 
comprised 3-4 pods of 5-6 computers in a circle); and an area called the ‘back office’ 
where administrative tasks like the filling out, storing and filing of paperwork could be 
conducted. (field notes: 07/17) 
 
As evidenced above, the physical securitization of G4S Scotland was a theme which arose 
from my observations. Yet, I realize this is hardly a revolutionary theme to suggest; as a 
private sector company specializing in security and monitoring services, the physical and 
material source of these services could parallel their workings and operations. Nevertheless, 
the authorization procedures for entry into these private company spaces are significant to 
consider. While I recognize my status as an outsider to the company (which could lend itself 
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to the assumption that an MO worker should be paired with me for the duration of the visit), 
the security features of the building suggest a more securitized space than what I anticipated. 
With every door requiring an ID badge scan to slow the mobility between rooms and floors, 
there was a greater sense of information protection that G4S Scotland wanted to maintain; an 
arguable superior power relation they wanted to institutionally impose and enforce 
throughout one’s stay on their premises.  
 
However, the physical securitization of the building could be construed as akin to the 
physical securitization of carceral spaces, inasmuch as the features installed in G4S Scotland 
(i.e., ID badges, door authorizations, one-way windows, etc.) are similarly witnessed in the 
practices and procedures implemented in prison and detention facilities in order to control the 
flow of bodies (Moran et al., 2012) and information (Piché, 2011) from leaving the premises. 
As indicated in Chapter 4, territorializing spaces, bodies and information remain part and 
parcel to processes of inclusion and exclusion, communicating various dimensions of power 
and recognizing the superimposition of multiple relationships and interactions within its 
bounds. Arguably, the “ergonomically imprisoning confines” of the NEMC control room 
(Smith, 2007: 295) can also be seen in the CCTV control rooms that Smith (2008, 2014) 
ethnographically observed. It comes as no surprise that sectioning off different spaces within 
G4S Scotland can serve a variety of purposes similarly witnessed in typical organizational 
settings. Yet the fact that this specific company engages in EM for Scotland and G4S 
Scotland holds the contract from the Scottish Government to provide EM for Scotland 
suggests that the securitization of this institutional space goes beyond the mere architecture of 
the building, but also includes the design and layout of the inner workings of the building. 
Regulating and restricting access to various rooms and locations in the building ensures that 
both individual and material text alike are not easily between rooms on each floor, about or 
beyond the building itself.  
 
In effect, my observations suggest that the NEMC becomes a carceral territory of sorts. I say 
this not to conflate the experiences of MOs with MPs, but as a way in which to understand 
the presence of carceral particularities within the community at large, and present it in a 
manner that queries experiences, practices or procedures of carcerality beyond the 
conventional anchorage to the prison. While the NEMC engages in territorial tendencies like 
classification (ex. ID badges and scans), communication (i.e. security features 
communicating the boundaries between inside/outside the building, and between rooms), and 
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enforcement of access (i.e. the procedures to heavily restrict movement of people and text) 
once again this is not to suggest that the NEMC is a space of carceral territory similarly 
experienced like MPs (see Chapter 8). Indeed, carceral territory is the imposition and/or 
inscription of punishment into and upon the personal territories of offenders, their homes, and 
their loved ones. However, as a space which intends to impose this punishment upon 
particular groups in the community, the NEMC is a physical space which brings about 
specific intentions (either their own or bestowed upon them via the state) that may have (or 
will lead to) detrimental effects for this population. Taking these carceral conditions and 
territorial tendencies together, it is not a far cry to suggest that the carceral territories imposed 
in the community derive from an origin point; conceiving the NEMC as a “single node in 
larger practices of social control” (Brown, 2014: 385), it becomes a main carceral node which 
connects together all other carceral territories within the larger EM circuitous system, 
ensuring that the state’s reach into the community persists and perpetuates the self-
monitoring and governing of subjects (for a similar discussion, see Chapter 7). In effect, the 
NEMC does form a carceral territory, one which maintains and regulates the movements of 
people, objects, and practices within and throughout Scotland. In its contract to the 
government, G4S Scotland ultimately becomes a proxy for the carceral state (also discussed 
in Chapter 7), which (1) allows the carceral state to extend its penal arm out into the 
community (cf. Garland, 1997, 2001; Rose, 2000); and (2) guarantees that punishment 
imposed upon the offender by the carceral state is meted out through EM.  
 
The inner workings and operations of the main monitoring room itself is also significant to 
consider, insofar as it also demonstrates the comprehensive monitoring that one MO is 
responsible for while on shift. As my field note indicates:  
Per one monitoring officer (MO) workspace in the monitoring room, each MO space has 
one computer system with two screens. One computer screen is for the collective records 
of monitoring persons (MPs) which allows MOs to see what each other is working on; 
this screen shows the total list or ‘task sheet’ of calls the MOs in the NEMC must deal 
with on their shift, and this list is constantly updated in real time to show the progress 
made for all MOs on shift. The second computer screen shows the history of 
communication between MOs and a particular MP, and indicates all the details the MP 
has provided over the phone as well as the positive and negative reflections of the MOs 
in their conversations with this individual. The task sheet will also list the various 
reasons why calls to particular MPs must be made, such to regularly ‘check in’ with the 
MO; MPs with a ‘late start’ to their curfew or ‘left early’ from their curfew; indications 
of why there was ‘no answer’ from a MP, or for MOs to call MPs which may have 
tampered with the electronic monitoring (EM) bracelet (otherwise known as a ‘strap 
tamper’). (field notes: 07/17)   
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As demonstrated above, there is a great detail of information provided to the MO when they 
are tasked to monitor on shift. Through my observations, it became clear to me that once 
seated at a computer within a pod, the responsibilities associated with working as an MO 
means that there is little room to move about while upon shift. The MO worker is stationed in 
front of two computer screens, facing other MOs within the pod in a circular formation, while 
the scheduling manager and shift supervisor oversee MO monitoring from outside the pod. 
The circulations of knowledges produced within the cluster of MOs working one shift, 
coupled with the circulations of responsibilities amongst MOs themselves to monitor 
particular MPs at particular times of the evening (field notes: 07/17), suggests that within the 
particular geography of the pod what forms is an organized process of continual monitoring 
for MPs beyond the NEMC and MOs within the confines of the NEMC. To a certain extent, 
we can see how the workings of the institution, set up and organized in this way, sheds light 
upon “spatial analysis and associated insights into power relations” (Billo and Mountz, 2016: 
203). Indeed, a geographical appreciation of IE, especially in terms of spatial differentiation 
within the inner workings of an institution (cf. Billo and Mountz, 2016), has the ability to 
enhance and “enrich geographical research not only about a multitude of kinds of institutions, 
but about the structures, effects, and identities working through institutions as territorial 
forces” (Billo and Mountz, 2016: 200; italics emphasized). For example, how different 
workers are located within the building, offices, and cubicles speaks to “patterns of behavior 
and interaction, categories of identification, modes of management, exercises in power and 
interpretation in everyday life” (Billo and Mounts, 2016: 203). Such patterns, categories, 
modes and exercises reify the territorial force the G4S Scotland maintains both the explicit 
monitoring of individuals within their own communities as well as the implicit monitoring of 
those tasked to monitor said individuals. 
Taken in aggregate, it becomes possible to see an architecture of security and surveillance 
imposed upon the G4S building and throughout the main monitoring room of the NEMC. 
Engaging in IE at the NEMC provided an insightful interrogation of how EM operated 
throughout Scotland, opening up discussion of how the composition and design of the 
building feeds into the work MOs engage in on a daily basis. Yet these descriptions merely 
scratched the surface of what exists beneath; through IE it became possible to witness first-
hand the NEMC as a main carceral node of the circuitous EM system imposed and operated 
within and throughout Scotland. While the original intention of the project was to further 
understand the operations and workings of the EM programme in Scotland at the NEMC, 
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further investigation reveals how the maintenance of carceral territories in homes across 
Scotland derive from the NEMC as a securitized and surveillant space which powers and 
circulates the carcerality needed to perpetuate its EM regime. 
Behind the NEMC Screens: The MO Work of Sensing Disruption 
The work of a MO is an interesting job to observe. Similar to a closed circuit television 
(CCTV) operator (Smith, 2008, 2014), the work of a MO often involves the control of 
monitoring hundreds of offenders in Scotland; a large network which attempts to compress 
time and space (cf. Giddens, 1990) to make the work more manageable. While recognizing 
that the relationship between surveillance and society “is a ‘two-way’ exchange or 
interaction” (Smith, 2007: 290) the “micro communicative process taking place” between 
both MO and screen, MP and home monitoring unit (HMU) is significant to how disruption 
to the EM regime is managed and resolved (Smith, 2007: 290; italics emphasized). In various 
degrees, MOs watching the NEMC screens are caught within a complex dynamic of both 
interaction and socialization. Whereas interactions “take place recurrently with the 
surveillance technologies and the ever changing realities displayed on the monitoring 
screens” (Smith, 2007: 290), a corollary form of socialization emerges from the simultaneous 
meaning and significance the MOs adhere to such realities which impacts the course of action 
decided upon by the MOs (i.e. whether to communicate with a particular MP at the first 
instance of alert, delay communicating with a particular MP and order the calls a MO must 
undergo within their work shift, or alert an external agency to a MP’s violation of EM 
conditions and/or breach of curfew).   
Similar to the introduction of CCTV to city-centre streets, to a large extent the introduction of 
EM to criminal justice and corrections has fundamentally altered, in various ways, the nature 
of micro relations between state and citizenry: “from an authoritarian gaze which was 
historically embodied and face-to-face to one which is now ‘distanciated’[,] disembodied, 
anonymous and technologically mediated” (Smith, 2008: 128; see also Giddens, 1990). It is 
through this monitoring that these operators have the ability to accumulate vast knowledge 
and intelligence from the HMU placed in an MP’s residence and the telephone 
communications between the MP and MO. Through this textual, audio-recorded and 
surveillant information MOs are able to monitor multiple realities at once, and arguably 
finding themselves “locked within a continual interpretive figuration of risk assessment and 
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management” (Smith, 2008: 127; see also Beck, 1992). The collection of this information is 
evidenced in one of my field notes: 
Collective records on the first computer screen assisted MOs, as the list of records for 
one particular MP, including call history (especially when other MOs attempt to 
transcribe their conversations into the records), EM status of the MP and/or breach 
reports filed by G4S Scotland could be used by the MO to make sense of the situation 
before them and establish a relation with the MP that could be more easily received. 
(field notes: 07/17) 
In a real sense, this is a privileged perspective held by MOs; while every MP can become 
visible, at the same time every MP can become a potential risk. It is not only the privilege of 
monitoring which could empower MOs at the NEMC, but their capacity “to collect, analyse, 
store and know intimate details” about the MP populations they observe (Smith, 2008: 128; 
italics emphasized; see also Foucault, [1977]/1995). Another field note supplements this 
observation:  
While observing MOs at the NEMC what I found interesting is the amount of 
information collected by MOs while conversing with MPs on the phone. This amount of 
compliance work conducted by MOs involved continuous compiling, detailing, 
recording, and storing information about all communications with the MPs, as well as 
any changes in their EM status (including the status of the personal identification device 
(PID) or home monitoring unit (HMU)) in the MP residence. Should MPs discuss their 
loved ones (family members, friends, etc.) on the phone in relation to any changes in 
their status, the MOs will jot down these details as well. This is done to ensure that 
communications between MOs and MPs are as detailed as possible so that if a particular 
MP’s file needs to be passed to or shared with the authorities (criminal justice or 
otherwise) all information concerning the MP is comprehensively noted in the NEMC’s 
file and in those files of other authorities. (field notes: 07/17) 
Therefore, it is clear that flows of information eventually manifest themselves in actual and 
multiple locations—what Walby (2005b) in his IE research refers to as ‘contact points’ (see 
also Ball, 2005)—where information about a surveillance subject becomes accessible 
whether in paper or digital format and in the form of a text, dossier, file, etc. Often MOs have 
reasonable access to large amounts of physical and surveillant texts containing sensitive and 
detailed information of the MP they are tasked to monitor throughout their work shifts. This 
allows MOs to both locate the MP within the residence (ensuring they are abiding by their 
EM conditions and curfew) while concomitantly gathering information about their prior 
whereabouts, routines and lifestyles when MOs engage in telephone conversations with MPs. 
Collecting this information not only renders the MP ‘locatable’ (cf. Nellis, 2018) but 
knowable; the collection of this knowledge is not merely contained to the MP in their 
residence, but to information about the loved ones whom come into contact with the MP and 
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the carceral territory established within the residence. Emanating from the HMU outward, 
EM extends its surveillant (and arguably carceral) reach and captures information about those 
that come into contact with it, which allows MOs to bring together “a seemingly limitless 
range of information to formulate categorical images of risk data profiles which render 
opague flows of information comprehensible” (Hier, 2003: 4000). As suggested in Chapter 4, 
the perpetual process of capturing, deconstructing and reassembling this system of 
surveillance upon the MP and their personal contacts can be what Haggarty and Erison 
(2000) refers to as the ‘surveillant assemblage’ (p. 606); with its rhizomatic sequence of 
processes, this assemblage thinking perpetuates an ongoing and ever-prevailing “rhizomatic 
levelling” of surveillance, rendering groups which had been previously exempted from 
routine surveillance becoming subjects of interest and/or to increased monitoring. 
Indeed, one could construe MOs as empowered agents of control; through the medium of 
largely wired technological networks closed off from public view, the MOs, housed in the 
G4S building are safely distanced from the action, and “are presented with the unique 
opportunity to freely, discreetly and subjectively target and scrutinize all that crosses their 
gaze” (Smith, 2008: 127). So while MOs have an greater freedom to choose to monitor in 
closer detail who they like, MOs themselves cannot be seen, remain relatively disembodied 
and anonymous should they choose to communicate with MPs, and are, in a corporeal sense, 
inviable to MPs.   
Furthermore, the MOs’ placement behind the screens enables these individuals to ‘virtually’ 
follow, track (through physical or surveillant texts if warranted), and facilitate the exclusion 
of bodies (i.e. MPs) from the monitored Scottish population “perceived to be ‘out of place or 
out of time’” (Smith, 2008: 128; italics emphasized). This observation was noted in one field 
note:  
This evening there were a lot of ‘out past curfew’ events displaying in the system. When 
I asked the MO about these events, they remarked, “we get this a lot—most times it’s 
MPs who don’t make it home in time before the curfew is in place”. (field notes: 09/17)   
Being ‘out of place’ (i.e., not at home) or ‘out of time’ (i.e., those individuals of whom depart 
early from or arrive late to home while the curfew is taking place) provides further insight 
into how tagged bodies are rendered knowable and locatable through MO work. It becomes 
clear that is a wider ontology of control at play, insofar as the surveillant technology is linked 
to notions of power, governance, and risk management; in effect, by knowing where a tagged 
body is not (i.e. at home on curfew) the EM system then initiates procedures for MOs to 
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contact and follow up with these missing individuals, in an attempt to manage and resolve the 
disruption of these individuals’ curfews that said individuals have caused to the EM system. 
 As evidenced in Chapter 2, EM’s development in the West is also tied to offenders’ spatial 
and temporal management and political-economic policies primarily concerned with securing 
and controlling offenders and their movements. While EM is but one node within a wider 
ontology and culture of control (cf. Garland, 2001), the controlling dynamics underpinning 
EM do not start and end with the technology and its ability to monitor individuals from the 
NEMC. Perhaps ironically, MOs, like CCTV operators, are themselves increasingly subject 
to a range of internal regulations and forms of monitoring within the NEMC. As Smith 
(2008: 134) suggests: 
Such measures include having to adhere to a raft of ambiguous yet legally stringent rules 
and procedures regarding what is and is not permitted, an expectation of continuous 
intelligence-gathering productivity and the requirement to meet targets and provide 
documentary evidence that sufficient intelligence…of certain populations has been 
achieved, and being physically constrained at a ‘control’ desk…for long periods of time 
and for relatively low psychological, financial, and organizational reward. 
Through IE, it became apparent from listening to and speaking with the MOs, while closely 
observing their interactions with each other, their screens, and MPs on the phone, that there 
were different ways MOs would approach the work and regulate their conversations they had 
to engage in with MPs: 
It became clear to me that most, if not all, of the job of monitoring compliance at the 
NEMC involves conversations between MOs and MPs (and to a lesser extent, between 
MOs themselves). Indeed, I noticed that different MOs had particular ‘creeds’ or ways in 
which they would converse with MPs over the phone: while some MOs were firm 
(arguably, even hostile) to MPs, others were more talkative, receptive and somewhat 
empathetic with the circumstances of the particular MP case the MO was dealing with at 
the time. I saw how some MOs were more progressive or conservative with their speech, 
tone, and general language use to better converse and/or connect with the MPs on the 
phone. (field notes: 07/17) 
To a certain extent, watching the NEMC screens intently for hours on end in a bid to 
document MP breaches of curfew, paired with telephoning MPs in the late hours of the night, 
is a job where the degree of ease of MO work waxes and wanes. Such MO work is certainly a 
monotonous, repetitive, and onerous task. Yet we must be mindful that MOs, much like 
CCTV operators, are not “unthinking organizational robots/dupes” (Smith, 2008: 141). In 
terms of conversations between MOs and MPs on the phone, MOs can be reflexive, emotive 
and creative social agents. Smith (2008, 2014) has brought attention to the discretionary 
powers which CCTV operators possess, in terms of defining the situation which they see 
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before them on their screens. Smith suggests that CCTV operators “are not simply passive 
conduits of information” but rather “are active agents of social construction who, like 
television audiences, partake in extensive practices of phenomenological hermeneutics” 
(2008: 130; italics in original). In effect, CCTV operators interpretatively created biographies 
or narratives for those they watched, “enabling anonymous bodies in space [on screen] to 
become…individualized and subjects of interaction” (Smith, 2008: 130). On the one hand, 
doing this enables meaning and entertainment to be gleaned from the work of the CCTV 
operators, bringing “colour to the greyness” these operators watch on their screen and interest 
to what is essentially an alienating job (Smith, 2007: 295); on the other hand, in their official 
role as watchers from distanciated rooms of control, such operators had the ability to 
“subjectively construct suspicion and narratives for the realities watched” (Smith, 2008: 130).  
Indeed, in terms of the conversations between MOs, these conversations would briefly 
involve two or three MOs within the vicinity to discuss and construct the scenario indicated 
by a particular MP. Such discussions and the collection construction could then assist the 
main MO engaging with the MP on the phone to inform them of how they (i.e. MO) would 
proceed with an MP’s particular disruption, whether it be in the form of warning or technical 
violation of the MP’s curfew. A similar experience was observed at the NEMC in one field 
note:  
Another call between the MO I was shadowing this evening and an MP was regarding an 
MP who breached their curfew (i.e. left the premises while the curfew was in place). The 
MO called the residence to inquire about the breach, and the MP indicated that he had 
seen a ‘fire in the street’ in front of his house; that something had caught fire in the street 
and the MP had stood in his front doorway to get a better view of the fire. When the MO 
asked if he moved past the doorway, the MP changed his story, indicating that he was 
actually in his front garden, but that his curfew order allowed him to be there. Upon 
hearing this, the MO pulled up the MP’s personal information in the EM system, and 
checked the MP’s curfew order. The MO indicated to the MO that the order does not 
specify that he can be in his garden, to which the MO changed the story back, indicating 
he saw the alleged ‘fire’ from his doorway but did not cross the doorframe threshold. 
The MP then indicated that they would make a note of this in the system, but that the MP 
technically violated his curfew as he moved too far from the premises while the curfew 
was in place. The MP hung up the phone and the MO indicated in the system the 
information the MP provided, but was certain that the MP was trying to talk his way out 
of the violation. After this conversation, the MO chatted briefly with their fellow MOs 
on the evening shift for further clarification about what they had heard on the phone, and 
through her interpretation of what the MO told her, the MOs discussed and recreated the 
MP’s story, ultimately coming to a collective agreement that the MP had violated the 
curfew. (field notes: 09/17) 
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As evidenced above, the MO dealing with the MP’s particular situation attempted to 
reconstruct the MP’s scenario, discussing the MP’s story with her fellow MOs. Not only was 
this recreation beneficial by providing clarity on the information the MP gave over the phone, 
but also provided the MO assurance that the information she intended to record in the MP’s 
file was correct, as such information was ultimately legitimized through other MO’s 
subjective opinions of the matter. Taken together, the MOs become active agents of social 
construction, drawing upon the discretion of other MOs to construct, manage, and resolve the 
MP’s disruption. By participating in such phenomenological hermeneutics, this co-
construction of knowledge through the MO collective not only secures the necessary 
information for the MP’s EM record, but the information for any and all associated 
surveillant texts that additional authorities may require when reacting to the violation of the 
curfew.  
Workplace conversations between MOs has the potential to create a more intimate connection 
with what is being monitored or documented, “facilitating the formation of a shared 
workplace culture (thus reality) and worker productivity” (Smith, 2007: 295). Such informal 
tactics (de Certeau, 1984), utilized mainly for understanding and ordering information for the 
MO while they monitor their screen (and arguably for general amusement) are also one of the 
unintended consequences of, and a response to, “a system which has, at its core, an ontology 
of rational control and, on its surface, strategies of management designed to induce 
conformity” in both MOs and MPs (Smith, 2007: 295). Furthermore, the informal tactics of 
MO conversations with MPs does not necessarily undermine the extension of EM’s rational 
power. In fact, the MOs generally employ such tactics to counter monitor and information 
overload and provide relief to what could be construed as a mundane yet exhaustive job. As a 
result, it becomes clear that the management of this information is to ensure that all 
disruptions are brought back into a state of order and predictability which allows the EM 
regime and carceral territory in the homes of MPs to proceed as planned.  
Responsibilization Strategies and Participatory Surveillance in Practice  
Within criminal justice institutions, various subjects are transformed and reconstructed into 
prudential and self-governing individuals who are charged to “take full responsibility for their 
lives and actions and align themselves with the neoliberal project of governing” (Gradin 
Franzén, 2015: 253; see also Phoenix and Kelly, 2013). Involving his or her own 
responsibility through self-governing (Garland, 1997; Rose, 2000) responsibilization ensures 
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that such institutions are designed to produce not compliant subjects per se, but rather “self-
monitoring subjects who willingly engage in introspection” (Gradin Franzén, 2015: 252, 
italics emphasized; see also Garland, 1997). Therefore, strategies of responsibilization are 
productive in the sense that they produce particular subjectivities aiming to transform 
offenders into “active, law-abiding, responsible citizens by partly changing the offenders’ 
thought patterns” (Gradin Franzén, 2015: 253; see also Cox, 2011). For Rose (2000), self-
responsibilization becomes an iteration of governing at a distance in which ‘advanced liberal 
democracies,’ as he terms, centres on governance through notions of inclusion and exclusion. 
The excluded are “the criminalized, the underclass, the pathological and any additional 
‘others’ who do not conform to the ideal of the prudent, self-actualized, neoliberal self. The 
included are, of course, all the rest” (Moore and Hirai, 2014: 7). Thinking through 
responsibilization, Rose (2000: 334) suggests that responsibilization works 
[t]o reconstruct self-reliance in those who are excluded…within [the] new politics of 
conduct, the problems of problematic persons are reformulated as moral or ethical 
problems, that is to say, problems in the ways in which such persons understand and 
conduct themselves and their existence. This ethical reformulation opens the possibility 
for a whole range of psychological techniques to be recycled in programs for governing 
‘the excluded.’ The imperative of activity and the presumption of an ethic of choice, is 
central not only to the rationale of policy but also to the reformatory technology to which 
it is linked.  
As indicated earlier in the chapter, the main approach to interactions between MOs and MPs 
occur over the phone. Therefore, language as a social action is significant to how it becomes 
a responsibilization strategy to shift the weight and the efforts of EM compliance onto the 
MP. An example of this can be witnessed in the field note below:   
The first call I listened in on with the MO I was shadowing this evening involved an MP 
whose home monitoring unit (HMU) reported that their electricity in their flat had been 
cut off. When the MO called the MP, the MO informed the MP that the electricity had 
been shut off by the council because the MP could not pay his rent, forgetting that the 
HMU would run on a back up battery (which only would hold a charge for up to 24 
hours, and ensuring that the EM curfew would remain stable and secure for an MO to re-
visit the home and check the HMU connection to the NEMC). The MP asked the MO on 
the phone if the MP could get authorization to leave his flat to run to the shop and pay 
his electricity bill, but the MO refused, indicating to the MP that he would have to send a 
family member to run errands in his stead; relying on the back-up battery did not change 
the status of his court order to remain in his residence during curfew. The MP retorted, 
saying he always runs to the shop to do errands for the family, justifying that his shop 
was only on the corner and wouldn’t take long to run there and back. The MO firmly 
indicated that if the MP left the premises he would be breaching his court order; the MO 
told him that MOs had no authority to provide MPs this authorization, that G4S Scotland 
only monitors, and that if the MP was to leave his premises it would be his choice to 
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leave but that he would be in violation of the enforced curfew. The MP took a few 
seconds, indicated that he would send a family member to the shop, and hung up the 
phone. After the conversation, the MO informed me that “they” (MPs) always try to do 
this, and that the NEMC gets a lot of MPs asking for authorization to leave but time and 
again MOs cannot give it to them. The MP’s sentence outlines what they can and cannot 
do, “we just monitor” indicated the MO. (field notes: 09/17; italics emphasized).  
Therefore, we can see a significant linkage between language and power (Foucault, 1982). As 
a responsibilization strategy, MO language encourages MPs to reconsider choices and 
actions, reminding MPs that with their increased agency of living in the community there will 
be further punishments and/or consequences should the MP not take introspection and their 
own self-governance seriously. By repeating ‘we just monitor’ and reiterating language 
around choice and responsibility, such MO practices endeavour to shift the burden of 
compliance onto the shoulders of MPs. Such practices also remind MPs of how their personal 
spaces have become territorialized by and through the carceral state, and it is because of these 
responsibilization strategy that processes of inclusion and exclusion—as well as processes of 
mobility (i.e. staying within the bounds of the curfew) and visibility (i.e. rendered locatable 
and knowable to the state)—are reaffirmed and reified (cf. Brighenti, 2007). Once again, 
carceral territory becomes relational, a type of intraspecific communication (as indicated in 
Chapter 4) which acknowledges the power relations inherent in the making and sustaining of 
carceral territory. As a result, self-monitoring becomes a warranted action to ensure curfews 
are enforced; the MP’s conformity with other prudent, self-actualized, neoliberal and 
responsibilized citizens in their community becomes the target in the main.  
Besides language, those subjected to surveillance might also engage in other 
responsibilization strategies themselves to comply with EM surveillance. As Ball indicates in 
her analysis of the subjects of surveillance, “surveillance may be tolerated or even sought 
after because the giving of data satisfies individual anxieties, or may represent patriotic or 
participative values to the individual” (Ball, 2009: 641; italics emphasized). Complementary 
to this tolerance of surveillance is the notion of participatory surveillance. While this concept 
is typically defined as a mutual monitoring situation in which participants knowingly watch 
each other in the pursuit of some goal or state (Collister, 2014: 337), and is akin to reciprocal 
surveillance (Regan and Steeves, 2010) and lateral surveillance (Andrejevic, 2005) I 
respectfully diverge from this definition. I alter the notion of participatory surveillance to 
suggest that the subjects of surveillance (i.e., the MPs) tolerate or seek surveillance in order 
to satisfy the NEMC’s concerns for the disruptions in the EM system by MPs, and MPs 
participating in this surveillance renders these surveilled subjects visible, knowable, and 
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locatable for the carceral state. The co-production of EM compliance and carceral territory 
not only requires the participation of MOs to do their jobs (i.e. to engage in compliance 
work), but also requires the active participation of MPs to make themselves known to the 
NEMC. Such participation, whether invoked willingly or unwillingly by the MP, is necessary 
to ensure the continuance of EM surveillance. In doing so, it is through MPs’ own 
responsiblization strategies used within their homes that confirms that should the NEMC 
come calling, MPs will be responsible (or become responsibilized) and answer. To not 
answer these calls (and in some respects, to ‘disappear,’ as one respondent eludes to in 
Chapter 8) is unforgivable in the eyes of the carceral state, and may hinder further privileges 
of MPs remaining in their communities. Further efforts of responsbilization strategies and 
participatory surveillance on the part of the MP are indicated in the field note below: 
The MO I was shadowing this evening informed me that when calls are made or taken 
by MOs, protocol dictates that all calls must be logged, and there always must be a 
‘reason for calling’ description inserted into the monitoring history. A common lie this 
MO told me is that what he hears when he is monitoring is the “I was in the bath” 
excuse, which for MPs is a justification of why they could not answer the NEMC call 
sooner, or why the MP missed the call altogether.  
While listening in on phone calls between the MO and MPs, I noticed that even the 
activities of the MPs are limited even when the curfew is in place; while there may be 
other conditions imposed in the curfew at sentencing (to keep the peace and be of good 
behaviour; to stay off drugs or alcohol), even mundane activities are now further 
scrutinized. For example, even if we are to accept at face-value that this remark is 
truthful (that indeed, an MP on one call indicated he ‘was taking a bath’ and missed the 
MO’s call), while on curfew the MP is responsibilized to answer the call—the MP 
should be able to reach the phone in time, he should be able to hear the phone, and others 
should not impede him in order to answer the call. The conditions of the EM technology 
indirectly regulates the actions and activities of the MP more so than a virtual radius 
imposed upon the physical residence of the MP. MPs may have to turn down noisy 
appliances and technology to listen more intently during this period of time; they may 
not able to take showers, baths, use restroom facilities as they will be ‘on guard’ for fear 
of missing the call; the MP may stay away from upper and lower levels of the home (if 
they have the luxury of a multi-storied residence) for fear of not reaching the phone in 
time. It could also be the case that childcare and relationships with friends and family 
may differ during this time, as their needs are then not a priority compared to the MP 
forced to answer the MO call. (field notes: 07/17)  
As the field note suggests, MPs are potentially caught within a continual negotiation of self-
governance. Responsibilization strategies, like those indicated above, recruit neoliberal 
notions of choice and empowerment to charge the excluded “to take control of their own lives 
(and thus join the majority in the society of the included)” (Moore and Hirai, 2014: 8). 
However, the rhetoric used in practice (i.e., ‘we just monitor,’ as indicated above) to guide 
139 
 
the excluded towards individual choice and responsibility has the power to guide the 
excluded towards “a particular, state-defined subjugation in which the individual who takes 
responsibility for herself ends up paradoxically following the directions given by others” 
(Moore and Hirai, 2014: 8).  
Furthermore, the efforts MPs enact to live in the community and to take responsibility for 
themselves through a range of techniques has the potential to change their routines and/or 
behaviour because of the carceral territory imposed upon them. In their critical analysis of 
responsibilization strategies, Moore and Hannah-Moffat (2005: 93) observe “the wedding of 
individual choice and responsibility”. Under the carceral state and its neoliberal penal 
practices, “subjects of…programmes are empowered as rational and responsible choice-
makers. Responsibility and empowerment become interchangeable” (Moore and Hirai, 2014: 
8). It is through participatory surveillance that we can also see how being part of surveillance 
can give a feeling of increased agency for the surveilled subjects; while MPs are afforded the 
privilege of living out in their communities to reengage in their lifestyles post-release, MPs 
are no longer tied to the schedules and routines of the prison; EM provides a sense of 
increased agency for offenders (for example, see Hucklesby, 2009, 2011, 2013). In theory, to 
do so will assist the MPs in casting of their excluded status and be included (and made 
visible) in the eyes of the majority of society, of whom are responsiblized citizens just like 
them. Yet in effect, what we also witness is the ability for MPs to self-monitor themselves 
through responsibilization strategies to ensure they conduct themselves in a manner which 
abides by the rules of the EM curfew. Granted a creative community penalty, MPs are able to 
remain in their communities and continue to traverse and inhabit the personal territories they 
hold dear; however, such a privilege comes with a price, as this penalty requires active 
participation on the end of the MP to ensure they are not only rendered knowable and 
locatable to the NEMC, but that the carceral territory installed in their home persists as 
intended.  
Conclusion  
The purpose of my research, indeed all IEs, is not solely to analyze everyday practices and 
texts; rather, it is to connect them to institutional ruling relations, assisting us in explicating 
why and how we experience our social world (Taber, 2010). This chapter was an endeavour 
to stimulate further attention towards notetaking and field notes, highlighting the significance 
of IE and discussing emergent themes which arose from this particular method. My method 
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involved an encounter between personal reflection and the organizational culture and 
practices witnessed at the NEMC. It is clear that researchers who pursue IE in organizations 
can be met with barriers in their research (cf. Taber, 2010). IE can pose a threat to powerful 
authorities who may rather not have their organizational policies and practices questioned in 
open-ended qualitative research. However, methodological approaches like IE can 
nonetheless still critique organizations such as the NEMC in Scotland without gaining full 
access on the condition that the methods and focus of research is changed to suit such 
authorities. By incorporating IE into the project, I was able to construct my research 
methodology according to my own ontological and theoretical grounding, avoiding 
restrictions and obstructions that may have occurred had my research been co-opted by the 
Scottish Government or G4S Scotland.  
I allowed my IE analysis and expectations to be contested by new considerations that altered 
my research process and conclusions. In doing so, my questions concerning how carcerality 
takes place and spreads throughout society is framed by this research, moving outside and 
beyond what I had thought I knew about the practices and procedures of EM. By letting my 
research guide me, I was able to search for the invisible relations between MOs working at 
the NEMC, the organizational structures with the NEMC, the MO work of sensing disruption, 
and the responsibilization strategies and participatory surveillance used not only render MPs 
visible, knowable, and locatable, but to ensure that the carceral territories in their 
communities are maintained. 
 
Even with only the limited access available to me for ethnographic observation, my IE 
analysis provided me the opportunity to ‘peek’ into the black box of EM supervision for 
offenders in Scotland. As Campbell and Gregor contend, IE is distinct from “conventional 
research” in its requirement that the researcher be “a knower located in the everyday world 
and find meaning there, in contrast to [sole] reliance on library research and the application of 
theories” (2004: 11; italics emphasized). Therefore, IE assisted the study by establishing a 
solid bedrock which with I could find a footing to move into mobile methods of ‘ride-alongs’ 
with one mobile MO (see Chapter 7), to engage in semi-structured interviews with inmates 
(see Chapter 8), and to consider the notion of carceral territory as an apt frame of reference 
for geographically contextualizing EM as a form of punishment. Indeed, the exploration of 
supervisory labour through IE (still) matters, as it offers “a more nuanced understanding of 
how power is actually operationalized and flows in a multiplicity of ways[,]” providing 
141 
 
further credence of why lived experience through ethnography (institutional or otherwise) is a 
valuable resource for academic inquiry (Smith, 2014: 151). As Taber (2010: 20) contends, IE 
is central to how one begins to query the ways in which an organization operates itself: “IE 
tends to show us the trees that were hidden in the forest; once we can see the trees (ruling 
relations), they can never again recede. And once we can see the ruling relations, we can 
begin to interrogate and challenge them.” Speaking to these themes does not allow them to 
recede back into obscurity, and begins to shed a critical light on the practices and procedures 






















Chapter 7: On the Move with G4S Scotland  
Introduction  
Mobile methodologies generate rich spatial observations and theories grounded in lived 
experiences (Finlay and Bowman, 2017) and guided by the notion that place matters 
(Massey, 1984) researchers can experience places that matter to participants in situ 
(Kusenbach, 2003). According to Spinney (2015: 231), there has been “a recent upsurge in 
mobilities research related to embodied movement, and a corresponding interest in adapting 
methods to acquire data while on the move.” Increasingly attention is also being paid to “the 
complex interrelation between travel and dwelling, home and not-home” for researching such 
mobile experiences (Sheller and Urry, 2006: 211). In a similar vein, go-alongs and ride-
alongs, as forms of mobile participant observation, are significant then to understanding how 
G4S monitoring officers (MOs) travel around Scotland to install and maintain the electronic 
monitoring (EM) of offenders or monitored persons (MPs).8 
As I have indicated in Chapter 5, the go-along/ride-along method is important to the project 
as this mobile method of inquiry examines place specificity insofar as respondents articulate 
their own subjectivity in real time (Finlay and Bowman, 2017). Their ideas and emotions are 
articulated differently firsthand, as opposed to by recall (Evans and Jones, 2011). Indeed, the 
self-place relationship is not just one of reciprocal influence; it is “more radically, [one] of 
constitutive co-ingredience: each is essential to the being of the other. In effect, there is no 
place without self and no self without place” (Casey, 2001: 684; see also Wolifson, 2016). 
Given the advent of increased speed in global transit and social media influences, such 
influences can be said to have a significant impact upon us, altering our experience of place 
and movement more so than ever before (cf. Finlay and Bowman, 2017). With spatiotemporal 
compressions (Harvey, 1990) our sense of place is not limited to immediate surroundings; in 
the software universe of lightspeed travel, “space may literally be traversed in ‘no-time’; the 
difference between far away and down here is cancelled. Space no more sets limits to action 
and its effects, and counts for little, or does not count at all” (Bauman, 2000: 17).  
As Sheller and Urry (2006: 210) contend, the passages of ourselves and communications 
central to a sense of place spurred a new mobilities paradigm:  
                                                          
8 G4S Scotland opted for this particular lingo, and depending upon the discussions in this chapter these terms 
will be used as well.  
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A set of questions, theories and methodologies that seek to transcend the 
dichotomy between transport research and social research, putting social relations 
into travel and connecting different forms of transport with complex patterns of 
social experience conducted through communications at-a-distance.  
Indeed, mobility is more than just the simple movement between two or more localities, and 
to dwell is more than to be immobile within a locality (Sheller and Urry, 2006). Movements 
and dwellings are shaped and challenged by structures and power. Mobilities are attributed 
with meanings and are therefore context-related (Cresswell, 2006). Accordingly, Bauman has 
exemplified that “immobility is not a realistic option in a world of permanent change” 
(Bauman, 1998: 2). But he demonstrated that the conditions are unequal. On the one hand, he 
recognized those whose reach became global, such as ‘tourists’ (Bauman, 1993), the 
‘transnational capitalist class’ (Sklair, 2001) or as the ‘global elite’ (Elliot and Urry, 2010). 
Conversely, those who are located and to be local (or localized) is considered as “a sign of 
social deprivation and degradation” (Bauman, 1998: 2) as not having the possibility to being 
nor becoming mobile. 
In the spirit of utilizing mobile methodologies to generate such rich observations and to 
recognize the lived experiences of those ‘on the ground,’ this chapter examines the go-
along/ride-along method in terms of shadowing a mobile MO from G4S Scotland. I 
endeavour to engage in a discussion which highlights the importance of mobility, connecting 
the significant themes of data collection and analysis back to a carceral territorial framework 
for EM. Observing how monitoring and place matters while ‘on the move’ (cf. Cresswell, 
2006) to the maintenance of EM operations in Scotland provides an insightful connection to 
the significance of carceral territory. First, the chapter will discuss the issues faced with 
negotiating access to mobile MO ride-alongs, and the information which I was able to collect 
from my observations with Angus,9 one mobile MO I arranged to follow. I then turn the 
attention to how EM is operated ‘on the ground’ by way of the work mobile MOs engage in 
on a daily basis. Doing so highlights the significance of the mobile MOs work, in relation to 
the operational freedom they can obtain from the mobility in their position as mobile MO. 
However, such operational freedoms are also met with particular constraints, of which I turn 
to next. Following this, I then discuss the significance of the G4S Scotland car, the main 
vehicle used by mobile MOs to move around Scotland. I argue that this car that while the 
freedom of driving may alleviate the struggles of the mobile MO work, the car also serves as 
                                                          
9 Pseudonyms are used here to ensure confidentiality of the respondent. 
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an object of carceral mobility and as a proxy for the carceral state. Reflections on the 
importance of mobile methods to the academic project will conclude the chapter.  
The ‘go-along’/‘ride-along’: Notetaking on the Move with the Mobile MO 
The go-along10 offers intimate views of landscape, life history, and layered meanings of 
place. Through this mobile method, participants can be empowered by becoming the role of 
‘tour guide’ and expert (cf. Garcia et al., 2012), which reduces situational disparities (such as 
age, education, etc.) and allows participants to “interact on a deeper level through a more 
egalitarian connection” (Finlay and Bowman, 2017: 269). In addition, this method helped me 
convey respect, interest and enthusiasm (cf. Carpiano, 2009). As Spinney (2015: 232) 
suggests, while all researchers will have “a different take on why they felt it important to ‘go-
along’ in some way, they all have in common the ethnographic desire to understand in detail 
what constitutes a mobile practice, particularly the fleeting, relational and felt aspects of 
mobility.” Indeed, Spinney goes on to state that “many mobile researchers have sought to 
adapt methods to become ‘mobile’ so that they can ‘bear witness’ to the presences and 
absences that occur in response to moving through different environments as they happen” 
(2015: 235; italics emphasized).  
Negotiating access to go-alongs faced similar issues as outlined in Chapter 6. In total, 14 
hours were spent riding along with one mobile MO. Go-alongs with Angus in the field lasted 
approximately 7 hours in length per shift (i.e. a mobile MO shift always began at 5pm and 
they can visit an MP’s residence at midnight, at the latest). I wrote comprehensive field notes 
within twenty-four hours to describe the sites visited, the participant and researcher mobility, 
observed features, social interactions and discussions.11 In effect, the informality of such 
settings can reveal insights on behaviours, attitudes, and efforts exerted to engage in EM 
work on a day-to-day basis. Given the institutional schedule and the convenience for both 
Angus and I to meet in one place for a go-along, coupled with the limited financial resources 
and time on the part of the researcher, two car journeys were conducted over the course of a 
six-month period of data collection. Angus and I visited eleven residences in total to examine 
                                                          
10 ‘Go-alongs’ and ‘ride-alongs’ have similar meanings under the umbrella of mobile methods (cf. Kusenbach, 
2003; Evans and Jones, 2011; Finlay and Bowman, 2017). In the context of this chapter, both refer to shadowing 
Angus and following his work across Scotland. I use these terms as dependent on particular contexts in this 
chapter.  
11 Similar to the previous chapter, the limitations of this method of recording notes are readily acknowledged. I 
recognize that, much like ethnographic observations in the NEMC, the authenticity, accuracy and validity of the 
research findings presented in this chapter are influenced in part of memory erosion since the original mobile 
MO visits.  
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how Angus conducted his work as a mobile MO in the field. Routes were not set by the 
researcher, as I felt it necessary to limit my unnecessary disturbance of the socially 
constructed nature and routines while Angus worked, allowing my observations, our 
conversations, and the go-along in general to be as natural and free flowing as possible. In a 
similar vein to the limitations I recognize in Chapter 6, my ethnographic observations have 
not been ‘checked’ by Angus for accuracy or validity. Furthermore, Angus consented to take 
part in the research only after he made it clear to me that I do not quote him directly on any 
observations or interpretations of his work with G4S Scotland. To safeguard Angus’ 
confidentiality, excerpts from my field notes are provided throughout this chapter and his 
thoughts are inferences at best. I respect his wishes, as to not adopt such an approach could 
have alienated, angered or affected Angus, insofar as he would be so defensive it would 
hinder my observations while on our car journeys and further jeopardize my access with him 
and G4S Scotland mobile MOs.  
In contrast to the seated interview, the go-alongs offered rich insights into self and place as it 
attends to participants’ rich realities and places in the world (cf. Finlay and Bowman, 2017). 
The unstructured nature of the go-along with only paper and pen enabled Angus to guide the 
conversation with minimal intrusion or interruption on my end. Indeed, it can also offer many 
of the advantages of participant observation and “hanging out” with participants without the 
intensity or time commitments of traditional ethnographical research (DeLyser and Sui 2013). 
I was also able to engage with my senses and comprehend places myself (Evans and Jones, 
2011). I witnessed poverty and marginalization firsthand, such as seeing the decrepit council 
estates offenders were living in during their periods of EM, or looking at the shabby and 
unkempt rooms in flats where offenders kept their home monitoring units (HMUs).  
Furthermore, this mobile method’s flexibility put Angus at ease. Indeed, by connecting 
participants and researchers to the “materialities of doing” (Spinney, 2015: 236), “the 
‘effervescence,’ [or] the ‘over-flowing’ nature of lived experience” as it happens in real time 
could be retained, enriching data collection and conversations between Angus and myself 
along the way (Spinney, 2015: 236). It was conducive to frank conversation with natural 
breakpoints involving stories and personal experience (Carpiano, 2009; Finlay and Bowman, 
2017). Angus was less concerned with attempting to give the ‘right’ answers to me as may be 
the case in seated interviews (Evans and Jones, 2011). In doing so the conversations between 
Angus and myself seemed more fluid and relaxed with open dialogue. 
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In effect, these observations of Angus’ MO work adds rich details to the understanding of 
how EM and ‘compliance work’ at large takes place. I grasped his embodied struggles, and 
car journeys with Angus overtime became more personal. Angus also expressed gratitude to 
have an opportunity to share his thoughts, opinions, and experiences with me. Similar to 
Spinney (2015: 237), the point I want to make here is that “‘movement with’ becomes a way 
of ‘attuning’ a researcher to the mobile practice and in so doing, of facilitating cultural and 
social empathy.” As indicated in the prior chapter, MOs are placed within a hierarchical 
structure of surveillance and organizational culture of accountability and control. As Smith 
(2008, 2014, 2016) contends, these workers tend to experience further disenfranchisement 
and alienation from these power structures, disempowering their spirit as a result. My hope is 
that, through the mobile method implemented, inviting Angus to speak about his experiences 
in my study encourages participants to feel more important and valued, and with any luck 
contributes to a reinvigoration of their spirit in the process.  
Carceral Territory as ‘Circuitous’: Calibrating Carcerality by ‘Ranging’ a Home  
The main job of a G4S mobile MO is to install EM into the home of an offender. On my go-
alongs it became clear that there are a variety of steps required to ensure that the EM 
technology—most notably, the home monitoring unit (HMU)12 and the ankle tag or personal 
identification device (PID)—is properly set up and operating for G4S Scotland to monitor 
offenders. As my observations indicate: 
When G4S Scotland installs EM into an offender’s home they refer to this process as an 
‘induction.’ Shadowing Angus this evening I was able to witness two inductions. For 
both inductions, Angus had gone through the paper work with the offender, informing 
them of what they are and are not allowed to do during the curfew period, to not tamper 
with the ankle tag strap or HMU, and potential situations involving the police or A&E 
(accident and emergency services). If the police require tag information, they need to 
have a warrant and a reasonable cause to collect the data; they cannot take the info 
arbitrarily. However, if a crime occurs near the residence and the description of the 
offender matches the tagged offender, the police may visit the residence to question the 
tagged offender of their whereabouts. Additionally, should an emergency trip to the 
hospital (i.e., A&E) happen, the offender should call the NEMC before they leave to 
inform them they need to go, and upon arrival to/departure from the hospital, the 
offender must inform a nurse to call NEMC to validate the times the offender was in the 
hospital’s care—this information will be compiled and provided to the court so that a 
violation of the curfew does not constitute an actual breach. However, if this trip 
happens too often, G4S will contact the court to inform them of this regular pattern so 
that the court can determine whether the offender should be brought back to the court for 
                                                          
12 As indicated in Chapter 8, the HMU was also referred to by respondents as ‘the box’; I will use these terms as 
dependent upon the context of my discussion.  
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further investigation. Once this was made clear to the offender, they sign the consent 
form and Angus fits the offender with a tag. We then call the NEMC to begin the test (to 
verify a test can begin). The range test begins in the residence, and once it is completed 
Angus makes another call to NEMC to verify the test’s completion, and Angus asks who 
is the gas/electricity supplier so that it can be recorded in case of a power outage in the 
residence or the battery dies in the HMU. The offender must then wait for a call from the 
NEMC and answer the call to verify their contact information. In total, an induction can 
take approximately 40-45 minutes within one home. (field notes: 10/11) 
As demonstrated above, there are several procedures both the mobile MO and the offender 
must undergo in order to begin the initial setting up of the EM technology in the home. A 
‘range test’ is the main procedure to create the territorial boundaries of EM within the home 
itself (as discussed below) and its function is to maintain and monitor the offender under 
curfew. The range test also creates a secure connection to the offender in the community, 
maintaining the ability for G4S Scotland to survey the offender from the NEMC. Terms and 
conditions of operating EM in the home must be discussed with the offender and in turn the 
offender must consent to all of these implemented procedures. Similar to Chapter 6, material 
text is used to compile information on the individual to be monitored in the home, as well as 
to gain the tagged individual’s consent that all terms and conditions have been properly 
understood and made sense. This discussion produces a particular power relation between the 
mobile MO and offender, insofar as the interaction is not only between two individuals, but 
in reality, what we can witness is an interaction between (1) an individual who will be 
punished within their own residence; and (2) the mobile MO as both a representative of G4S 
Scotland, as well as a proxy for the carceral state at large.  
It is interesting to note that for the offender, particular services such as police and hospital 
visits are still allowed while the offender undertakes EM; however, the offender must still 
inform the NEMC of any changes in their status should they feel the need to leave their 
residence during curfew to access these services. Should these services be utilized more than 
necessary or what G4S Scotland deems reasonable, further investigation of the monitored 
offender will then take place, and may warrant a return to court to alter the offender’s curfew 
order. In effect, my observations suggest a larger ontology of surveillance and control; 
drawing upon Garland (1996, 2001), the EM technology exists as both a symbolic and 
physical punishment imposed by the state, and through the technology’s symbolic 
enforcement (i.e. the standard terms and conditions for each offender to be monitored through 
the EM period, and the maintenance of the EM curfew) the offender becomes responsibilized 
to inform the NEMC of any changes to the monitoring; should the offender require any 
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authorities (i.e. police, hospital, gas/electricity supplier, etc.) they are again responsibilized to 
ensure those authorities are informed of the offender’s tagged status and then must inform the 
NEMC of any status changes as well. Therefore, multi-agency collaboration and public-
private organizational relationships are forged to ensure the maintenance of offender 
monitoring proceeds as planned. In so doing, each individual and group becomes one node or 
component of a larger circuit, and like electrical circuits, forms part of a broader system of 
surveillance and control that are not intended to be visible at first glance (cf. Gill et al., 2016: 
8). This facet of circuitry captures the way certain carceral systems are configured with a 
broader purpose in mind: namely, the management and containment of risks (social, 
economic, or otherwise) (cf. Rose, 2000; Garland, 1996, 2001).   
Indeed, the calibration of space into carceral territory provides an appropriate exemplar of 
one of the ways offenders are managed and contained within the confines of their own 
homes. ‘Ranging’ a home, in the institutional lingo used by mobile MOs, is the more intricate 
process of ‘securing’ offenders’ mobilities in order to contain those within the carceral 
territory by delineating the boundaries of EM. As my field notes indicate: 
In order to range a home for EM, the mobile MO calls the NEMC on the mobile MO’s 
G4S cellphone to ensure that the mobile MO has the clearance to begin testing the home 
monitoring unit (HMU) in the monitored person’s (MP’s) residence. Once the mobile 
MO is given clearance by the NEMC, the MO reads the serial numbers of the specific 
HMU to the MO on the other end of the line. The mobile MO also reads the serial 
numbers of the specific ankle tag (or as referred to by G4S Scotland, the personal 
identification device or PID) the MP will be wearing of the duration of the MP’s EM 
curfew. Once the MO on the other end of the line receives these numbers, the test of the 
HMU inside the MP’s residence begins. The HMU emits a series of repetitive, loud 
beeps to indicate to everyone in the residence that the test is occurring. The MP, while 
wearing the PID, must stick their leg wearing the EM tag in every corner of the room 
where the HMU is situated. Per G4S Scotland protocols, the HMU is to be set up in the 
most geographic centre of the residence as possible, or else the room in which the people 
living within the residence will mostly use, like the MP’s bedroom or living room. Once 
the MP has put their leg with the EM tag in every corner of this room, they are instructed 
by the mobile MO to slowly walk through each room of each floor of the residence, and 
in each room they must again put the leg with the EM tag on it in every corner. Doing 
this ensures that the radius of the HMU can be established within the entire premises of 
the residence. When all rooms have been slowly walked through to establish the range of 
the HMU, the MP and mobile MO walk back into the room where the HMU is stationed. 
The mobile MO shuts off the test from by pressing a button the HMU, and a series of 
numbers are listed on the HMU screen. The mobile MO must then call another MO at 
the NEMC, indicate that the test has been completed, and reads off these numbers to the 
MO on the other end of the line. This series of numbers is to verify that a test has been 
conducted, a residence has been successfully ranged for the HMU, and the test can be 
completed. The MO on the other end of the line then hangs up the phone and calls the 
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MP on the phone set up with the MP’s HMU. The MO and MP then briefly discuss that 
what the MP can and cannot do with the HMU phone, and the MO hangs up the phone. 
(field notes: 10/11)  
As evidenced above, the multitude of sensorial experiences (for example, telephoning the 
NEMC; reading and stating various serial numbers to the NEMC operator; hearing the EM 
technology ‘range’ the home; walking through the home to establish the carceral territory, 
and so forth) demonstrate the productive benefit of witnessing carceral mobilities in everyday 
contexts and engagements. Indeed, such mobile and embodied research interactions from the 
range test, immersed “in the ordinary commotion of everyday” (Ross et al., 2009: 615) were 
effective in aiding Angus to manage the pacing of the EM tests (i.e. the slow walk throughout 
an offender’s home) and to range the homes correctly (i.e. sticking the tagged foot in each 
corner of each room) in order to calibrate carceral territories successfully. These interactions 
also aided the researcher in gaining meaningful understandings of how EM is installed in the 
home of the offender, and the overall process by which the surveillant technology is set up to 
produce the EM penalty.  
The practice and performance of transforming a home space into a carceral territory suggests 
that such mobility of objects, people, and practices are “entwined with a complex array of 
carceral particularities” (Schliehe, 2017: 118). Put differently, whereas geographies of 
mobility are often concerned with different forms of human movement (for example, see 
Cresswell and Merriman, 2011), these micro-scale mobilities play out in an environment 
where life and mobility at home becomes restricted and now rests in part upon imaginative 
yet carceral mobilities (i.e. putting your tagged foot into each corner of each room of your 
home to imagine where boundaries of EM will exist), coupled with practices of identification 
and classification (i.e. syncing personal with numerical information together to identify the 
offender on the HMU phone). As Urry (2007: 9) points out, movement, regardless of the 
scale of movement under consideration, “can be a source of status and power” whereas the 
restriction of movement is linked to social deprivation or exclusion. The diverse carceral 
practices witnessed in the ranging of the home reify the power of G4S Scotland and the 
carceral state and the exclusion offenders will feel as punishment through EM. To a certain 
extent, such carceral practices parallel prison environments, inasmuch as such practices 
augment broader questions of the connection between inhibition of movement, boundaries, 
and boundary-making processes (Schliehe, 2017: 118).  
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Furthermore, Urry (2007: 290) indicates how ‘securing’ mobilities means ‘securing’ people 
within “multiple panoptic environments,” which seems to suggest, along Foucauldian axes, 
the spreading of disciplinary power into society overall (cf. Foucault ([1977]/1995). In a 
similar vein, to secure the mobility of the offender in their home is to regulate their self-
discipline of acknowledge the boundaries formed through EM. Securing offender mobilities 
also secures these individuals under the watchful gaze of the NEMC, and to a larger degree, 
the carceral state governing-at-a-distance (cf. Rose, 2000; Garland, 1997, 2001). We can see 
how mobilities at the small scale of the carceral (i.e. within the home of the offender) reveal a 
complex picture where “mobile and inertial practices can both stand for the display of status 
and power as well as being a diagnostic of deprivation and disempowerment” (Schliehe, 
2017: 118). Once again, these smaller instances of the carceral are the components that, when 
taken together, form a larger circuitous carceral territory system that is perpetuated by the 
carceral state and pervades the community spaces and places of everyday life. In effect, the 
practice and performance of ranging a home for EM and its installation transform the home 
environment into a carceral territory, reifying the status and power of the carceral state and 
the deprived and disempowered nature of the offender.  
Operational freedom through mobility  
A significant theme which arose from my observations was the relative freedom Angus had 
in his daily work as a mobile MO. Besides his main task of installing EM in offenders’ 
homes, Angus’ work schedule was very flexible. While the NEMC would create his work 
schedule for one work shift, of which certain homes on his schedule had to be visited, Angus 
was able to move this schedule about to ensure reasonable driving distances and times to visit 
these homes.  
Furthermore, Angus’ job also provided the freedom of moving about different communities 
in his car. Inherent in the go-along method are multisensory techniques which also 
acknowledge the importance of the perceptual memory of humans (cf. Degen and Rose, 
2012). These everyday experiences were some aspects Angus reflected upon in our go-
alongs. Driving gave Angus the chance to see different neighbourhoods and communities, 
and upon reflection, he informed me that he remembered the development of communities, 
seeing how they change as he engaged in his mobile MO work over the years: 
When Angus received calls in his car, he spoke using hands-free technology to NEMC 
MO, and often while they conversed Angus could hear an address and know it; he was 
able to recall the person, place, and feelings and experiences associated with the address. 
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So while the NEMC may only recite the physical residence address, Angus was able to 
reflect on his experiences of prior interactions with the offenders who lived there. 
Furthermore, should the MP had relocated to a different residence, Angus was able to 
recall the reason for the relocation without needing to consult the log history or MP 
details. (field notes: 08/17)  
To certain extent, motion and emplaced knowledge “served to mediate normative 
generational power relations” (Ross et al., 2009: 615) insofar as Angus also opened up to me 
about his experiences with particular spaces in the community. As we passed particular 
communities worked in by Angus, our conversations opened up into talk about places past 
(both in terms of direction and time) and associations with events that took place there. It was 
through some of these conversations that I gained insight into his everyday life at home, his 
locality and issues of importance to him: namely his strong ties to his wife and daughter, his 
sense of community, and his perspectives on redeveloping neighbourhoods while being 
cognizant of how lower socioeconomic status populations could experience these community 
changes. Arguably, these insights could not have been gleaned from more structured 
interviews. This free-flowing conversation encouraged Angus to share past memories, 
associations, and future imaginings that the journey brought to mind, placing his everyday 
locale at the centre of the research encounter (Ross et al., 2009).  
The freedom of moving between field sites certainly reveals both the practical and necessary 
nature of the work of the mobile MO, yet it also highlights the access these workers can have 
in entering the personal territories of the lives of offenders and their loved ones. The 
movements within the micro-scale geographies of the home was another theme I observed in 
my field notes:  
The third visit this evening involved an MP (white man in his late teens or early 20s) 
who had asked the court to be moved to his grandparent’s residence for the remainder of 
his EM period to ensure compliance. Originally, Angus was only meant to ensure the 
MP signed the appropriate paperwork for the transfer. However once Angus and I 
arrived at the MP’s home and discussed the visit with the MP, we learned that the prior 
MO had not ranged the MP’s home properly in their last visit, which meant that the MP 
was more likely to have a technical breach. As a result, Angus and I spent more time re-
ranging the home for the MP, which added more time into the job/visit than necessary.  
In order to range a home for EM, the MO calls NEMC to ensure that they have the 
clearance to begin a test, and indicate the HMU and PID numbers. Once the test begins, 
the HMU emits loud beeps to indicate to everyone in the residence that a test is 
occurring. The MP, while wearing the tag, must stick their EM leg in every corner of the 
room where the HMU is situated (HMU is set up in the most centre of the residence, or 
else the room in which most people use). From there, they walk through each room of 
each floor of the residence, ensuring that the radius can be established on the entire 
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premises. The MP must stick their EM foot in each corner of each room for several 
seconds, and slowly walk throughout the home.  
I did notice that this noise for the test can be quite loud and bothersome, especially if the 
radius test is ranged incorrectly and must be redone. While walking through the home 
with the MP and Angus we came across the grandparents of the MP, who were visibly 
unhappy to see us perform this test (especially the grandfather, who glared at me even 
after I gave him a small smile and said hello, with my university ID clearly visible). He 
continued to glare, unhappy and frowning in the sunroom of the residence. While we had 
legal permission by the MP’s court order to be here, and it became clear for Angus and I, 
in the eyes of the grandparents, we were interfering with their family life, and as such 
Angus and I kept our conversations with family members to a minimum. (field notes: 
08/17)   
As indicated in the prior section, the range test requires the MO and offender to move about 
the physical residence and ensure the boundaries of EM are in place. In doing so we moved 
throughout different personal territories within the home itself, like bedrooms, bathrooms, 
kitchens, living rooms, hallways, stairwells, and closets. Typically one does not open up their 
homes and lives to strangers and in doing so have their personal lives out in the open for 
members of the public to examine. Yet the access G4S Scotland obtained by the Scottish 
Government to move about the offender’s home is a particular freedom for mobile MOs 
(especially as EM requires the offender to consent to this sort of access). MOs working 
within the NEMC may be able to communicate with offenders on the phone, which gives the 
former a sense of the latter’s lifestyle out in the community. However, mobile MO work 
provides more operational freedom to witness and engage in the monitoring of offenders ‘on 
the ground’. Interestingly one could argue that such mobile MO access provides a freedom 
for the carceral state, represented through the work of the mobile MO, to see the lives of the 
monitored as they live and the conditions of their living. In effect, both the meso-scale 
movements between different homes and the movements between the micro-scale 
geographies of each home itself proved to be analytically useful, inasmuch as such 
movements render a more nuanced understanding of how the carceral state was taking place 
within the personal lives of offenders (marginalized and/or formerly incarcerated) out in the 
community.  
As indicated in previous chapters, carceral geographical scholarship has recognized the 
enrolment of mobility in order to punish through the use of transfers between carceral 
establishments in both immigration detention and prison (Gill, 2009; Moran et al., 2012; 
Hiemstra, 2013; Conlon and Hiemstra, 2014) and these transfers typically involve the 
movements of detainees and prisoners. Yet the movement of MPs between different homes to 
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ensure EM compliance is relatively insightful. As the situation with the MP in the above field 
note suggests, the transfer of these offenders from one site to another (where the former 
carceral territory would not ensure compliance, while the ‘transfer’ to the latter carceral 
territory based at the MP’s grandparents’ home would ensure compliance) demonstrates how 
mobility is used to punish offenders. In some cases, the case could be made that by uprooting 
an offender’s lives and personal territories at one home and planting them in another place, 
this act could be construed as a potential burden on the offender in the community. The 
possible tension, conflict and reorganization of works schedules of offenders and family 
members, coupled with the movement of necessary and personal items of the offender from 
one home to another can be difficult to manage as an offender attempts to comply with their 
EM conditions in the community. Furthermore, the movement of mobile MOs between 
different sites is also significant to consider. Indeed, the operational freedom bestowed upon 
the mobile MO to transfer themselves between homes may appear as Angus just doing his job 
at first glance; however, the mobile MO’s mobility highlights how Angus’ daily work as 
‘compliance work’ can be rendered carceral, interweaving homes together to form a grand 
mosaic of carcerality in the community. In effect, the transferring of people (Angus, myself), 
objects (Angus’ personal items, EM equipment) and practices (procedures to install EM in 
offenders’ homes) once again configures and constellates a larger field site from an array of 
homes-as-carceral territories across a plethora of communities.  
Constraints on operational freedom  
While mobile MOs have some operational freedom in their schedules and mobility, this is not 
to suggest that these workers wield unyielding powers upon those they monitor in their daily 
work. In fact, it was through the go-alongs with Angus that I was able to observe constraints 
on his ability to complete his mobile MO work efficiently.  
Angus relayed the difficulties of driving to scheduled points on his shift, as he felt that 
sometimes, half the job is just finding the place to visit (field notes: 08/17). Angus felt that 
typically, it was access to the buildings he was to visit, coupled with finding the location on 
his maps and parking the car were added stressors to his job. Furthermore, while Angus 
informed me that the NEMC scheduling manager does their best to group scheduled points in 
a more coherent sectors of Scotland (i.e. jobs within the vicinity of the city of Edinburgh and 
surrounding villages and towns, etc.) there were times where Angus felt the scheduler should 
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consider how they manage to schedule visits within a mobile MO’s work shift. I observed the 
latter difficulty in one field note:   
Angus and I were coming to the last scheduled visit of the evening. This visit was a 
court-ordered restriction of liberty (RLO) order, and the MP would have the home 
monitoring unit (HMU) installed in their flat within the city of Edinburgh. This evening 
we had been visiting residences to check in on MPs who were living in towns in the 
Scottish Borders, areas in the southern parts of Scotland. Once we pulled up to the front 
of the MP’s council estate, Angus chuckled, indicating to me that after all the driving we 
had endured over the last several hours driving all the way out to the south of Scotland 
and back into the city, it would be nice to finish off a visit in the city as it would be more 
convenient for the both of us (who live in the city) to make it home at the end of Angus’ 
shift. As Angus began filling out the “EM Scotland – Operational Record” (a form 
which documents the personal details of the MP, the time, date, and mileage taken of the 
car, and other information), he suggested that for him, the greatest concerns to do a shift 
in the field was generally the distance it took to reach visits, and the scheduling of visits 
themselves. Angus recalled that sometimes it would take him hours to reach the visits he 
was scheduled for, only to simply turn up and check why some MP was tampering with 
the strap of their tag. Angus would always wonder why the NEMC could not send a 
closer mobile MO to this visit, rather than him. Angus indicated that some visits are just 
so far from the areas he needs to be for the majority of his shift, and it would take hours 
to drive back. Angus liked it when the schedulers would actually take a second to 
organize his shift with more common sense. It became clear to me that if the scheduler 
on duty does not consider the geographical proximities of all the distances between 
visits, Angus would have spent hours reaching remote areas with not enough time within 
the actual visit to truly engage in the work he needed to accomplish. (field notes: 08/17)  
As we can see above, Angus’ frustrations with the scheduling of visits can certainly influence 
his impression of the NEMC schedulers on his shift. To a certain extent, mobility for the 
mobile MO can be freedom and a burden; while the mobile MO can alter their work schedule 
to visit homes in a way that can be travelled to in a more reasonable manner, the act of 
moving themselves there by way of driving has the ability to hinder the work mobile MOs are 
tasked with by the NEMC. With some distances taking ‘hours’ to reach by car, according to 
Angus, and factoring in weather conditions and driving in darker hours, Angus attempts to 
manage his work shift schedule to the best of his ability. However, as demonstrated above, 
there are times where Angus hopes the NEMC would reconsider the actual distance Angus 
would need to cover to reach these homes for visits, and whether the schedule they provide 
Angus should be reorganized accordingly. To not reconsider this could create conflict 
between the NEMC and mobile MOs in the field, as each could blame the other for not 
prioritizing the mobile MO’s work shift more appropriately for the tasks at hand.  
Another constraint that came up in the go-alongs was the re-ranging of homes for EM. On 
several occasions in our go-alongs, Angus had to re-range a home, due in part to other mobile 
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MOs’ mistakes, or other mobile MO’s lack of care or attention to detail for a proper EM 
induction. This constraint was observed in one of my field notes:  
The fourth visit we had this evening was to another decrepit flat in a council estate. 
Angus informed me that we were making a visit to this home because the EM system 
indicated that the MP was absent from the radius between 3:39-3:48am. Once we arrived 
and stepped inside the home, the flat was small, cramped and cluttered; the MP was a 
white man in his late 20s or early 30s (wife (similar) and two children (two young girls) 
were present). After discussing with the parents as to why the system would indicate an 
absence in the system, everyone came to the conclusion that the MO who originally 
ranged the residence did not have the MP stand in the shower/bathtub area—typically, 
the MO asks the MP to fill a bathtub with approximately a foot (i.e. twelve inches) of 
water and submerges their EM foot and ankle into the bath for a few minutes. This 
procedure ensures that the HMU can calibrate the depth of the submerged foot. 
However, as we realized in this procedure, antique or old cast iron bathtubs will interfere 
with the connection between the PID and the HMU, which would explain why the signal 
was lost with the HMU and why an absence was recorded. In effect, Angus had to re-
range the residence, once again adding additional time into the visit, as he had to correct 
the mistakes of whomever ranged the residence originally. (field notes: 08/17)  
Re-ranging a home adds time to a mobile MO’s schedule that they do not readily have; these 
workers are only provided approximately 40-45 minutes to range a home, and it is hoped that 
each mobile MO ranges a home appropriately, whether or not they are the MO returning to 
the home for another visit as required. Especially as it may take time to find the home in 
question, Angus informed me that he gets frustrated that other mobile MOs may not properly 
conduct EM inductions, as the MOs that are conducting EM inductions to the best of their 
ability are left to pick up the slack and are forced to resolve mistakes created by others’ lack 
of attention to detail or care for the work involved.   
As Jungnickel (2014: 642) contends, it becomes clear that regardless of the nature of distance 
(physical, virtual, or symbolic) “movement and travel are deemed vital to the development of 
an authentic ethnographic presence and authoritative voice.” Indeed, my presence in the 
movement and travel with the mobile MO is a clear attempt to develop a more authentic 
ethnographic presence in the ‘on the ground’ work associated with EM. My presence also 
highlighted constraints Angus experiences as he engages in his mobile ‘compliance work.’ 
Similarly we can witness that, regardless of the distance the mobile MO must take, or the 
amount of time mobile MOs must use to range (or unfortunately re-range) a home, these 
constraints on operational freedom are needed to ensure that carceral territory continues to 
takes place; in other words, that carceral territory is maintained in the homes of offenders and 
proceeds as usual. Constraints such as distance travelled or time used for re-ranging homes, 
while mild annoyances for mobile MOs, are necessary, in the eyes of the NEMC, to re-
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establish an authentic presence of G4S Scotland and the carceral state in the lives of 
offenders. Regardless of where the homes may be placed in Scotland, these practices 
performed by G4S Scotland re-presents (and continues to represent) an authoritative voice 
which pacifies and resolves the issues taking place in these carceral territories.  
The Car and its Carceral Mobility: Extension of Self and the State  
Car journey interactions were generated as Angus and I drove together in Angus’ car, 
travelling together to and from designated visits on his work shift. These journeys formed 
part of the regular routines set up to maintain the EM curfew of offenders in the community. 
In fact, car journeys were not originally envisaged as part of the data collection process, as I 
considered them more so as a necessary means of shadowing mobile MOs in the field in 
order to reach different residences in Scotland under EM curfews. However, these journeys 
slowly became an intriguing aspect of the processes by which EM as work is conducted and 
how it maintains carceral territory for offenders in the community. As the project progressed, 
it became clear that the conversations and ethnographic observations that took place in the car 
were potentially interesting data in themselves.  
Attention to the car journeys themselves are important as place-making practices (Sheller and 
Urry, 2006; Pink, 2008; Ross et al., 2009) insofar as we can come to know and potentially 
understand everyday experiences through embodied, multi-sensory research experiences. 
Practices and everyday experiences like driving or ‘passengering’ (cf. Thrift, 2004) can 
become subject to scrutiny, turning our attention to the embodied experiences of different 
travels and distances between sites and focusing upon the multitudes of activities they 
comprise (Ross et al., 2009: 606). There has been increasing interest in the mobilities 
literature regarding the embodied experiences of driving and ‘passengering’ and the 
emotional, multi-sensory experiences of car dwelling (Sheller, 2004; Thrift, 2004; Ferguson, 
2008). Before, en route to, and after visits at residences with offenders on EM curfews I was 
provided opportunities to ask Angus clarification on the work he engages in, the struggles he 
faced while working, and his insights on EM as a practice used within Scottish criminal 
justice. Car journeys also gave Angus time to reflect on questions I posed him, and allowed 
him time to offer up and share thoughts of his own accord. The car journeys themselves, as 
dynamic and place-making practices of installing and maintaining the carceral territory of 
offenders in their geographic residences, foreground movement, interactivity, and the multi-
sensory, allowing the ethnographer to focus upon not only the research relationships but the 
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contexts and engagements within and throughout such relationships (Kusenbach, 2003; Pink, 
2008; Ross et al., 2009).  
Indeed, the “immediacy and nowness” of place-making practices were significant to consider 
within the go-alongs (Ross et al., 2009: 606). The meaning of places and significance for 
those people either doing the surveying or those being surveyed through EM were 
transformed over time through a continued practice of co-construction. As Angus and I drove 
from site to site, from home to home, and from carceral territory to carceral territory, it 
became clear that how Angus, the offender (and their loved ones), and myself each viewed 
the places which brought us together brings to light “a world that is not only perceived or 
conceived but also actively lived and receptively experienced” (Casey, 2001: 687; italics in 
original).  
Finding ways to reinvigorate the work Angus conducted was another significant theme. 
Angus’ car assisted him in ameliorating stress while driving between MP visits, as well as 
preparing him for conducting home visits: 
Angus’ car was spacious, and it was clear that the more time I spent in the car the more I 
realized he had taken the time and effort to make this space his own. In most respects, 
his car became his office: it allowed him a space where he could fill out records and log 
times, mileages and details of each visit he was scheduled for on one shift. While we 
drove around, Angus would play the radio, and the radio stations he liked were all preset 
for him so that when he wanted to hear news, music, or weather forecasts he could 
switch to whichever he preferred at just the click of a button on the car dashboard. 
Sometimes we would talk about the homes we were to visit that evening, our 
experiences of what we saw, heard, smelled and otherwise felt in the homes, and the 
conversations we had with offenders and their relatives we interacted with on several 
occasions. Besides conversations about the different homes we were to visit, Angus and 
I would also get into conversations about my personal interests as a Canadian student 
foreign to Scotland, my research interests, and why I chose Scotland for my PhD degree; 
other times, we chatted about our collective interests like sports teams and recent 
matches, and places we each have travelled to in Scotland and the rest of the world. 
When conversations grew stagnant between Angus and myself, he would generally hum 
to the music that was playing on the radio. I certainly did not mind this, as it gave me 
additional time to collect my thoughts and jot down in my notes my observations of the 
shift thus far.  
Besides his radio, Angus had a satellite navigation system (‘Satnav’) installed in his car, 
and to assist him in finding an MP’s residence, he would input the postcodes of each MP 
residence into the Satnav to find the quickest way to each destination. However, if 
Angus’ Satnav provided him confusing directions, he would often look to Google Maps 
on his personal cellphone to either confirm the directions given on the Satnav or to find a 
more appropriate journey to the destination.  
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This was not the only technology in Angus’ car-as-workspace; beside Angus’ personal 
phone in the glove compartment, as a mobile MO he is also provided a G4S cellphone to 
allow him to call into the NEMC to begin each job, as well as the time he arrived to each 
site and the residence address.  
In Angus’ car, his car-as-workspace contained a variety of items, such as a spare jacket, 
sunglasses, pens, extra pads of paper, used and spare file folders, gum, phone installation 
equipment for his car to enable hands-free conversation and for Google Maps on his 
personal cellphone, and hand wipes for visits where Angus felt the need to wipe his 
hands and jacket off from touching items in an MP’s residence. (field notes: 08/17)  
Therefore, the embodied practices of driving and ‘passengering’ can “can create a place of 
communication” between Angus and myself; a place where the car journey itself gives us “a 
valuable time to talk” about and reflect upon the homes we just visited, the things we had 
seen, heard, and smelled, and the people we spoke to while Angus made his home visit (Ross 
et al., 2009: 610). Indeed, shared journeys led the researcher in an open, fluid, and evolving 
format. In other words, conversation gaps were less noticeable, as conversations with Angus 
was only one contribution to the mass of other elements that comprised our car journeys, such 
as the people, places, and things passed, and coupled with the sights, sounds, smells and 
feelings associated with the journeys, to name a few. To a certain extent, the “commotion of 
the journey” (Ross et al., 2009: 614)—namely what was passed en route, mingling with in-
car activities like Angus negotiating routes, his attention focused on driving, our combined 
attention on finding offenders’ residences and parking, turning the radio on and switching 
radio stations, and the lapses between listening, talking, and distractions—provided “stimulus 
for, and interruptions and disruptions to, interactions” in our shared car journeys (Ross et al. 
2009: 615).  
In a similar vein, Bull’s (2003, 2004) research on ‘car habitation’ (mainly from the 
perspectives of solo drivers) has suggested that the soundscapes of the journey and the 
personal touches of the car owner to the car has the potential to transform the driving 
experience into a more liberating one. The association of car space to motion and freedom 
has been examined elsewhere (cf. Ross et al., 2009), despite the different context of sharing 
the car space between researcher and participant(s). However, while mobility is by now an 
established area of interest in carceral geography (for example, see Gill, 2013; Peters and 
Turner, 2015, 2017; Turner and Peters, 2016, 2017) objects in particular have been 
previously mentioned in passing in carceral context (cf. Philo, 2001; however for a notable 
exception see Schliehe, 2017) while there has been no attention focused upon car space in 
relation to carceral contexts.  
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Interestingly, one could argue that the G4S Scotland car itself exists an object of carceral 
mobility. While some mobile MOs opt to use their own cars for various reasons (especially 
given the geography of Scotland and how mobile MOs are dispersed into the Scottish rural 
countryside to monitor, making trips to the NEMC impossible), other mobile MOs can use 
unmarked G4S cars to monitor offenders on their work shifts. As “objects and their 
movements tell tales of inner social worlds and complex interplays of care and control” 
(Schliehe, 2017: 115), the G4S car itself could be construed as a space of confinement which 
moves between carceral territories throughout Scotland. Due to its high level of mobility, the 
car (with Angus as its driver) constantly cross boundaries of various scales, from different 
community and neighbourhood boundaries to the inside/outside of offenders’ homes. G4S 
Scotland is tasked with installing EM in and at a range of sites in Scotland, and in doing so 
the movements of these cars, as objects of carceral mobility, and the underlying power 
influencing these actions produce both imaginary and material boundaries imposed by the 
carceral state. Moving between different personal territories and a diverse array of living 
accommodations in Scotland, the car’s presence in the community evokes the presence of the 
carceral state in the community, of which continues to evoke “atmospheres and symbolic 
perceptions of closed space” within these offenders’ homes (Schliehe, 2017: 115).  
To a certain extent, the actual and imagined object mobility of the car literally and 
figuratively “holds keys to control and self-assertion, as well as symbolizing powerlessness 
and inertia” (Schliehe, 2017: 125). As evidenced above, Angus, as one mobile MO amongst 
the G4S Scotland MO workforce, carves out personal space by imbuing materials spaces (like 
the G4S Scotland car) with meanings that express their identity or respective status within a 
particular space. For example, de Certeau’s (1984) concept of ‘tactics’ is significant to 
understanding the importance of objects to make sense of how they are used in particular 
spaces. De Certeau uses the example of a radio to underline his argument that it is only an 
object in the corner of the room until it is used/turned on, when suddenly it transforms the 
space and embodied experiences within –therefore, objects do have an effect (de Certeau, 
1984: 211). The “visual, audible and haptic imprint” on the interior of Angus’ car is reflected 
in objects that are, in turn, “intimately connected to people’s tactics and their social worlds” 
(Schliehe, 2017: 117). As indicated above, personal touches Angus had in the car included 
several packs of gum, stationary, his personal technological devices, and preset radio stations 
on the radio (field notes: 08/17) Therefore, the alteration of the car-as-workspace through a 
tactical use of objects means that MOs can transform their spaces to assist them in coping 
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with and working through the work of creating and maintaining carceral territories in the 
community.  Mobile objects, specifically the EM equipment of G4S Scotland, similarly 
express such statuses to the offenders whom are restricted to their homes for periods of time 
through EM.  
Furthermore, much of the movement of the car occurs in line with the movement of people 
tagged to particular locations out in their communities and within the wider EM regime of the 
carceral state. Put differently, just as offenders move between courts, prisons and their 
homes, Angus and I travelled along various routes and paths to reach these offenders, 
‘following’ their paths as they were documented in Angus’ records, and ensuring that the 
carceral territories we established in different community spaces in Scotland would be 
maintained and complied by the offenders we visited. In effect, the movement of the car as an 
object of carceral mobility becomes one of many objects, people, and practices concurrently 
working together to (re)produce carceral territory with multi-scalar effects. It becomes clear 
that, as a proxy of the carceral state, the car carries meanings with it, and while the car itself 
may be unmarked for security reasons (so that G4S MOs working in the field are not 
concerned about their safety in certain neighbourhoods) the car carries objects, people, and 
practices all of whom comprise the conditions needed to create carceral territory. In doing so, 
we can see how the movements of G4S Scotland cars into and out of diverse sets of territories 
(personal and/or carceral) occur at the micro- and meso-levels (within offenders’ and between 
offenders’ homes, respectively), and maintain the wider scheme of carceral territory-making 
at the macro-level, witnessed across the macro-scale geography of Scotland. Therefore, by 
taking up space in the homes of offenders and through various practices (for example, by 
driving and ‘passengering,’ and moving within these homes for an EM induction) it becomes 
possible to witness EM taking place in diverse set of ways and at various scales of mobility 
and geography, all of which reproduce carceral territory in the process.  
Conclusion 
The mobile method highlights the significance of the shared real time fieldwork, making 
visible some of the filters that shape participants’ social worlds (Kusenbach, 2003). By 
grounding this analytical stage of the project in the go-along/ride-along method, mobility 
“highlights the fundamental reflexivity of human engagement with sociospatial 
surroundings” (Finlay and Bowman, 2017: 272), invites participants’ lived experiences to 
supplement the research, and offers innovative ways to better understand how place and 
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space matter (Carpiano, 2009). This method accesses more mundane and less easily storied 
spaces that can be overlooked in traditional ethnography or seated interviews, and further 
investigation of mobile methods can not only broaden the fields of criminology and 
geography but critically query how carceral territory takes place within and between the 
homes of MPs and how such practices are routinized, maintained and perpetuated.   
The above observations and findings underscore the significance of diverse scales of 
processes for understanding the objects, practices, people, and experiences of carceral 
territory while physically ‘on the move’ (cf. Cresswell, 2006). While many movements of 
objects and people are inherently embedded in the EM regime—from the routes planned and 
taken in the G4S car, to the distribution and installation of EM within offenders’ homes—it 
becomes pivotal to uncover the realities of carceral mobilities by following them beyond the 
NEMC and betwixt and between the community spaces of everyday life. It is through 
mobility and mobile methods that we can productively unpack the role particular people, 
objects, and practices of EM have in constituting and reproducing punishment as it extends 
from the carceral state.  
Ultimately, ethnographers must remain mindful that the mobile methods we adopt or adapt 
raise particular questions of what kinds of abstractions we aim to produce, for whom, and the 
temporal and spatial contexts we study. As Spinney (2015: 241-242) states:  
It is certainly clear that one researcher’s ‘loss’ will be another’s ‘gain’ because they will 
be asking different questions for different audiences. We should not lose sight of this in 
attempting to produce some kind of new methodological orthodoxy; rather, we should 
always think carefully about…how we mobilize method to apprehend traces of 
movement in any quest to provide convincing and relevant interpretations.  
Indeed, whatever our mode of enquiry, mobilizing methods so that we have the ability to be 
‘on the move’ with our participants “is at its heart a call to be transformed by our research: to 
get involved, to feel and care and be moved by what we are studying” in the hopes that our 
abstractions will become less abstract as a result (Spinney, 2015: 242). In a parallel vein to 
Ross and colleagues (2009: 619), I found that interactions with Angus were dynamic, 
“characterized by a more free flowing dialogue, moving from topic to topic, returning to 
previous topics, [and] allowing unrestrained gaps and pauses” when Angus or myself felt 
necessary. Focusing upon the ‘materialities of doing’ alleviated the pressure to converse and 
allowing the researcher a richer experience of the car journey in motion and in between sites 
for EM installation. As a result, go-alongs/ride alongs, as one aspect of mobile methods, have 
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the ability to generate insightful understandings of everyday life as a mobile MO in a more 




















































Chapter 8: Talking Territorially – Inmates’ Experiences of Electronic 
Monitoring 
Introduction  
This chapter provides an analysis of the experiences of formerly tagged offenders. In carceral 
settings, mobility is a key facet of the power geometries of tagged offenders’ everyday lives. 
Autonomous mobility is restricted along temporal and spatially sensitive lines; offenders are 
subjected to flow control and regimes of movement. As indicated in Chapter 3, a mobile 
ontology provides a way of thinking about the circuitry of people, objects, practices and 
experiences (Gill et al., 2016). Such a lens of circuitry benefits the theoretical approach of 
this project as it to make sense of the rhythm, periodicity, frequency, and the pace of carceral 
cycles as experienced by those routinely caught within this detrimental loop (cf. Edensor, 
2010; Gill et al., 2016). Not solely understood as a way to describe carceral systems, the 
‘carceral continuum’ comprises these sequences and loops of bodies, communities, and 
global flows of capital, resources and information (cf. Wacquant, 2002, 2009). The extent to 
which electronic monitoring (EM) influences the spatial and temporal rhythms of mobility 
within settings and locales suggests that, as a form of carceral territory, such technology can 
be vehicles of punishment which accelerate, decelerate, interrupt or distort the recurrence of 
routines in the personal territories of offenders’ lives.  
Inherent to an understanding of carceral mobilities is the recognition that circuits return to 
their own starting or anchor point (Gill et al., 2016; see also Peters and Turner, 2017). Yet for 
various stakeholders, ‘return’ captures and denotes different meanings and interests for 
diverse participants. For instance, a return for investors refers to the efficiency and collection 
of profits made on investments. For those ‘released’ from custody or incarceration, a return to 
communities with prospects equal to or worse than when and where they left can be a 
disparaging experience, fraught with strife and struggle. A return for professionals and 
practitioners within the criminal justice system could capture the cyclical patterns of offender 
behaviour, coupled with the ‘revolving door’ of North American prisons, in which the 
circulation of poor, racialized men between city blocks and prisons is so common that 
everyday life gets fundamentally (re)figured (cf. Wacquant, 2009; Massaro, 2015). Finally, a 
return could also indicate the practitioners’ goal to reduce offender recidivism and 
rehabilitation while mediating a balance between cost-effective criminal justice initiatives 
and programmes (Gill et al., 2016).  
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Regardless of its usage, what remains clear is that the circulation of people, objects, practices 
and experiences, coupled with the proliferation of carceral environments can become 
embedded in everyday life. EM has become an increasingly complex entity within the 
expanding carceral state, a notion which I described in Chapter 1 and similarly refer to here 
as “a set of institutional configurations and actors that prioritize punishment, containment, 
detention, and/or incarceration for treating poverty and marginalization” (Villanueva, 2017b: 
150; see also Beckett and Murakawa, 2012; Peck, 2003; Wacquant, 2009). The extra-
territoriality of carceral spaces, as evidenced in Chapters 6 and 7, is the linkage which 
connects this study to the everyday life of criminal justice actors engaging with surveillant 
technologies. Thus far we have seen this extra-territoriality witnessed in both the monitoring 
of location and status of both offenders and monitoring agents, as well as the physical 
distances and routes taken and navigated by both groups as they engage in the social world 
surrounding them. EM and other technology-driven surveillance and management 
innovations (such as identity cards worn by monitoring agents and home monitoring units 
installed in the offender’s residence, workplace(s) and public space) effectively extends 
carceral space into everyday life, rendering carcerality and surveillance commonplace (cf. 
Patterson, 2007; Gill, 2013).    
Now is the time to invite and speak to those on the other side of this surveillant technology; 
namely, those individuals whom are subjected to EM surveillance. Doing so allows them to 
talk ‘territorially,’ by which they are encouraged to share their experiences and struggles as 
authentic knowers of their own stories, narratives, paths and life trajectories, all the while 
recognizing their perspective and insight as I endeavor to examine EM as a form of carceral 
territory. In this spirit, the chapter is structured as follows. First, I describe the demographic 
characteristics of my inmate sample group. Data analysis follows this discussion, insofar as I 
reflect on themes which arose from the data collected and position them in relation to wider 
reflections of power, space, and mobility. In particular, I discuss the normalcy of EM in terms 
of the commonsense and commonplace characteristics associated with carceral territory. In 
addition, I examine how timepass and penal waiting ensure offender compliance of the EM 
curfew. Following this, I turn the attention towards the struggles of stigma or sticking to 
home or ‘watch-time,’ highlight how the feelings of ‘sticking,’ or being ‘stuck’ run parallel to 
aspects of carcerality. I then examine how the extent to which routines changed for both 
respondents and their loved ones, as well as the general freedom and mobility felt outside of 
curfew times and through transient living, taking into consideration the ‘unruly’ mobilities 
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experienced by respondents as they continually venture between the prison and their 
communities. Taking these findings together, the chapter will conclude by reflecting upon 
how carceral territory is an apt frame of reference to examine EM, especially as a particular 
and creative form of punishment imposed by the carceral state which extends carcerality out 
into society.   
Demographic Characteristics  
Of the ten interviews conducted with inmates at HMP Edinburgh, the sample comprised of 
two women and eight men. Eight inmates identified as White Scottish while two inmates 
identified as White English. The average age of the sample was 33 years old (the youngest 
was 22 while the oldest was 43 years old). The level of schooling varied across the sample, as 
eight inmates indicates they had completed secondary education, one inmate had a college 
degree, and one inmate had left school when they were 15 years old to get a job to support 
their family. When asked if they were presently in a relationship, seven of the ten inmates 
reported that they were not in one at that time, while the remaining three were involved in a 
relationship. When asked if they had children, eight inmates reported that they did while the 
other two inmates reported that they had no children. Of the eight men that reported that they 
had children, the number of children ranged from one to three.  
 
When asked where they each had grown up, eight inmates reported that they had grown up in 
various communities in Scotland, one inmate had grown up in England, and the remaining 
one inmate reported that they had grown up in both Scotland and England, moving between 
different communities for all of their childhood and teenage years.  
 
While the length of their incarceration and period of EM may be relatively brief in some 
cases, for these respondents their experiences of moving between the prison and the 
community is no less significant. In sharing their experiences, my respondents reveal the 
everyday realities of their lives beyond prison walls. Inviting these incarcerated people to 
describe their own carceral situations brings to light various and memorable experiences of 
themselves and their interactions with their loved ones. In essence, the stories my sample 
shares capture the quotidian atmosphere of ‘the carceral’ as it is lived and understood by the 




Calibrating Carceral Territory: Commonsense and Commonplace 
Characteristics  
When asked about their interactions with G4S Scotland, in terms of phoning the company, 
being called by the company, or visited by them (to install or de-install the home monitoring 
unit (HMU)), respondents felt that their experiences with G4S Scotland was quite simple and 
straightforward: 
It was simple and basic to set up the box [home monitoring unit], and they told me the 
standard terms and conditions—basically being in your house for 7pm and don't commit 
any offences, and if there's any issue just phone us [G4S Scotland]. Also don't touch the 
box unless we phone you, and make sure you don't turn it off. So there was nothing 
really complicated about it—it was a simple, simple procedure to have done. (Aaron)13  
It was alright, and the guy doing it was nice. He was just doing his job, and we didn't 
have much conversation, because he came there to do a job. Like I said, it was the Friday 
before Christmas when he came to my place to tag me, so you could tell he wanted to 
just finish the job and go. It was quite simple really, put the tag on my ankle, told me 
what to do, and then left. (Billy) 
The women who come set up the box was alright… And it terms of experience, they go 
through basically, just, the repetitive things of what you can and can't do while on the 
tag. (Danika)  
G4S was alright, and I think they are quite a good security firm. The boy that fitted my 
tag was alright, and the set up of my tag was pretty simple. (George)  
Yeah they were alright, aye. I didn't have any problems. They came into the house and 
fitted the tag. It all seemed pretty simple to get tagged to my mum's house. (Isaac)  
To a certain extent, one could argue that such experiences were expected to occur in this 
way. Viewing the interactions with G4S Scotland as ‘basic,’ ‘simple’ and ‘alright’ 
highlights the lack of concern the respondents had with EM as a practice and punishment. 
To these respondents, it appeared as a standard procedure that mobile monitoring officers 
(MOs) would instruct them of what the respondents can and cannot do while the curfew 
was in effect. Yet what becomes clear is that such commonsense and commonplace 
perceptions of EM procedures becomes a creative extension of carcerality, inasmuch as the 
timespaces of the home—which compounds human activity, the diverse hermeneutics of 
meanings, and social life together (cf. Schatzki, 2009)—are then reconfigured to ensure 
that punishment is imposed upon and sustained within the personal territories of offenders’ 
lives, however minute and banal the punishment may actually appear. 
                                                          
13 Similar to Chapter 7, pseudonyms were used to ensure confidentiality of respondents.  
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Indeed, calibrating the space of the home into a carceral territory also speaks to 
classification of the territory to be imposed upon the home as well as the acceptance of the 
EM as a legitimate punishment. This punishment was seen as legitimate when it ‘made 
sense’ in its application (Danika); the ease of communicating the punishment of EM (i.e. of 
getting ‘tagged’ to your or someone’s home), the physical and symbolic bounds of the 
punishment, and the ‘simple’ conditions required by the offender to ensure that they do not 
interfere with the carceral territory’s continued calibration (i.e. ‘don’t touch the box unless 
we call you’; make sure to not turn the HMU off, etc.) are all significant attributes to 
ensuring that this particular type of penal measure imposed by the state is legitimate. Taken 
together, the commonsensical and commonplace-like conditions of the carceral territory for 
both MOs and inmates suggested that the carceral territory, as a legitimate punishment, 
would hopefully be sustained and monitored more effectively.  
In effect, this form of punishment need not be a grand spectacle for the offender, nor 
should the form of punishment be so complex that the offender does not understand the 
terms and conditions of their confinement. To keep the punishment as simple and 
straightforward as possible was the carceral state’s attempt to communicate the territorial 
bounds of the punishment as effectively as possible, and to ensure that the inmates would 
have a higher chance of completing the EM period in the community. Therefore, while the 
visibility of the punishment remained minimal, insofar as the respondents suggested an 
almost lack of experience with G4S Scotland MOs, it is clear that the commonplace 
characteristic and mundanity (and indeed, the normalcy) experienced by my respondents 
indicates the presence of punishment was taking place, regardless of the severity of the 
punishment imposed or the proportionality of the interaction.  
EM Offenders as ‘Waiters’: Carceral Territory as Timepass and Penal Waiting  
Spatialized through the home, the punishment of time imposed by carceral territory gives us a 
view of imprisonment in which we ‘see’ offenders coping with timepass, allowing both them 
and ourselves to understand penal time and penal waiting as sitting around. Carceral territory 
encourages us to see EM offenders, not as physically trapped in their homes, but in fact as 
penal ‘waiters’ immersed in their own dysfunctional, marginalized and ‘suspended’ lives (cf. 
Medlicott, 1999). In terms of the struggles offenders and their loved ones faced while the EM 
period happens, focusing upon this waiting provides a crucial insight into how EM as a 
penalty and carceral territory as a state penal power subsumes the personal territories and 
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lifestyles of those in comes into contact. Indeed, “the analytical power of waiting…derives 
from its capacity to highlight certain features of social process that might have been hitherto 
been foreshadowed by others or entirely hidden” (Hage, 2009: 4).  
When asked about what activities they engaged in while the EM curfew was in place, 
respondents shared how they attempt to pass the time: 
It was mostly play Xbox, or watch tv, but you get bored of watching tv after being in 
here [prison] for so long, because that's all you can really do to pass the time. Outside, 
I'd go on social media and talk to people. But otherwise it's playing Xbox and that's 
pretty much it. (Billy; italics emphasized)  
Sit and watch telly, watch football probably. Play on the computer, and muck about on 
my phone, checking social media. Just things like that to help pass the time. These 
activities helped me comply, aye. (Ernest; italics emphasized)  
Just watch tv, play on the computer, and watch DVDs. Maybe I'd read books too. These 
activities helped yeah, light reading would help me take my mind off of stuff. Finding a 
room in the hostel and getting into a book helped time pass. (Fred; italics emphasized)  
Honestly, I would just sit at home and drink. Drink and get wasted. Have parties too. 
Wait for the boys to come around, and we'd party and drink. Sometimes the kids would 
come around in visit, but besides that it was just drinking. (George)  
When I was off curfew, I would like to play football, go swim, go to the gym. Yeah I 
like to stay active. But when the curfew was happening, I would just be watching DVDs, 
telly, listen to music, go on the computer, aye. (Hank)  
I never really had many activities, to be honest with you. I was staying at my mum's 
place, and there's not much to do there in the evening. So when I was on curfew, I would 
just go to sleep, basically. I know I would hate to be awake and missing out on being out 
with pals, so I figured I should just go to sleep. Other times, I would sit in my room and 
watch tv, but sleeping was it most of the time. (Isaac; italics emphasized)  
Female respondents slightly differed from their male counterparts in terms of passing time, 
as Danika and Jackie indicate:  
I would just tend to be out and about doing what I had to do during the day, and deal 
with my housework, cooking, and things like that when I was in at night. Also getting 
my child organized, like with homework and for bed, and things like that. (Danika)  
Just cooking and drinking (laughs). I liked to cook, but I also liked to drink. (Jackie)  
As demonstrated by several of the respondents above, it becomes clear that imprisonment, 
regardless of whether it takes place in the prison or the home, “is the exemplary symbol of 
waiting, of being stuck in a space and for a time not of our choosing” (Armstrong, 2015: 1). It 
is not a far cry to suggest that the home may be a space where we choose to be ‘stuck,’ 
especially when passing the time with loved ones; it can also be a place where we engage in 
diverse range of activities which might have productive value (i.e. housework and cooking 
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versus checking social media, watching television and DVDs, etc.). To this end, I remain 
mindful that the inside/outside dichotomy of the home has been analyzed and critiqued, “with 
feminist scholars pointing out the patriarchal character of the association between masculinity 
and the public, and femininity and the private/domestic, in the light of the fact that the 
domestic can be the locus of oppression rather than freedom” (Moran, 2015b: 31; see also 
Rezeanu, 2015 for a further review). Nevertheless, the point underscoring this form of 
confinement is that for a particular timespace (7pm – 7am within a physical residence) what 
we may actually experience are feelings of being trapped or ‘locked up’ within a particular 
area all the while preferring the freedom of just ‘being out’ (Isaac). Typically the prison 
conveys this metaphor of waiting, “evoked when we feel stuck, caged, forced by others to 
endure a period of…time” (Armstrong, 2015: 1). While prison waiting may be experienced as 
particularly burdensome because it stops time (for the inmate) while the rest of the world 
remains ‘on the move’ (Cresswell, 2006), this type of waiting as rendered stagnant through 
EM produces the particular pain of “time standing still but passing away” (Armstrong, 2015: 
2, citing Wahidin, 2006: para. 6.4). In effect, by being forced to wait on the margins in 
carceral territories can be considered a pain of which is witnessed from my respondents’ 
experiences.  
Conventionally the temporality of imprisonment finds its spatial translation in the prison cell 
(an arguably crucial space of imprisonment), in which “time itself [is] compartmentalised 
through space” (Matthews, 2009: 37). Yet to understand penal waiting, as Armstrong (2015: 
2) rightly contends, we should not solely consider it as “a form of stopped time and stilled 
movement” which focuses on particular moments and populations and constructs their needs 
in particular ways. We must also acknowledge the mobility embedded within experiences of 
imprisonment, examining how “waiting can be a mobile experience” (Armstrong: 2015: 3) 
which makes visible the inmate as ‘waiter’ (or in the context of EM, the offender released to 
their home and/or physical residence in the community) and other ‘waiters’ feeling such 
similar pains (the loved ones of the tagged offenders). My earlier work suggests that inmates 
will attempt to lessen the impact of carceral regimes by engaging in activities which takes 
their minds off or helps them forget their carceral environments for short periods of time (cf. 
Gacek, 2017). Indeed, the mobility of inmates “to psychologically enter the inner spaces of 
their minds to avoid and distance themselves from…prison life” (Gacek, 2017: 73) existing 
outside their anatomical control can be similarly compared to the activities engaged in by 
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these respondents (i.e. watching television, playing video games, going on social media, 
drinking, etc.).  
Furthermore, while the prison cell “produces a particular visibility of punishment that 
furnishes our social imagination of penal possibility” (Armstrong, 2015: 5), I argue that such 
possibility should be extended to the geography of the home within the EM curfew. This 
adherence to a space renders a particular visibility to the offender and/or former inmate, 
making them visible to G4S Scotland specifically and criminal justice authorities generally 
(further discussed below).  
Notwithstanding, it is clear that such resemblances of carceral spaces through timepass and 
penal waiting can be witnessed through the carceral territory of EM. Once the EM curfew 
begins for the offender “the swirling flow of life is broken up…into boxes of time” in which 
particular activities and movements are authorized or not, much like what is seen in the 
prison (Armstrong, 2015: 5). By slicing up life into spatiotemporal boxes, this logic of 
control through EM reveals a Foucauldian penal power in which “[w]e…become disciplined 
through the waiting process” (Kohn, 2009: 225). As indicated above, the calibration of the 
home into a carceral territory initiates the feeling carceral experiences and it is further 
sustained by the offender, their loved ones, and G4S Scotland through monitoring 
compliance. Therefore, when all of these actors come into the fore to ensure that, through 
monitoring compliance, the calibration of the carceral territory constellates together and 
crystallizes, carceral territory continues as a result, and the penal power of the state can be 
felt and further sustained through the waiting and passage of time.    
The Monitoring Tag and Monitoring ‘watch-time’: Struggles with Stigma and 
Sticking to Time  
As I have indicated in prior chapters, there is more to the carceral than a mere anchorage to 
the prison. Indeed, Gill (2013: 26) has explored the use of EM as a natural extension of or an 
alternative to mainstream carceral environments, suggesting that confinement can be 
independent of physical restriction. By drawing upon Carnochan (1998), Gill observed that 
forms of punishment that are not explicitly prison-based can be just as constraining, in a 
different sense, as traditional incarceration.  
The risk of stigmatization was a theme which emerged from my respondents’ experiences. As 
Bülow (2014: 511) indicates, “the EM device is not only a technological artifact, but also has 
social and cultural content that may lead to stigmatization of the individual wearing it.” As 
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EM can lead to stigmatization, people who meet individuals undergoing EM “may ascribe 
normative expectations to that person, which may result in both social disadvantages and 
social exclusion” (Bülow, 2014: 512) especially if one considers how the stigmatization can 
relate to future employability (cf. Nellis, 2009a). Perceptions of whether respondents would 
hide the fact that they were tagged were similar in this regard:   
Yes, eh, there was one time, my friend wanted to go swimming and I had to deny I could 
go because I had the tag on, but that was it. It was just the one time I had to say no 
(chuckles). (Aaron)  
I used to get kind of anxious for people seeing me wearing a tag. Because dealing with, 
or out in the community anyway, it's easy for people to be judgmental or that had a brush 
with the law. So it was just another, you got to sort of deal with once tagged. And it 
wasn't easy to wear, as I was tagged in the summer, and that wasn't easy--I ended up 
walking around with long trousers on, and even that would be suspicious, you know? I 
do get quite anxious about being seen with the tag. But now being back in the prison it's 
just something I just want to put it in my past. Now that I'm back, would I hide it? No. 
But would I willingly disclose it? No. (Danika)  
No, but obviously I don't want people knowing. If I wear skinny jeans, then it's hard with 
my body being pumped, and people are gonna notice. But if they notice, they notice. 
(Carl)  
I mean I wouldn't walk around in shorts with it on. I would be embarrassed. So aye, I 
would hide it, aye, even if I was roasting in the summer months, I would hide it. (Isaac)  
Indeed, these respondents would hide the fact that they were tagged, but only in particular 
contexts and certain situations. Getting tagged in the summer months for respondents was 
particularly difficult as it would indicate to others in the community that they had ‘a brush 
with the law’ and did not want people in their communities ‘to be judgmental’ of them 
(Danika). In addition, Danika reframed her thoughts to indicate that rather than hiding the tag 
she would not disclose this knowledge to others, potentially for further anxiety of judgment. 
And hopefully, with the passage of time, the stickiness of the stigma would rub off and be 
less noticeable in the community. While Carl suggested that he would not hide the tag, his 
suggested a similar sentiment like Danika towards disclosure: that ‘obviously’ he would not 
want people to know, and that if the community notices him wearing a tag, then so be it, but 
not because he has disclosed this information from the outset.  
However, Hank, thought oppositely from the majority of respondents, indicating that he felt 
no reason to hide the tag:  
Why would I want to hide the fact that I've been tagged? There's nothing wrong with 
being tagged, it's a good thing and better than being in the prison. It's a good thing, and 
it's just up to you to stick with rules and the times of the curfew. It's better than being in 
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a cell, and why would you want to be back in here when you could be out there on the 
tag? (Hank)  
Certainly, past studies have regularly found that while most offenders consider EM to be 
punitive (and sometimes shameful and embarrassing at times, as indicated in the prior 
section) they prefer it to conventional imprisonment (Gainey and Payne, 2000, 2003; Payne 
and Gainey, 1998, 2000a, 2004; Wiloughby and Nellis, 2016).  
Besides the focus of stigma sticking to them, respondents also indicated the hardest thing to 
deal with once released was ‘sticking’ to the time, or monitoring the time they had before 
their curfews began:  
The time was the hardest to deal with, yeah. There was sometimes I was late getting in, 
but sometimes it was just the initial looking at the watch, sometimes from like, half six, 
quarter to seven, constantly looking at the watch and asking yourself "Am I going to 
make it? Am I going to make it? Am I going to be ten minutes late?" So it was really 
'watch-time' that was the only issue. (Aaron; italics emphasized)  
When you get tagged, you've got to figure out how much time you could do things 
before the curfew, and that put a strain on my relationship with my girlfriend. And when 
I was in here it was hard for her to see me, as there's not many buses that will take her 
from Dunbar to here, so that also added to the strain. (Billy)  
Sticking to the time. Aye, sticking to the 7pm to 7am time. I'm a nighthawk, and I like 
being out of the house and if I can. Especially if I'm taking my dogs for a walk and it's 
hard to collect them. You can lose track of time without even realizing it. (George; italics 
emphasized)  
Indeed, the theme of sticking to or being/feeling stuck is a significant theme which spans the 
experiences of my respondents. Along parallel lines, I concur with Gill (2013) that while 
imprisonment does cast a long shadow, one which may start from the prison and extent 
outward into society, carceral territory as a form of punishment becomes an apt frame of 
reference to consider the pains of waiting as a “state of ‘stuckedness’” (Hage, 2009: 7). 
Unlike traditional incarceration, carceral territory is a distinctive geographical context which 
adheres to the personal territories of offenders and their loved ones, manifesting within and/or 
supplementing the fraught realities these individuals face on a day-to-day basis. 
Like glue, the adherence leaves behind residue which exacerbates the detriment these 
marginalized individuals are already experiencing in their lives in the community. One could 
argue that such residue is the product of experiencing the pains associated to the EM penalty; 
in other words, the feelings and experiences of being in a ‘state of stuckedness’ parallels the 
feelings associated with aspects of carcerality, notably the detriment of social exclusion, the 
aggravation and frustration of isolation from the community, the shame and embarrassment 
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of being incarcerated or electronically monitored, and in terms of EM, the annoyances 
attributed to micro-managing times and schedules before and after curfews. Taken together, 
the stickiness of stigma and time and being or feeling stuck in indoors during the curfew 
demonstrates how carceral territory, as a punishment, does its part to enforce offender 
compliance and to ensure that, in varying degrees, the offender feels punished, even within 
the comfort of their community.    
The Freedom of ‘just being out’    
When asked about their typical day in prison, respondents indicated how routines were 
assigned by prison staff to inmates to organize respondents’ typical days and schedules in 
HMP Edinburgh. A typical day for inmates in HMP Edinburgh can be summarized by Ernest: 
Before you get sentenced, a typical day starts with 8 o’clock wake up, then breakfast ‘til 
around 9. Then it's exercise from 9am ‘til 10am. Then locked up from 10am ‘til half 
11am. Lunch at half 11, then locked back up from noon ‘til 2 o’clock, then you get 
recreation from 2 ‘til half past 3, then locked back up from half past 3 ‘til half past 5. 
Then after you have dinner ‘til half 6, then locked up again ‘til 7 o’clock. Then from 
7pm ‘til half past 8 you have recreation again, then locked up from half past 8 ‘til the 
next morning. But when you get sentenced, it's pretty much the same routine, except that 
you get exercise from half past 12 to half past 1, and then recreation is half past 6 ‘til 
half past 8, and half past 8 ‘til half past 12 you have a work shift. Then 2 o’clock ‘til 5 
o’clock you have another work shift. Being in here, and in that regime…it's like, you're 
locked up then closed, and then locked up then closed--I think it's just done to break 
people, you know? (Ernest; italics emphasized)  
Indeed, Ernest’s understanding of a routine day in HMP Edinburgh provides an apt summary 
of how routines shape the movements and behaviours of inmates. Linked to order, 
predictability, and control, routines can be seen by some as helpful tools for organizing the 
flow of time. Routines “create rhythms and patterns by squeezing and synchronizing time[,]” 
and become the manuals for what has been tasked or to be completed in the course of a single 
day (Ehn and Löfgren, 2010: 81). Routines are the maps of life at home and work, where 
many activities are charted in detail, and as “economizing devices[,]” routines, to a certain 
extent, may help one avoid making a myriad of choices, or having to reflect about various 
alternatives in recurring situations (Ehn and Löfgren, 2010: 81).  
However, the lack of routine, or disorder and unpredictable nature of respondents on the 
outside of prison was a theme which emerged from my participants’ responses. When asked 
about what a typical day looks like for them out in the community, respondents had varied 
experiences, and most of my sample did not abide by a particular routine:  
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I had the day to myself, and it would just be driving about with my friend, either doing 
other stupid things or things that I shouldn't be doing and just, like, somedays I would be 
out with my girlfriend and others it would be out driving with my friend. (Aaron) 
It would be wake up, find a way to get alcohol, get drunk and then just drink all day… 
everywhere I was, everywhere I went, there was alcohol. If I was on my own, I was 
staying at a bed and breakfast, and I'd be moving between those spaces. If I was on my 
own, it was pretty much drinking. It's not what twenty years old think of their lives, and I 
got into a lot of trouble and I had and still have a hard life. But that's it, I would go to 
anyplace that had alcohol. (Billy) 
I'd always go to the gym… [and] I would definitely be out having a drink... I'd like to 
have a good night with the boys. At home I'd probably get hammered up, have a drink 
(chuckles)…or else just on Facebook chatting to birds…[and] maybe on the weekend go 
for a drink [with them], do a couple of lines [together], and then… bang them (chuckles). 
(Carl)  
Crime and drugs, really, that's all I can explain it as. Just get up in the morning, and I 
needed drugs, and I would go wherever I could find them. And if I needed money for 
drugs, I'd go and shoplift. Go anywhere I could to buy drugs. (Fred)  
Wake up around 9 o’clock, and take the dogs out and go for a ten mile hike with them. 
Come back, and then start drinking and taking drugs. That was basically my day, and 
I've done it for years. I was also a heroine user and that was my typical day, just drinking 
and taking drugs. (George)  
Sometimes I would get up and take the bus to go see my daughter at her place, and sit 
with her for a wee while -- like a few hours just being with her. And then I'd leave and 
walk about, you know, just being out. Sometimes I would bump into my pals and we’d 
go drink. I'd go into the pubs for a while, just back and forth between the pubs. When I 
was able to keep a job I'd be working, but that didn't happen often. (Isaac)  
As the respondents demonstrate, their typical days manifested as an array of choices in which 
they were free to seek out any pursuit they desired. It was not routine per se to head to 
particular spaces in the community; rather, for several of respondents, it was more so of an 
adherence to general places (i.e shops, pubs, etc.), faces (family, friends, and pets), and what 
I refer to as ‘chases,’ such as searching for drugs (Carl, Fred, George), alcohol (Billy, Carl, 
George, Isaac), the opposite sex (Carl), and the thrill of adventure (like ‘having the day to 
myself’ and doing ‘stupid things’, as Aaron suggests). Contrary to the male inmates’ 
responses, female responses indicated a more routine approach to a typical day on the outside 
of prison:  
Typical day's just getting up in the morning, and getting my daughter organized and 
prepared and make breakfast for me and for her; then getting her off to school. Then, I 
would get myself ready and go deal with my education and things. Then perhaps go into 
town, and visit family, like my dad, and make sure they are alright. Sometimes I would 
maybe be doing a computer course, so I would be visiting the library and things like that 
for the afternoon. I was out of the house most of the day, you know. And then I would 
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return as my daughter would be due back from school, and I'd get the tea and things 
organized. (Danika).  
I was just working at my job most of the day. Life was good, but I definitely made a 
mistake and ended up incarcerated. (Jackie)  
Once again we see another example of how the female respondents engaged in more 
productive activities (home-based domestic work, and paid work outside of the home), only 
here we see activities engaged in a typical day in the community. Gendered experiences 
about the meaning of home has certainly been discussed by Rezeanu (2015: 16), especially 
when we consider the larger implications of conventionally placing women in spaces 
associated with care and emotional tasks, while men with “mind-related work, leisure, and 
prestige.” Even now women continue to be responsible for both organizing and engaging in 
domestic tasks both while within the home and when away from this space, more so than 
their male counterparts (Rezeanu, 2015; see also Kan et al., 2011). Therefore, the fact that 
female respondents would be making greater efforts to organize their homes and their lives 
more than the male respondents runs parallel to what the extant literature suggests.    
Notwithstanding, “routines hold onto us just as much as we hold onto them, sometimes 
unwillingly and oftentimes unwittingly” (Highmore, 2004: 311; italics emphasized). As 
simultaneously comforting and frustrating, routines can be hard to acquire and even harder to 
break. Yet, what routine feels like, and how it is experienced, is by no means clear; it 
certainly can produce mixed feelings of both autonomy over life and adaptation to imposed 
restricted time, as Danika and Ernest indicate: 
Yeah, my routine did change a bit, but not as much as what it would normally be like 
without the tag. It would be, not really, the same routine that I would have had before, 
you know? I would deal with everything later on at night, because I was on the tag. 
(Danika)  
My routine did change a bit, yeah. Because when I got off the tag, I was finding myself 
getting back in the house earlier than what I used to do. Because I used to be out at my 
partner's ‘til half 10 or 11 o’clock at night, and then make my way back home. But once 
off the tag I was leaving earlier than I thought, so actually it did change my time 
schedule, yeah. (Ernest)   
For Danika and Ernest, their routines slightly changed; while EM did not forcefully impose a 
new schedule onto them, it certainly impacted how they went about completing tasks they set 
out for the day and the management of their everyday lives in general. While the pair still 
retained a certain degree of autonomy while during the period of EM supervision, the 
imposition of EM into their lives had an effect upon how they organized their times and 
schedules, and especially for Ernest, continued to have a presence in how he managed his 
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times once the period of EM had finished. However, as Carl and Isaac suggest, their typical 
routines (or arguably lack thereof) were not impacted by EM: 
I don't think it changed my routine. I just figured it was better than being in the jail, so 
that's it. (Carl)  
No it didn’t change because I wasn't on the tag for long enough, and really the only rule 
was to be back to your home by 7pm. It was just better than sitting in a jail, so it didn't 
really have a big change or effect on my life. (Isaac)  
As indicated earlier in the chapter, examining EM in relation to traditional incarceration has 
the ability for offenders to view EM in a better light, incentivizing them to comply with the 
curfew conditions (cf. Paine and Gainey, 1998, 2003; Wiloughby and Nellis, 2018). 
Certainly, Carl and Isaac’s responses compliment such findings from these past studies. 
Notwithstanding, the point running through these experiences is that EM, as a form of 
punishment, can be experienced differently by different individuals and groups (cf. Payne and 
Gainey, 2000a; Bülow, 2014). EM may coalesce, conflict, or contravene with the offender’s 
routine and how they attempt to organize their life out in the community. While EM for these 
respondents had minimal impact upon how they structured their times in the home and out in 
the community, a greater consideration of routine warrants a concern of how carceral territory 
is legitimated and sustained as an appropriate penalty to impose upon an offender at 
sentencing.    
In addition, such a consideration of routine can be evidenced through penal waiting within 
both the prison and carceral territory. All prisoners can be moved throughout their sentences, 
and over the course of their sentences, for many reasons, including ‘population management,’ 
a term of art referring to the movement of prisoners around correctional facilities to ensure 
building capacity limits (cf. Armstrong et al., 2011); for disciplinary reasons or sometimes 
specifically as a punitive measure for particular inmates (Gill, 2013); as well as “medical 
reasons; court appeals; revised risk assessments; new offending; for their own protection; to 
be closer to family” (Armstrong, 2015: 9). Similarly, EM offenders, once released into the 
community, can move or be moved if they (or the person they are living with who owns the 
residence) withdraw their consent to live in the home where the EM is established, wants to 
move to another residence to ensure they properly comply with the conditions of the EM 
period, or they fail to have authorization to move from their home while the EM curfew is in 
place and breach. While my sample was able to adapt their routines to EM supervision and 
the curfews imposed, we must remain cognizant of the fact that moving back and forth 
between prison and community, and between residences for EM, has the ability of creating 
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pains of punishment; put differently, it is not solely about sitting still in prison or the home, 
but the monotony of routine in the prison and/or the unpredictable circulations of life on the 
outside that could cause these pains to occur. 
Being anywhere but home: Transient lives and ‘unruly mobilities’  
When asked about respondents’ lives in the community, another theme which emerged from 
the interviews was the transitory living most respondents engaged in throughout their lives. 
Specifically, Aaron, Billy, Fred, and George mentioned their consistent mobility in a variety 
of ways:  
Me and my girlfriend, when she felt pregnant, we went into the homeless wait program 
to try to get a house a wee bit quicker. We went into a hostel ‘til she was about 5 months 
pregnant, then they gave us a short term council tenancy down Leith Walk in Edinburgh. 
We were there for a year and a half, and our son—he was about or coming up to one 
years old at the time—they [the landlords] said that it was getting overcrowded at the 
one bedroom house, and they offered us the two bedroom council tenancy house in 
Edinburgh. (Aaron)  
When I was tagged, I was living in Dunbar. I grew up there and then I was staying in 
Musselborough before I went to jail. Then I would move between homeless shelters and 
bnbs when I’d get out of jail. (Billy) 
I've never owned or rented anything, I'm homeless. I just keep moving around. (Fred; 
italics emphasized)  
In Glasgow I lived in a neighbourhood called Pollock, and I've lived there since I was 
10. Back then it was all drugs, gangs, stabbings; that was the place for all of the crime. 
Then we moved to get away from it to the Scottish Borders, to a place called Selkirk, but 
there I also got picked on a lot… And one day I got fed up, I just wanted to get back at 
them so I started robbing their houses, and it just got worse from there. Now I'm 
homeless, and I’ve been homeless for some time. (George)  
As we see above, respondents like Aaron continued to move about Edinburgh to find a stable 
accommodation to raise his family, whereas other respondents (Billy, Fred, George) were 
forced to move about upon release, whether they wanted to move or not. While it is clear that 
the duration of mobility for respondents was varied—occurring over days, months, or even 
years—the continual upheaval from one home or residence to another made it difficult for 
respondents to improve their transient lives. Interestingly, Billy expressed his need to be on 
the move:  
Well, before I got the tag, I would be trying to get drunk--Ya might say, I don't know 
what you'd call it or how to describe it, but I liked to disappear. I was always somewhere 
else, I would have decided to go out with friends or travel around Scotland, even leaving 
my place for a half hour and come back. I would go visit my son in Dunbar, and when I 
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could and when I had the money, I was always out. I was always with my girlfriend too, 
even going for walks, like stupid things like that. (Billy; italics emphasized)  
JG: Was it difficult for you to comply with the conditions of being monitored? 
No, it just, I'd like to go on adventures-- how do I say this; you had freedom but you 
didn't. Kinda like you weren't in a prison, but you're still pretty much locked up in your 
house for twelve hours. (Billy; italics emphasized)  
As the excerpts above suggest, the day-to-day coping, adjusting to or managing with carceral 
territory can make respondents visually assess their daily routines of life on the outside of 
prison. Per Billy, rather than feeling ‘locked up in your house’ one could ‘go on adventures,’ 
and through movement, find a greater sense and experience of freedom. In a similar vein to 
van Hoven and Sibley (2008: 1001-2), vision is of central importance for an individual’s 
ability to (re)make space within carceral environments, as the ways in which they look, are 
seen, or stay out of sight are in turn affected by the materiality of the carceral environment. 
To obtain more freedom while off curfew is to make yourself ‘disappear’ from the purview of 
those tasked to monitoring your offender compliance in the community. Indeed, Billy’s 
responses reflect Foucault’s ([1977]/1995: 200) assertion that in a disciplinary society 
“[v]isibility is a trap” as visibility means disempowerment, and the awareness of one’s own 
visibility status can potentially influence one’s behaviour, rather than being under actual or 
physical control. In a very real sense, disappearing could also be construed as a way to 
impede the carceral state’s focus upon you, and through mobility (i.e. travelling, as indicated 
by Billy) you can feel as if you render yourself invisible to the state surveillance upon you 
and the personal territories of your life. In effect, to be ‘always out’ and ‘somewhere else’ is 
to reconfigure your agency and, to a certain extent, be out of reach of the penal arm of the 
carceral state. Carl and Fred had similar perceptions of needing to be (willingly or 
unwillingly) on the move upon release:  
When I got out I would go anywhere, try to go anywhere. When I got out I tried to get an 
accommodation, like a ‘bnb’ [bed and breakfast]. But the bnbs in Edinburgh are nae 
good, you can't even stay in one for more than a night before getting kicked out. (Carl; 
italics emphasized)  
It’s hard to describe, like I can't really describe the spaces I would go. It’s more I would 
be seeing friends, acquaintances, and family. Travelling to see them or just go around the 
community with friends and stay with them for most of the day. Didn't like sticking to 
one place, so I was always moving around. (Fred; italics emphasized)  
As indicated in Chapter 4, visibility breeds identification, inasmuch as it makes possible the 
ability to see and been seen by others. As Fred tries to visit and communicate with friends, 
acquaintances, and family, he is seen just as much as they see him out in the community. The 
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feelings of trying ‘to go anywhere’ (Carl) were coupled with the personal freedom of being 
out of prison, and relishing in the ability to have freer access of mobility. Yet Carl and Fred’s 
respective responses indicate the transience of their lives and the turbulence they may be 
facing. To an extent, the experience of ‘sticking to one place’ (Fred) could parallel the 
sticking Fred may feel from being ‘stuck’ in prison or at home on curfew. Therefore, ‘moving 
around’ may be a more enjoyable activity to retain some agency from the state surveillance 
imposed upon you.  
Similarly, Fishwick and Wearing (2017: 44) have explored the extension of the carceral state 
into the community and into the lives of young offenders where “the legal-administrative 
measures of diversionary programmes create long distance control and discipline (including 
self-discipline), and punishment” over broad yet diverse geographies. The authors defined the 
movement encompassed within diversionary measures as ‘carceral mobilities’ insofar as such 
measures had the capacity to “coerce, constrain, and potentially immobilize the lived time 
and spatial freedoms of…youth” creating ‘liminal’ or pseudo-carceral spaces in homes, 
streets, or shopping malls (Fishwick and Wearing, 2017: 44). As a result, the need to govern 
the behaviours of these offenders are driven by what Fishwick and Wearing refer to as 
‘unruly mobilities,’ inasmuch as these offenders are “often seen to be unpredictable[,] 
ungovernable, [and] ill-disciplined” (2017: 44). Conventionally these individuals are 
categorized as “vulnerable, marginalized, and usually highly disadvantaged” (Fishwick and 
Wearing, 2017: 45) and patterns of mobility and movement are then orchestrated and mapped 
by specific mobile technologies and practices—such as through curfews, behaviour 
management programmes, and probationary regimes—in an attempt for authorities (police, 
prison, welfare, health, and education) to manage and monitor these offenders’ ‘unruliness’ 
based on their whereabouts in geographic domains.  
As indicated in Chapter 2, there are many points of compliance involved in EM in Scotland 
which govern offenders’ movements and their ability to abide by curfews or see their loved 
ones in the community. Failures to comply with Restriction of Liberty Orders (RLOs) or 
Home Detention Curfews (HDCs) can include being absent from an address to your presence 
is required, or being present at an address to which you are restricted from entering; the 
withdrawal of consent to use EM, either by the offender him- or herself or by the loved one 
of whom owns the residence the offender is restricted to within the hours of the curfew, and 
the tampering or damaging of the EM equipment itself (cf. Graham and McIvor, 2016). In the 
event of non-compliance for an RLO, G4S Scotland could initiate proceedings by reporting 
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the offender back to the court to decide, or in the case of HDC, the offender must report back 
to the prison from which they were released. Where a breach in the EM curfew has been 
proven, a court could impose a fine on the offender or vary their conditions of the order. 
Indeed, courts hold the power to impose an order restricting whom offenders can meet with 
and where they can go. If an offender breaches the order they may be liable for a sentence of 
imprisonment, or the court could rescind the order and re-sentence the offender (Graham and 
McIvor, 2017). Even technical breaches of curfews have meant that offenders have been 
arrested and placed in detention as a result of minor breaches of the conditions of EM 
(Fishwick and Wearing, 2017; Graham and McIvor, 2016). In turn, as the carceral state 
extends in the spaces of everyday life, it becomes clear that EM conditions and curfews have 
the potential to create unruly mobilities for offenders, and/or supplement and exacerbate the 
unruliness already existing in the offenders’ lives. 
Back and Forth: Breaching the EM Curfew and Returning to HMP Edinburgh 
It would be a truism to say that inmates are caught up in the “ongoing circulation between the 
two poles of a continuum of forced confinement” formed by the prison and the 
neighborhoods they return to upon release (Wacquant 2010: 611). Per Wacquant, prisons 
today have shifted their operations from rehabilitative to primarily warehousing “the rejects 
of the labour market” (Wacquant 2012a: 5; see also Jeffrey, 2010). A strong representation of 
punishment, the prison has come to serve three missions that have little to do about crime 
control: to “bend the fractions of the postindustrial working class to precarious wage work, to 
warehouse their most disruptive or superfluous elements,” and to monitor and police the 
boundaries of the ‘deserving’ citizenry while (re)asserting state authority within the restricted 
domain it now assigns itself (Wacquant 2012b: 240).  
While respondents opened up about how they felt returning to HMP Edinburgh, there 
experiences were mixed. For some respondents, like Fred, George, and Jackie, it was not 
difficult to return to prison:  
No it wasn’t difficult for me, because I've been to so much prison for so many years, it 
just feels like a 'home' to me. That's the only way I can really explain it. It's like a second 
home to me. Actually, the prison has been more like a first home, to tell you the truth. 
I've been here in prison for longer than I've been out. And it’s not difficult for my family 
and friends because they're just used to it. They're just used to me going back and forth. 
(Fred; italics emphasized).  
It was difficult to come back. But honestly I've been back and forth so much and seen 
this prison change so much in the last twenty years that it would shock you. I've seen this 
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jail change from when it was a Victorian building to what it is now, all renovated and 
things like that. But every time I come back in, there's been no changes. Nothing 
changes really for how a prison works for us. Every time you go through that door, and 
every time I come back, it all comes back to you, you know? You see the same faces, 
and a lot of the same boys that have been in here for years. Was it difficult for family 
and friends? Probably for my mum, but again she's a drinker so I don't know for sure. 
(George; italics emphasized)  
No it wasn’t hard for me to come back. At the time it was quite easy to be in prison, 
compared to what it was like for me outside. Just difficult, all I can say. But it was hard 
for my family, aye. Just coz, obviously they knew that I messed up again, even after I 
promised I would change. (Jackie) 
However, Aaron felt that it was difficult to return to HMP Edinburgh, and the emotional 
heartbreak they felt before they returned, as he indicated:  
Yes. Leaving my son and girlfriend…was very heartbreaking. There was tears that night, 
so it was hard. It was especially difficult for my family. Friends, they come up and see 
me here [HMP Edinburgh] but it isn't long enough, so it's hard, it's hard saying goodbye 
to them as well. (Aaron)  
Other respondents, like Carl, Danika, and Ernest, could especially feel their loved ones’ 
displeasure of them for not trying harder to remain on the outside: 
Difficult to be back in prison, yeah. Probably difficult for my family, because seeing me 
back in here again... “I'm just not learning,” that's what they're probably thinking--"same 
old Carl". (Carl)  
Yeah, because I felt like I had really let myself and my daughter down. I battled hard, 
you know. But I regretted shoplifting once I did it, because it was just more hassle of the 
consequences than I expected. Because if I didn't shoplift I wouldn't be back in prison…I 
do feel like because I breached [my curfew] I lost confidence and trust in myself, and I 
definitely lost trust and confidence in my daughter. Definitely difficult for my family and 
friends, because they hope that on your release from prison that that is you, and that is it, 
and that you won't create more problems back in the community. And they want you to 
succeed--but you don't. And when you don't it hurts; it hurts them, it hurts you. (Danika)  
It was difficult to come back, and probably for my friends and family as well. Because 
they probably were thinking "this fucking guy, he's not changing his ways" and things 
like that. And that's gutting, aye. (Ernest)  
Billy and Isaac found it hard to return to prison knowing what special events and moments 
they would be missing on the outside, and the pressures it could cause the ones they loved:  
Yes… it was hard, because when I told my girlfriend I was coming back in here ‘til 
April she wasn’t happy. She told me I was missing my birthday, and my son's birthday, 
and stuff like that. I missed New Years too, and it's just, it's just hard being back in the 
prison. (Billy)  
Yeah it was hard for me to leave, because my kids mean so much to me. They and my 
girlfriend, and my mum -- it was just hard for me to leave. It was hard on my girlfriend 
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mostly, because of my kids. My oldest keeps asking 'where is dad' and it's getting hard 
for her to answer that question, and it's hard for me too. (Isaac)  
In their examination of the prison visiting room as a site of multiple and overlapping 
experiences of embodied presence and absence, Moran and Disney (2017) found that 
prisoners experience “multiple forms of absence, not least their own from the world they 
have left behind, as a form of presence. Similarly, prisoners’ loved ones negotiate as a 
presence the painful absence of the prisoner as a loved one, from everyday routines and 
experiences. Prisoners and their loved ones are therefore both present in and absent from 
each other’s lives” (Moran and Disney, 2017: 2; italics emphasized). In a related vein, my 
findings present similar experiences felt by the respondents interviewed. My respondents’ 
experiences suggest an oscillation or circulation between presence and absence, insofar as 
this presence/absence dialectic speaks to the continued disruption of their lives and the lives 
of their loved ones. Indeed, one could argue that a hallmark of neoliberal capitalism and the 
carceral age we find ourselves has decidedly become characterized by and experienced as 
“left-behind-ness, and a simultaneous fear of missing out” when we are forced to wait as a 
punishment or to waste time in a society which prizes the ability to be both productive and 
‘on the move’ (Wafer, 2017: 406; italics emphasized). In effect, the constant appearance and 
disappearance of offenders from their loved ones and their communities can reconfigure and 
recirculate the personal territories of those missed by loved ones when the offenders are sent 
back to prison. In other words, the collateral effects of prison (i.e. the feelings of loss, 
neglect, displeasure, and resentment towards the offender) may reshape how loved ones 
classify, communicate, and enforce the boundaries of their lives. This may lead to loved 
ones’ reimagining their personal territories to such an extent that the offenders may not have 
the ability to access these territories any longer. As Billy indicates: 
I'm still close to the people I'm still with before and after I was out. Though the only 
relationship that has changed was between me and my son and me and my ex-partner. 
It's made a lot harder on our relationship between us because she thinks that I was being 
selfish to come back here--which I mean, I think now I kinda was--but now when I get 
out I have to take her to court because I never get to see my son anymore. (Billy)  
Indeed, collateral effects of imprisonment have certainly been discussed in the prison 
literature (Mauer and Chesney-Lind, 2002; Travis and Waul, 2003; Breen, 2010 Comfort et 
al., 2018). Such effects range from the more direct emotional and financial effects on 
inmates’ individual families (Comfort, 2008; Breen, 2010; Comfort et al., 2018), to wider 
social outcomes related to labour market opportunities (Western, 2002), civic engagement 
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(Uggen and Manza, 2002), and community health (Thomas and Sampson, 2005). 
Respondents opened up of how both the EM curfew and the return to prison changed 
relationships they had with loved ones in diverse ways:  
My relationship with my girlfriend, yeah. Me being on a tag did rock us a wee bit, just 
because I was tagged to my mum's house. And when I cut it off she [my girlfriend] told 
me that I was being stupid, and that going back to the jail meant I wouldn't be seeing my 
kids as often. I know I was stupid; it was my choice to cut it off and I regret it. (Hank)  
My daughter would have her dancing classes or swimming classes or things like that in 
the evening, so usually we would leave after tea time to go and do all these sorts of 
things. Yeah, that was a bit of an issue for me when I was tagged, actually. Definitely 
more of an issue. Because, like, she'd start to, how do I say this, it [EM] would start to 
affect her, because she would start… skiving dance or swimming, or she'd just cut 
classes altogether. Because she knew that I couldn't say "right, let's physically take you 
there” or be there to pick her up after classes because I would be stuck at home. So she 
knew I couldn't do it, so she would just use it as an excuse to get out of going to these 
things because she knew we wouldn't be back in time for the curfew, and wanted to 
make sure I wouldn't breach. So yeah, that was hard for her, and that was hard for me to 
deal with, yeah. (Danika; italics emphasized)  
As these responses indicate, there were emotional effects on Hank’s family when Hank 
returned to prison, seen in the loss of a father from the family. For Danika, she could also see 
the collateral effects of imprisonment in terms of EM, insofar as her daughter began to feel 
‘stuck’ in certain situations. Indeed, once the period of EM began, her daughter knew Danika 
would not be able to take her daughter out to evening activities or events, or would not be 
able to pick up her daughter in the evening altogether. As a result, the daughter begins to 
shirk outings she might enjoy out of concern for Danika’s punishment to be ‘stuck at home.’ 
Once again we see the penal arm of the carceral state stretch into the personal territories of 
loved ones, either through the return of an offender to prison and the removal of the offender 
from the lives of their loved ones, or through the collateral effects and carceral feelings 
imposed upon loved ones through the punishment of electronically monitoring offenders in 
the community.  
Finally, when asked if he would like to add any final thoughts to our discussion before our 
interviewed was over, Carl opened up about how he felt that the prison system should refocus 
its efforts to assisting inmates post-release: 
I think that people are put in here [prison] for crimes for being drunk, and I think if 
people can't fight the drink, and it's just part of their system, then they [the prison] need 
to focus on that. They should help these people look for work, and things like that, 
instead of being chucked back out, where you only get to have a small amount of money 
when you're out, and you just end up going back into crime. Trying find a job is hard, 
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and with only 57 quid in your pocket it's impossible. You might as well just live in the 
jail. (Carl; italics emphasized)  
Rather than solely relying on incarceration to handle deviancy, Carl reportedly felt that SPS 
should encourage open discussions about the needs and issues of their inmate population. 
Further assistance for inmates in obtaining legitimate work opportunities would be beneficial 
in guiding inmates out of the prison system rather than inmates be ‘chucked back out’ into 
society and ‘back into crime’ (Carl). Such movements between the prison and the community 
reflect Wacquant’s (2009) work on the ‘carceral continuum,’ and highlights the fact that 
without proper programmes and supports in place post-release, these marginalized 
individuals are forced back into carceral environments and situations where they feel 
disheartened by their families’ perceptions of them, trapped in a vicious and endless carceral 
cycle, and desperate to escape the continuum. Especially for the fraught and detrimental 
situations some inmates may experience upon return to their communities (as Jackie indicates 
above), Carl is correct to say that you might as well ‘just live in the jail,’ as opportunities for 
personal growth and prosocial development appear as empty pursuits. Therefore, even 
through the use of EM we can view a creative extension of the carceral as it reaches out into 
communities, and much like the prison, it recreates similar feelings of incarceration while the 
offender serves their punishment beyond the prison.  
Conclusion  
This chapter was an attempt to galvanize further attention towards the experiences of 
formerly tagged offenders, now inmates at HMP Edinburgh. It is clear that the distinctive 
geographies and personal territories which comprise offenders’ experiences of EM, as 
authentic knowers, need to be recognized in attempts to understand socio-spatial relations 
(Moran, 2015b). The point here is that the nature of carceral territory within the home and its 
purposes do matter to existing criminological and carceral geographical scholarship, and they 
matter intensely.  
As this chapter demonstrates, there are insightful ways carceral territory is created, sustained, 
and legitimated by both offenders and their loved ones. Whether this be through the 
commonsense and commonplace characteristics of carceral territory, by drawing upon 
different examples of mobility and waiting in prison and the home, the struggles of stigma or 
sticking to home or ‘watch-time,’ this chapter reveals wider connections of power and space, 
coupled with “temporal flows which are multiple, nested, distorted and disciplining” 
(Armstrong, 2015: 9). In addition, we can see how EM can be vehicles of punishment which 
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alter in significant ways the recurrence of routines in the personal territories of offenders’ 
lives, from the freedom felt outside of curfew times, within transient living, or through the 
general ‘unruliness’ of mobilities experienced by respondents as they go back and forth 
between the prison and their communities.  
Furthermore, this chapter has attenuated towards the ‘return’ of offenders and their loved 
ones, and the ‘return’ of the offender from prison to the home, arguably from one carceral 
setting to another. As a creative extension of the carceral state, EM as carceral territory 
allows the carceral continuum to persist and pervade society, and just as circuits return to 
their own starting or anchor point, inmates upon release return to their marginalized lives and 
unfortunate circumstances. In effect, the nature, form and delivery of carceral territory 
produces further insight into how EM has been experienced, as the significant themes 
addressed here connect back the bigger picture of carceral territory as a form of punishment 
imposed by the carceral state. Offenders and inmates alike are caught up in carceral territories 
beyond the anchorage to the prison; hopefully by recognizing this reality we can begin to 










































Chapter 9: Conclusion  
Introduction  
This project was an attempt to galvanize further attention towards aspects of carcerality in our 
everyday lives. Supplemented by existing criminological and carceral geographical 
scholarship, this project was as a desire to “broaden the conceptual and analytical contexts in 
which imprisonment is situated” (Mitchelson, 2012: 148). In the last chapters, I have begun 
to explore conceptions of carceral territory, highlighting its importance within academic 
examinations of carcerality, and imagining how carceral territory fits in and amongst the 
overwhelming and overarching societal spread of the ‘carceral.’ Carceral territory has 
become an appropriate frame of reference to reconsider carcerality within empirical research 
of criminology, carceral geography, and mobility studies; within methodologies and methods 
of carceral work, like institutional and mobile ethnography and inmate interviews; and across 
various research sites, like the National Electronic Monitoring Centre (NEMC), the prison, 
and the home. Each are apprised of a comprehensive level of depth and nuance, yet the 
importance of the project lies in the overarching notion of carceral territory and where this 
notion, through its recognition, can take us.  
The concluding chapter begins by briefly revisiting carceral territory in terms of the spread of 
the carceral throughout society. By stressing the linkages between people, punishment and 
places, this project has come to bear upon the wider yet intricate geographies of 
marginalisation within which people, punishment, and places are intimately connected, and 
how carcerality manifests within, throughout, and beyond these linkages. I also address the 
limitations of the study, and consider future considerations of this carceral work. By 
recognizing the carceral territories created and maintained in the homes of offenders allows 
us to see another example of how carceral states have been established in the West. Perhaps it 
is now time for future research and policy to critically reconsider whether the reduction, 
reversal, or outright razing of these carceral states is a warranted venture (for a further 
discussion of razing the carceral state, see Gottschalk, 2015). Connecting carceral territory to 





Recognizing Carceral Territory: A Step Towards Resisting the Spread of the 
Carceral State?  
As Mincke contends, immobilization “makes sense in the context of a society that prizes 
anchorages: family, nation, culture, class, country, or even the company, with every 
individual asked to stabilize in different spaces” (2017: 238; italics emphasized). To a certain 
extent, laying roots is part of the human experience: “to be human is to have and to know 
your place” (Cresswell, 2006: 31). Disciplining and social functioning could then be gained 
from “the assignment of a geographical, social, professional, and familial position” (Mincke, 
2017: 238). Compulsory rooting, such as that experienced by electronic monitoring (EM), 
could be seen as a way to prevent disorders inevitably arising from uncontrolled mobility; 
that is, from the uncontrolled mobility of those deemed incapable of moving responsibly, 
insofar a self-governing manner exists and is maintained within society (cf. Rose et al., 2006; 
Valverde, 2010). In effect, a carceral anchorage to the home would become necessary in 
order to ensure that those formerly incapable would become responsibilized and could be 
trusted to know how to move without additional supervision.  
Upon further inspection, however, we can see how the legitimation of the carceral anchorage 
to the home requires a comprehensive level of empirical scrutiny which this project has 
offered. As evidenced from this project, carceral territory constitutes the imposition of a 
particular punishment upon the offender, namely the targeting of the personal territories of 
the offender’s home or physical residence. While in theory the punishment is imposed only 
on the offender by the carceral state, my findings have suggested otherwise; in practice, the 
effects of carceral territory stretch out farther than merely the offender, coming into contact 
with and entrapping their loved ones in particular ways.  
Carceral scholarship in the realms of criminology, geography, and so forth are pushing at the 
boundary of the ‘carceral’ definition (Moran, 2017: 9). Although “incarceration” has 
conventionally come to refer to “the legal confinement of sentenced offenders under the 
jurisdiction of the state” (Moran, 2017: 8), carceral scholarship continues to examine and 
interrogate the myriad ways in which persons could be, and indeed are, confined by other 
means (such as unlawful imprisonment, kidnap, abduction, curfew, grounding), or even the 
means by which people could confine themselves (phobias, cultural practices, competing 
gang territories, and so on) (Moran, 2017: 8-9). Certainly, as this project has pointed out, a 
vast array of brilliant yet diverse carceral scholarship continues to reconsider the vast 
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latitudes of the ‘carceral.’ Through synthesizing and synergizing more sophisticated 
comprehensions of how these carceral geographies form, take place, and sustain themselves 
in our society, we are opening the bounds and taking a more lateral approach to interpreting 
the ‘carceral’ as not necessarily limited to state-sanctioned legal imprisonment (cf. Moran, 
2017). While such interpretations can include the conventional, state-sanctioned spaces of 
incarceration which hold sentenced prisoners, this is not an exhaustive approach to the 
carceral; interpretations also encompass “spaces of detention of refugees, noncitizens, asylum 
seekers, the trafficked, and the renditioned,” (Moran, 2017: 9) as well as “forms of 
confinement that burst internment structures and deliver carceral effects without physical 
immobilization” (Moran et al., 2013: 240) like EM, surveillance, and carceral territory. 
Therefore, carceral territory, as one form of confinement within the broad scope of carceral 
geography, is an apposite frame of reference to geographically contextualize the punishment 
of EM, inasmuch as it has the ability to manifest itself “in mobile notions of the carceral” 
(Moran, 2017: 9) and adhere to the much more personal and nuanced territories of 
individuals’ lives.  
 
Indeed, a more lateral approach to interpreting carcerality and mobility can be evidenced 
from each analysis chapter this project has undertaken. In a literal sense, moving between the 
analyses chapters of the project demonstrates how the use of movement takes carceral 
scholarship generally and carceral territory specifically into new directions of inquiry. In 
Chapter 6 ethnographic observations were conducted at the NEMC as a way in which to 
initiate a further examination of how the EM programme operated in Scotland. My 
observations allowed me to examine the relations between monitoring officers (MOs) 
working at the NEMC, as well as the organizational structures within the NEMC itself. It 
became clear that the MO work of sensing disruption, coupled with the responsibilization 
strategies and participatory surveillance witnessed in my field notes, were used to not only 
render monitored persons (MPs) visible, knowable, and locatable, but to ensure the order and 
maintenance of carceral territories out in the homes of MPs. Following on, Chapter 7 
examined the work of EM surveillance ‘on the ground,’ riding along with Angus in his car as 
he conducted his EM work. Calibrating carcerality through ‘ranging’ a home, as well as the 
carceral mobility of the G4S Scotland car itself, indicates how the physical movement to 
reach homes and install EM surveillance constitutes the material manifestation of the carceral 
state within the homes of MPs and their loved ones. Moving to Chapter 8 the project situates 
itself within HMP Edinburgh where I conducted semi-structured interviews with ten inmates. 
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Demonstrating wider reflections of power, space, and mobility, the commonsense and 
commonplace characteristics of EM as a carceral territory arose from conversations with 
inmates, as well as how aspects of timepass and penal waiting ensure compliance of the EM 
curfew. Inmates also experienced struggles of stigma, of sticking to home or to ‘watch-time.’ 
Taken in aggregate, these findings highlight how feelings of ‘sticking,’ or being ‘stuck’ in 
carceral territory run in a similar vein to aspects of carcerality experienced in the prison. In a 
real sense, the excluded became the stuck; stuck within lives which required assistance and 
support from social services they could not reach (both literally and figuratively speaking) on 
their own. Their experiences also shed light upon how routines changed for themselves and 
their loved ones; such a general freedom and mobility felt outside of curfew times and 
through transient living was especially felt in regards to the ‘unruly’ mobilities experienced 
by inmates moving back and forth betwixt and between the prison and their communities, 
caught within a carceral continuum with multi-scalar effects (cf. Wacquant, 2009, 2010, 
2012a, 2012b).  
 
In effect, the concept of carceral territory is further examined in various sites (the NEMC, the 
home, within inmates’ experiences), all of which suggests that carceral territory can be 
reasonably extended to EM as an apt frame of reference. Each chapter considers carceral 
territory amongst the politics and dynamics of mobility; by capturing the observations and 
experiences of carceral territory in a variety of ways, this concept supplements greater 
considerations of carceral mobilities within and beyond the larger discipline of carceral 
geography (cf. Turner and Peters, 2017). In addition, by moving across chapters this project 
offers evidence of and critiques the ways in which the normality of contemporary 
surveillance has developed and is experienced by and through the people, objects, and 
practices associated with the operation and management of EM surveillance in Scotland.  
 
Furthermore, this project provides a way in which to map out sites of power and knowledge 
(cf. Youngblood Jackson, 2013) where EM, as a surveillant technology, operates and 
monitors those it has been instructed to survey at the command of the state. Drawing upon 
carceral geography, criminology, and other cognate disciplines as this project as done 
reconsiders “how the multiplicity of carceral spaces ultimately work together to create the 
carceral society that is so common to modern day descriptions” (Brown, 2014: 386). Indeed, 
this project makes available a sort of cartography which highlights multiple forms of 
confinement and mobility (especially for those marginalized and/or incarcerated populations) 
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in the shadows of the carceral state (cf. Beckett and Murakawa, 2012), a process of tracing 
out some of the forces at play in the reproduction of the ‘carceral’ beyond the anchorage to 
the prison. The use of the private security firm G4S Scotland by the Scottish Government to 
monitor offenders in the community could be rightly argued as one tool of the carceral state’s 
arsenal; put differently, the penal arm of the state which is charged with the task of 
“containing the surplus populations constantly (re)produced by the neoliberal paradigm of 
capitalist development” (De Giorgi and Fleury-Steiner, 2017: 3). By recognizing the carceral 
territory created, sustained, and perpetuated in the homes of offenders in their communities, I 
seek to extend the critique of the carceral state in a direction which supplements the academic 
clarion call for greater attention towards the extension of carceral logics outside of prison 
walls and the larger, “punitive governance of social marginality through carceral expansion” 
(De Giorgi and Fleury-Steiner, 2017: 2). Indeed, the carceral state now includes not only a 
country’s “vast archipelago of jails and prisons but also the far-reaching and growing range 
of penal punishments and controls that lie in the never-never land between the gate of the 
prison and full citizenship” for the excluded of society (Gottschalk, 2014: 289). Notable 
scholars anticipated these penal developments (cf. Cohen, 1979, 1985; Feeley and Simon, 
1992; Simon, 2007), and fortunately there continues to be great interest in and concern for the 
dynamics and politics of carceral expansion (Lynch, 2001; see also Dolovich, 2011; Archer 
Alvaré, 2017; Coddington, 2017; Guenther, 2017; Headworth and Ossei-Owusu, 2017; 
Whetstone and Gowan, 2017).  
As De Giorgi and Fleury-Steiner (2017: 7) contend, current mainstream penal reform efforts 
have been aimed at reducing prison populations in the West, and coupled “with the support of 
corporate actors eager to capitalize on the resulting human surplus in poor and 
segregated…areas” and communities, such efforts are no more than “simply technocratic 
plans to rationalize the carceral apparatus—initiatives dictated by fiscal concerns over rising 
correctional expenditures rather than by any serious concern for the welfare of prisoners and 
of the dispossessed communities they come from” (De Giorgi and Fleury-Steiner, 2017: 7; 
see also Aviram, 2015; De Giorgi, 2015; 2017; Gottschalk, 2015). In this spirit, 
distinguishing carceral territory as an appropriate frame of reference for geographically 
contextualizing the monitoring practices and experiences of EM is to add to these 
discussions, as well as to further query the carceral state crisis as it exists. In a parallel vein to 
De Giorgi and Fleury-Steiner’s (2017) assertion, it becomes clear that only “a massive 
reinvestment in social welfare, public education, free health care, affordable housing, and a 
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guaranteed basic income—that is, a renewed struggle for the social wage—can begin to 
address the structural violence produced by a [carceral] system of neoliberal governance 
[now] rooted in the normalization of human disposability” (2017: 7). Certainly, we could do 
more to engage with civil society and rouse public interest in resisting the spread of the 
carceral throughout society. By considering carceral territory in the way the project has 
outlined, hopefully we can spark the flames of further public concern towards how we 
punish, who benefits by this punishment, and whether the punishment espoused by EM and 
the expanding carceral state is warranted, proportionate and appropriate in its delivery and 
application.  
Limitations of the Study  
While much has been examined from the present study, no research is immune from 
limitations. Indicating the limitations of this thesis project below can hopefully contribute to 
future directions in investigating the monitoring practices and experiences of EM offenders, 
as well as the continued spread of the carceral throughout society.  
 
First, while I have made significant attempts to acknowledge and be reflexively open-minded 
to the experiences the inmates at Her Majesty’s Prison (HMP) Edinburgh have shared, I do 
realize the epistemological ground I stand on while engaging in such research. As I indicated 
in Chapter 5, my standpoint impacts my perceptions of these inmates’ experiences, and while 
I have gained some understanding of their struggles—moving between the prison and their 
communities—my experiences are not relatable to theirs. This study only provides pieces and 
fragments of knowledge that my sample of respondents have chosen to share. Sharing the 
social-constructivist understanding of subjective ‘truths,’ I cannot make the claim that the 
study illustrates these inmates’ ontological experiences as a whole (Rapley, 2001) nor can I 
generalize the findings presented here to inmate populations across Scotland, let alone further 
afield. Furthermore, while it is true that my standpoint barricades my efforts to ‘truly’ 
understand the small sample’s experiences, I am not suggesting this research is all for naught. 
Instead, this research project highlights the importance of subjective experiences from 
various standpoints, and the attempts made by academic inquiry to bridge a relationship 
between researchers and the individuals we ask to engage in our research (Berger, 2013; 
Mallozzi, 2009). Doing so speaks to the significance of personal experiences that individuals 
can share when they move through similar life-course events (i.e. the incarceration period, 
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followed by release) and the need for researchers to examine how individuals understand 
themselves alongside their own experiences of carcerality (cf. Gacek, 2017, 2018). 
 
Second, the decision to have a purposive, snowball sample impacts the type of experiences 
mentioned in the interviews. In other words, while purposively seeking out individuals that 
have experienced EM was a main objective of the thesis project, it is noteworthy that in terms 
of such experiences, there is a potential that respondents with similar experiences will choose 
to participate in the study (cf. Flick, 2009), a caution to which I raised in Chapter 5. Indeed, 
similar experiences could alter the findings of the study in general. Similarly, I recognize the 
limitations of a sample recruited through snowballing techniques, insofar as inmates of HMP 
Edinburgh were encouraged to recruit others within the prison to participate in the study, and 
those willing to sit down for an interview were to notify Scottish Prison Service (SPS) 
Operations’ management of their interest. At the same time, SPS Operations’ management 
were encouraged by the researcher to compile a list of potential respondents for the study. As 
I relied on SPS Operations’ management to recruit respondents for the study, there is the 
chance that they would compile a list of respondents who may have similar experiences of 
EM. Therefore, while the benefits of purposive, snowball samples are simultaneously their 
own weaknesses (cf. Geddes et al., 2018; see also Yin, 2009, 2011), it is significant for 
researchers to acknowledge the benefits and costs of implementing such samples, and be 
cautiously aware of the experiences their participants share within the research encounters 
(Gacek, 2018). Doing so illustrates the need for future research to incorporate additional 
methods (i.e. surveys, questionnaires, diaries, journals, prison poetry and writings, etc.) to 
triangulate various sources of knowledge that illuminates experiences of incarceration and 
EM within inmate populations.  
 
Third, observations at both the NEMC (Chapter 6) and riding along with Angus (Chapter 7) 
can also become constrained by particular limitations. For example, seasonal weather 
conditions are conventionally largely beyond researcher control (cf. Finlay and Bowman, 
2017) and may limit access to EM operators and their locations. In particular, I did not have 
access to a car to make my own way to these research sites, and had to rely primarily on 
public transportation. Especially during the winter, sessions can be cold and difficult to 
access with snow and ice on roads and tracks, and sessions were timed with the NEMC 
research director to ensure travel modes that are more sheltered (i.e. buses and trains). In 
addition, when the days grow shorter in the winter months, observations may be limited in 
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terms of what I could see from Angus’ car. In effect, time of day is another important 
methodological consideration, as mobile ethnographies “generally capture a brief snapshot of 
local daily rhythm” (Finlay and Bowman, 2017: 271). Observations at the NEMC and riding 
along with Angus occurred during evening times where I was told by the NEMC research 
director more ‘activity’ takes place. Going forward researchers could repeat mobile 
ethnographies across a wider range of times to account for diverse rhythms in the field.  
 
Fourth, the sample of inmates interviewed in Chapter 8 was capped at ten, due to the time 
restraints of both the thesis project and degree completion. Furthermore, I began to reach data 
saturation towards the tenth interview, and while data saturation is generally a subjective 
limit imposed by the researcher (cf. Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Corbin and Strauss, 2015; 
Gentles et al., 2015) I recognize that there is a chance that a larger sample of inmates could 
alter the themes that had emerged from the interviews. While such a limitation may impact 
the other knowledges and experiences that could be shared, the significance of qualitative 
super quantitative research suggests that even a sample size of one person is still one person; 
a pebble dropped into a pond still has the potential to make waves, regardless of the size of 
waves the pebble produces. Human experience is crucial to such empirical work, as it can 
provide a significant amount of knowledge, information, and experience that enriches 
academic inquiry. Rather than assessing numbers and data trends, I sought to promote the 
humanness of the sample, the intricacies of experience, and the complexities embedded of 
being within our complicated, social world. 
 
Fifth, my own subjectivity, in terms of theoretical preferences and convictions in analyzing 
the emergent themes that arose from the inmate interviews is a potential limitation. In other 
words, contributions to criminological and geographical literature have outlined themes 
which could arise when observing surveillant technologies through institutional ethnography 
(cf. Smith, 2008, 2014) as well as speaking to offenders about EM experiences (cf. 
Hucklesby, 2008, 2009, 2011, 2013). While at the same time, however, I felt it necessary that 
within data analysis I remain open to the experiences my respondents share. The themes that 
theory determines and what themes emerge in practice can be a difficult balancing act for 
researchers, and while this academic project attempted this balancing act, the themes that 
arose are not an exhaustive list. There is the potential for existing themes that this academic 
project has not recognized. Therefore, it is important for researchers to balance theory and 
practice the best they can, as doing so opens up fascinating observations within making sense 
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of carceral and compliance work, respectively, which inevitably enhances academic inquiry 
going forward.  
 
Sixth, it is significant that the respondents interviewed had been recruited from HMP 
Edinburgh. Therefore, recruiting a sample of inmates from a particular prison may impact the 
findings that arose from the experiences inmates shared, as the requirements for admission to 
the prison may have produced more of a homogeneity in the sample than might otherwise have 
been the case.  
 
Seventh and final, the choice of venue to conduct inmate interviews may impact the 
experiences shared by the respondents. As mentioned above, while researchers must be aware 
of sampling techniques to recruit participants, the location for the interview must be 
acknowledged when examining the respondents’ experiences (cf. Moran et al., 2017). As 
indicated in Chapter 5, HMP Edinburgh provided me with a small office in their building so 
that I could interview my sample of respondents. Ideally, the office was to be convenient for 
both the participants and myself as it located within the prison itself. However, the fact that 
the location of the interviews took place within the same building could impact their 
experiences of returning to their communities upon release and returning to the prison once 
respondents breached their EM curfews. While I had made it clear to my sample that I did not 
represent the HMP Edinburgh, Scottish Prison Service (SPS) or G4S Scotland, some 
respondents indicated before our conversations that they thought if they answered all of my 
questions they would be available for EM again. I made it clear before the interviews began 
that my work bears no affiliation to such organizations or such ideas. Therefore, it is 
important for researchers to acknowledge the spaces they use to conduct their interviews, 
especially when it appears that particular criminal justice institutions have connections with 
the respondents-as-inmates or respondents-as-clients. Such decisions may impact the findings 
that arise from the interviewing process.  
 
Implications of the Study  
Reconsidering EM as a form of carceral territory is a fascinating empirical endeavour. Much 
like the carceral state, this reconsideration merits further examination in where the current 
trajectory of EM surveillance is taking us. In this spirit, I address several implications and 
directions of my research below.  
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From the outset it is no mystery that the situation of the carceral states in the USA and the 
UK have become “a frightening colossus of confinement” (Aviram, 2014: 413), and to 
resolve this situation one could argue that EM has been legitimated as a viable alternative to 
increase diversion and decarceration and to decrease incarceration rates and costs (cf. Nellis, 
2013c, 2015; Nellis et al., 2013; Graham and McIvor, 2016). While I recognize this argument 
as a fruitful endeavour to deal with mass incarceration in the West, I query whether a focus 
upon population rates and costs of prison on the one end and EM on the other merely 
obscures the underlying culture of control pervading our understanding of punishment (cf. 
Garland, 2001). As Kato (2017: 198) contends, even though demands in the West to 
dismantle mass incarceration “are increasingly gaining traction, it will not necessarily lead to 
a reduction of the carceral state.” Emerging trends which centre on surveillance and security, 
coupled with how policy-making is negotiated and social upheavals are managed, puts more 
of the onus upon the controlling aspects associated with the carceral state and less upon the 
enclosing characteristics of traditional incarceration. Therefore, declines in incarceration and 
increases in EM “should be seen as more of a realignment than an end to the carceral state” 
(Kato, 2017: 198; see also Simon, 2007) and while people may elude incarceration it is 
through EM that “they are nevertheless enmeshed within a carceral web that is more 
widening and diffuse” (Kato, 2017: 217; italics emphasized). Cognitive assumptions, 
normative commitments, and emotional sensibilities continues to coordinate crime and social 
control of our society in such a way that reshapes how we feel about marginalized groups and 
how they are made to feel punished, excluded, isolated, mobile, immobile, or stuck within the 
carceral web in numerous ways. Whether we are debating the use of prison versus the use of 
EM, such penalties merely represent two sides of the same coin; that is, the legitimation of 
the carceral state’s continued management of impoverished and marginalized groups with 
little to no consideration of ameliorating these social issues outright. At the end of the day, 
EM is no horse of a different colour; it represents a form of confinement similar to the prison 
while simultaneously widens the carceral web across a diverse range of geographic scales, 
and does nothing to assist or support the excluded in a meaningful way that could lead to 
their actual inclusion in our society.  
Indeed, the USA and the UK have become archetypes of carcerality, and I contend that we 
are now faced with current carceral circumstances so dire that it seems we have no choice but 
to reconsider where EM, as a creative extension and penal arm of the carceral state, seems to 
be taking us. Such a consideration begs questions about the path of punishment we are 
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venturing down at the behest of the carceral state and whether we continue to trek the path 
any further. In other words, what are the ethical ramifications of continuing the EM 
programme in Scotland? It is crucial that in answering this question everything is done to 
assure that offenders, in prison or upon release, are no longer a threat to themselves or to 
society. In effect, policies and programmes which emphasize therapeutic integrity and the 
principles of effective intervention should be intended to not only assist offenders, but also 
their loved ones, ranging from parents and children to neighbours and their communities as a 
whole (Sparks and Gacek, forthcoming; see also Lipsey, 2003; Petersilia, 2003). EM as a 
standalone punitive measure does nothing to assist the needs of the offender—simply 
returning the offender to their community without proper supports in place merely band aids 
a wound that requires greater attention. Should we decide that EM be allowed to expand 
further (both in technological prowess and punitive means) it must be paired with appropriate 
social policies and programmes which directly redress the actual needs of the offender.  
In addition, EM as it exists does nothing to redress the collateral effects of imprisonment 
imposed upon the loved ones of the offender. While I remain mindful that such redress may 
neither be within the nature of the technology nor the parameters of its use (cf. Bülow, 2014), 
greater attention must be accorded towards public involvement, both at the initial stages of 
expanding EM as well as its rescission. A very real task becomes how to create “a more 
receptive political environment” (Gottschalk, 2015: 44) for all citizens within modern, liberal 
democracies, for law-abiding and offenders alike. Greater public involvement would allow 
citizenry to reconsider both penal reforms and policies as well as the “the far-reaching 
consequences of the carceral state[,]” making both EM and the current situation of their 
carceral state “leading political and public policy issues” (Gottschalk, 2015: 44).  
Direct human vulnerability maintained by the carceral state mandates more comprehensive 
forms of public participation to resist it. In other words, the impact further expansion of EM 
will have upon the dignity and integrity of offenders requires greater consideration by the 
general public than those more impersonal domains of governmental contracts and control 
concerning, for example, the construction and maintenance of roads and bridges, or 
predictable service contracts where revenues and expenses may be more definitive in nature. 
In Scotland this has taken the form of a proposed legislative Bill made available for comment 
by the Scottish Government. The Management of Offenders (Scotland) Bill was introduced in 
Scottish Parliament in early 2018 and is currently under consultation by various stakeholders, 
experts, and the public. The proposed Bill is separated into two parts, the first part referring 
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to EM and the second to the disclosure of convictions (Management of Offenders (Scotland) 
Bill, 2018). It is expected that Part 1 of the Bill, if passed, will enable EM to be play a greater 
role in the Scottish criminal justice system, especially with the introduction of Global 
Positioning Satellite (GPS) technology to work in tandem with Scotland’s current use of 
Radio Frequency (RF)-based EM (cf. Weaver and Graham, 2018). However, there exists 
some concern for the potential for ‘net-widening’ (arguably, even carceral ‘web-widening’) 
especially as GPS technology would further allow authorities to prevent tagged individuals 
from entering specific locations and where the GPS exclusion zones can be tailored in size, 
“from a house, to a specific street pattern, to a neighbourhood, to a whole city” (Green, 2018: 
n.p.). In effect, there is an enduring need to observe the principle of proportionality and 
adhere to European ethical standards (cf. Nellis, 2013c, 2015) in future uses of EM in 
Scotland, as punitive and disproportionate uses of EM in some other jurisdictions “have 
proven counter-productive” (Weaver and Graham, 2018: 2; see also Graham and McIvor, 
2015).  
Unfortunately, mounting fiscal pressures alone will not be enough to spur communities and 
governments to make significant shifts in how they perceive punishment in nature, form, and 
function. The ‘carceral clawback’ has become so tenacious (cf. Carlen, 2002) that as the 
carceral state has grown “so has the political clout and political acumen of groups, 
institutions, and organizations with vested economic interests in maintaining [it]” 
(Gottschalk, 2015: 35). Indeed, the further privatization of corrections is another issue worth 
considering, especially as it has been a longstanding focus of scholars and policymakers alike 
(cf. Lindsey et al., 2016). While the bulk of privatization has predominantly focused on 
private prisons, privatization is slowly permeating all of corrections (Lindsey et al., 2016; 
Sparks and Gacek, forthcoming). Drawing attention to significant philosophical and ethical 
concerns of expanding the privatization of corrections generally and the privatization of EM 
specifically also paints a worrisome picture of its potential effects on the marginalized in 
society (cf. Nellis, 2006; Bülow, 2014; Sparks and Gacek, forthcoming). Besides prison 
guards’ unions, correctional departments at federal or state level(s), law enforcement groups, 
and financial firms, the private corrections industry is another entity which devises bonds and 
other mechanisms to fund and/or ensure the persistence of the carceral state and particular 
forms of punishment (Gottschalk, 2015). While each may have their own vested interests in 
the carceral state, it is certain that the predominant correctional philosophy of incapacitation 
(either through conventional incarceration or EM) omnipotently looms overhead. One could 
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argue that our entire penal system based on rational choice and issues of cost (Cullen et al., 
2002) and that privatization adheres to this dominant correctional philosophy to survive. And 
while such vested interests were not the main catalysts for the origins of the carceral state, 
they have certainly become major impediments to reducing prison populations significantly, 
to reining in the carceral state, and to the public’s involvement in reconsidering why certain 
forms of punishment in our society are allowed to persist, regardless of whether this be 
through the private or public sector (Gottschalk, 2015; Sparks and Gacek, forthcoming). The 
construction of the carceral state resulted from a complex set of developments: “No single 
factor explains its rise, and no single factor will bring about its demise” (Gottschalk, 2015b: 
34). Indeed, the resiliency of the carceral state is attributed mainly to its elasticity, insofar as 
“the various permutations of the carceral state suggests that it is informed by and contours 
itself around the ways in which the economic, political, and social structures interrelate to 
each other at different moments in time” (Kato, 2017: 217).  
However, while the carceral state may be exceptional in its size and tenacity, “many of the 
political, economic, and social forces that sustain it and stand in the way of genuine penal 
reform are not” (Gottschalk, 2015b: 39). Going forward, research and policy need to continue 
to critically query and examine how particular forms of punishment are legitimated through 
society’s “deep attachment to [punishment] and its centrality within our culture, vocabulary, 
and sensibilities” (Sparks, 1994:19). Only then can we reconsider EM’s place within the 
carceral state’s arsenal of penalties to impose upon offenders.  
Finally, it is through carceral territory that we witness how EM practices and measures of the 
carceral state move beyond traditional spaces of detention and confinement and work their 
way into everyday space of the offender (Fishwick and Wearing, 2017: 49). It becomes clear 
that such hyperincarceration not only enables constraint within the penal and remand 
institutions but also governs socio-spatial movements outside of such places of confinement.  
In this light, techniques of incarceration that manifest in the local community and in wider 
society “are now possible in unprecedented ways that were not feasible in earlier periods due 
to lack of infrastructure and technology for security” (Fishwick and Wearing, 2017: 49). Such 
techniques could expand and include technologies which reify aspects of carcerality in a 
multitude of ways, like “DNA analysis; high-powered satellite surveillance cameras; Taser 
guns; electronic tracking devices; Internet surveillance; and new security forces…introduced 
to police migration and ‘terrorism’” (Fishwick and Wearing, 2017: 49). As Brown (2014: 
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386) argues, “a geographically expansive understanding of the carceral opens up 
incarceration as a multi-institutional, fluid, and indeterminate practice.”   
Arguably such creative carceral extensions could also be described in part as ‘pre-emptive’; 
that is, EM, whether it be through the private or public sector, is but one measure among 
many within the shift from prevention of crime to pre-emption of crime and future risk 
(Zedner, 2007; see also McCullouch and Pickering, 2009; Jochelson et al., 2017 for other 
examples of the precrime shift). This shift is indicative of a new set of social ordering 
practices and, arguably, creates and maintains carceral territories alongside “liminal carceral 
spaces and new forms of mobilities that engage communities…and individuals” (Fishwick 
and Wearing, 2017: 51). An example of this shift is found in the work of Mincke and 
Lemonne (2014). The authors examined the Prison Act of 2005 enacted in Belgium to 
observe what the effects have been on offenders since the passing of the Act, and how the 
Act’s passing has developed and legitimized ‘punitive procedures’ in the community. 
“Traceability” was indicated in their study (Mincke and Lemonne, 2014: 545), in which the 
potentiality of the panoptic gaze—that is, highlighting a ‘potential gaze’ over an actual, 
constant gaze—had become developed and legitimized through various surveillance 
mechanisms, such as GPS tracking, changes in parole conditions, and required attendance to 
counselling and social service resource centres. Moreover, the exponential increase of 
‘surveillance archives’ has been a significant punitive procedure, insofar as the potentially 
infinite accumulation of data—through the resources offenders either seek out on their own 
or are parole-mandated to attend, and the places and spaces they habituate (or avoid) in the 
community—renders these individuals traceable and, arguably, knowable through preemptive 
or potential monitoring (Mincke and Lemonne 2014). Indeed, traceability affirms the 
continuity of carceral space, all the while maintaining the mastery of the situation. In essence, 
the power gained through traceability opens up new types of knowledges, from forecasting 
possibilities of recidivism by tracking various indicators to criminal career analyses and 
constructing models that predict situations of violence (Mincke and Lemonne, 2014). It is no 
longer the question of understanding, as the authors suggest, but rather the possibility of 
anticipating offenders’ actions slightly ahead of time in order to maintain continuity, both in 
control and in a permanent state of monitoring. Therefore, further carceral scholarship needs 
to continue to engage with these extensions of the carceral state as they come into contact 




Concluding Remarks  
By exploring the novel application of carceral territory within the EM programme of 
Scotland, this project presents a pertinent frame of reference to reconsider both the micro-
scale complexities of daily life for EM operators and offenders, as well as the macro shifts in 
carcerality spreading across society. To query the spread of the carceral throughout society 
also asks us whether such spread can be reduced, resisted, or halted altogether. Recognizing 
the carceral as it persists in the everyday spaces of life seams together embodied experiences 
across various sites and scales of carcerality (for example, the NEMC, the prison, and the 
home). Such a recognition also calls into question the politics of mobility, the geographies 
betwixt and between the carceral state, and the normality of surveillance (EM or otherwise) 
that extends its pervasive and insidious reach into the lives of the marginalized. Indeed, taken 
together my ethnographic observations and the experiences of inmates attest to such 
carcerality through a closer exploration of EM.  
Furthermore, while my own research attempts to investigate the meanings, interpretations and 
representations of carcerality in its various forms (Woolford and Gacek, 2016; Gacek, 2017, 
2018), it cannot be accomplished without the experiences my respondents have chosen to 
share. While sharing certain commonalities in terms of demographic information, these 
inmate experiences are intricately complex, with separate life-course events that make their 
narratives and perspectives unique. My ethnographic observations shed light on other 
significant realms of EM in Scotland. However such observations should not overshadow 
respondents’ experiences, but rather work in concert with them. The experiences presented 
here are the respondent’s stories, and they deserve to be shared and discussed, rather than 
discredited, neglected, or silenced. Inviting these respondents to speak does not merely voice 
their concerns to a broader audience. Rather, their words in concert with this study are more 
than a mere contribution to carceral scholarship and wider discussions of EM, but to the 
growing concern for ameliorating the unfortunate circumstances of the marginalized, 
monitored, and/or incarcerated in our society.  
Coalescing my findings together produces a more nuanced appreciation and concern for 
carceral territory and our current carceral age. If we are to accept that “the very purpose of 
producing knowledge about the social world is to change it” (Garland and Young, 1983: 32) 
then we must continue to query the carceral state as it exists. Bigger questions must be now 
asked of the direction the carceral state is taking us, and hopefully with the aid of my 
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Appendix A: Informed Consent for Scottish Prison Service 
Participants  
 
Project Title: Emplacing Compliance: Experiences of Electronic Monitoring Practices in 
Scotland  
Researcher: James Gacek, Postgraduate Student, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh Law 
School  
Phone: +44 7491 122232  
Email: J.Gacek@sms.ed.ac.uk  
 
This consent form, a copy of which will be left with you for your records and reference, is 
only part of the process of informed consent. It should give you the basic idea of what the 
research is about and what your participation will involve.  If you would like more detail 
about something mentioned here, or information not included here, you should feel free to 




James Gacek is from the University of Edinburgh and is interested in learning about your 
experiences of being electronically monitored with a G4S Scotland ‘tag,’ especially in terms 
of the impact compliance has had on your relationships with family, friends, community and 
G4S Scotland, the struggles you face(d) before, during, and after curfews; and whether you 
feel attached to your neighborhood and community.   
 
Participation in this study will involve either an in-person or phone interview conducted by 
the researcher of the study. The interview will take approximately 60 minutes. If the 
interview takes place over the phone, the interview will be recorded through handwritten 
notes. If the interview takes place in-person, the interview will be audio-recorded on a 
digital recorder and transcribed. In the case of the latter, the interviewer will request that 
you permit him to digitally record your conversation, but if you object the interviewer will 
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transcribe it by hand. The interviewer will ask you questions about your 
background/demographics and what you see as your physical, mental and emotional needs 
and challenges throughout your experiences of electronic monitoring. Your participation in 
the interview is voluntary and you do not have to participate in an interview if you don’t 
want to. You can stop the interview at any time and you are free to not answer any question 
you don’t want to. Your decision to participate or not participate will in no way affect your 
relationship with the Scottish Prison Service, other institutions or agencies, or any services 
that you receive.  
 




Any information that could identify you personally will be kept confidential. The audio-
recordings of the interviews will be downloaded to a computer file that is password 
protected. The audio-recording device will be wiped following download to computer. No 
names or names of agencies (aside from G4S Scotland) or businesses will be included in the 
transcript. Geographical setting such as names of cities, towns, villages and communities 
may be named, but any identifying information which ties the participant to their specific 
neighbourhood will not be included. The transcripts and consent forms will be number 
coded and stored separately in locked cabinets at the researcher’s university office. These 
consent forms and the transcripts will be stored separately so no one can link your name to 
your interview information. Only the researcher himself will ever be able to see your 
interview. All of the transcripts, recordings and consent forms will be destroyed after the 
completion of the data collection. This will at the completion of the project, with the latest 
completion date of November 2019. Please note that the researcher is required by law to 
report current criminal offenses, illegal behaviours/activities, and current and past 
unreported child abuse or situations dangerous to children to the proper Authorities. These 





The information you give will be combined with information collected from other 
participants.  A summary of the results from the interviews will be prepared for a thesis 
project concerning Scottish Prison Service participant and G4S Scotland service provider 
perceptions on compliance and electronic monitoring practices, and a more detailed summary 
will be supplied to the Scottish Prison Service and G4S Scotland for distribution. In addition, 
electronic copies will be provided to the agencies for posting on their websites to download. 
These summaries will be available in November 2019.  
 
The findings of this study will be disseminated in aggregate (group) form only through 
reports prepared by the researcher, journal articles, conference presentations and 
presentations to community organizations and institutions. No names or identifying 
information will be included in the findings.  
 
Risks and Benefits: 
There is the potential of risk from participating in this research. Participants may feel 
emotional or psychological stress from recounting their experiences of electronic 
monitoring. The Scottish Prison Service has offered to assist you if you require further 
counselling.  
 
There may be a short-term benefit to you in terms of having an opportunity to tell a 
concerned listener about the challenges and needs of compliance and electronic monitoring 
practices. In the long term, you may benefit if the findings of the research help persuade 
government officials and other policy-makers to change in a positive direction policies that 
directly affect you. 
Consent:  
Your signature on this form indicates that you have understood to your satisfaction the 
information regarding participation in the research project and agree to participate as a 
subject.  In no way does this waive your legal rights nor release the researcher or involved 
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institutions from their legal and professional responsibilities. You are free to withdraw from 
the interview at any time, even after it begins, and /or refrain from answering any questions 
you prefer to omit, without prejudice or consequence.  Your continued participation should 
be as informed as your initial consent, so you should feel free to ask for clarification or new 
information throughout your participation. 
 
A copy of this consent form has been given to you to keep for your records and reference. 
If you agree to participate in this interview, please place your name and signature in the 
appropriate spaces below. 
 
I ____________________________________________ (print name) understand what the 
study is about and what participation involves and the signature below means that I agree 
to participate. 
 
_________________________________________               _______________________ 
 (signature)         (date) 
 
_________________________________________                _________________________ 
(signature of interviewer)     (date) 
 
Email or surface email address to which a summary of findings and written reports (at your 






Appendix B: Interview Guide for Scottish Prison Service Participants  
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this interview. In this project, I am interested in 
learning about your experiences of being electronically monitored with a G4S Scotland ‘tag,’ 
especially in terms of the impact your family, friends, community and G4S Scotland has in 
assisting your compliance, the struggles you face(d) before, during, and after curfew; and 
whether you feel attached to your neighborhood and community.    
The first set of questions deal with your background. 
How old are you?  
Do you identify with a specific race or ethnicity?  
What level of schooling did you complete?  
Are you presently in a relationship? For how long?  
Do you have any children? How many and what are their ages? 
Where did you grow up? 
 
The next set of questions deal with your perception of community re-entry and 
reintegration with the monitoring ‘tag.’ 
Can you tell me what a typical day looked like for you before the ‘tag’ was attached to you? 
(i.e. your routine or schedule) 
What were the hardest things you had to deal with once the ‘tag’ was attached to you? How 
did you manage to cope? 
Did you have a lot of supports in the community when you were released? What did that 
involve? 
Was it difficult for you to comply with the conditions of being monitored? Why or why not? 
What activities would you do when the curfew was in place? Did these activities help you 
comply with the curfew? Why or why not?  
Did the change in curfew times change your activities, routines and schedule? In what ways?  
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When the curfew was not in place, where would you spend most of your time? Describe these 
spaces/areas for me. 
Do you think that being monitored with the ‘tag’ has changed you as a person? In what ways? 
Do you feel the need to hide the fact that you have been ‘tagged’? Why or why not? 
 
We will now move on to questions about the neighbourhood and (city, town, 
village) where you presently live.  
Which city, town, village or community do you live in? Have you always lived there? Why or 
why not?  
(If not always lived there) What was it like when you first moved here?  
What impression do you think people outside your area have of it? 
a) When have you encountered this?  
How has it changed?  
How would you describe your neighbourhood? Has the area gotten better/worse?  
Do you think it would be easy to move into your area (now and in the past)?  
 
The next set of questions discuss your perceptions of problems and safety in 
your area.  
Do you think there are problems living in your area? If so, what are they?  
Who deals with these problems in your area? Who do you think should be dealing with these 
problems?  
Have you or your neighbours ever tried to intervene?  
What do you think of the work of the police in your area? 
What do you think of government agencies (e.g. housing, social services) in your area?  
Do you feel safe in your area? Why?  
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a) walking at night, in the day time, when talking to people who are not from your area, when 
talking to others living in your area?  
b) compared to other areas of (your city, town, village), centre of (your city, town, village), 
neighbouring areas? 
c) compared to other estates where you have lived, or when visiting estates by other 
community members?  
 
We’ll now move onto our final set of questions which deal with your 
perception of the future of your area.  
What do you think your area will be like in five years’ time? Will you stay? Why or why not?  
Do you feel attached to your area?  
Do you feel like you belong in your area?  
Do you feel like the residents of your area share the same values as you?  
If you ran or oversaw your area, what would you do to sort out or deal with its problems?  
Is there anything you would like to add that you think I have not asked you about or think 
that I don’t understand?  
 
Thank you very much for your time and contribution to my research.  
 
 
 
